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Abstract
This thesis studies negation in logic and deductive databases. Among other
things, two kinds of negation are discussed in detail: strong negation and nonmono-
tonic negation.
In the logic part, we have constructed a rst-order logic CF
0
of strong negation
with bounded quantiers. The logic is based on constructive logics, in particular,
Thomason's logic CF. However, unlike constructive logic, quantiers in our system
as in Thomason's are static rather than dynamic. For the logicCF
0
, the usual Kripke
formal semantics is dened but based on situations instead of conventional possible
worlds. A sound and complete axiomatic system of CF
0
is established based on
the axiomatic systems of constructive logics with strong negation and Thomason's
completeness proof techniques. CF
0
is proposed as the underlying logic for situation
theory. Thus the connection between CF
0
and infon logic is briey discussed.
In the database part, based on the study of some main existing semantic theories
for logic programs with nonmonotonic negation, we have dened a novel semantics
of logic programs called quasi-stable semantics. An important observation is that a
nonmonotonic negation such as is required for logic programs should be computed
by a nonmonotonic, revision process. Only a process that allows one to withdraw by
revising provisionally held negative information can hope to be adequate to model
a non-monotonic negation. In light of this, we propose a model of negation that
owes much to the stable semantics but allows, through a mechanism of consistency-
recovery, for just this withdrawal of previously assumed negative information. It
has been proved that our new semantics maintains the desired features of both
the well-founded semantics and the stable model semantics while overcoming their
shortcomings. In addition, the quasi-stable semantics has been generalised to logic
programs with both strong negation and nonmonotonic negation, giving rise to the
quasi-answer set semantics.
i
Acknowledgments
I should like to thank my supervisor, Peter Mott for his direction, supervision,
criticism and encouragement throughout the whole process of my study. Without his
valued help, I would have not studied at Leeds, let alone nish the thesis. Thanks
also to my advisor, Professor Tony Cohn for his encouragement and instructive
advice.
There have been many other people giving me various kinds of timely help in
one way or another in my life. I should like to thank them too.
Finally I wish thank and acknowledge funding from an Overseas Research Stu-
dents (ORS) Award (#ORS-95023007), a Tetley & Lupton Scholarship, a Leeds
University Foundation Scholarship, and a departmental grant.
ii
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Negation in Logic : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 2
1.1.1 Negation in Classical Logic : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 2
1.1.2 Negation in Intuitionistic Logic : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 3
1.1.3 Negation in Constructive Logics : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 4
1.2 Situation Theory and Negation : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 6
1.3 Negation in Deductive Databases : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 8
1.4 Outline of the Thesis : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 10
2 Negation in First-order Logic 14
2.1 Two levels of rst-order logic : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 14
2.2 Failure vs Inconsistency : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 16
2.2.1 Negation as Failure to Support : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 17
2.2.2 Negation as Inconsistency : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 18
2.3 Two-valued vs Three-valued : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 21
2.3.1 Two-valuedness : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 21
2.3.2 Three-valuedness : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 23
2.4 Non-persistence vs Monotonicity : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 25
2.4.1 Non-persistence : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 26
2.4.2 Monotonicity : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 27
iii
2.5 Concluding Remark : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 28
3 First-Order Logic CF
0
29
3.1 Constructive Logics with Strong Negation : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 30
3.2 Motivations behind Logic CF
0
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 30
3.2.1 Dynamic vs. Static Quantiers : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 31
3.2.2 Expanding vs Constant Domains of Quantication : : : : : : : 32
3.2.3 From Thomason's Logic CF to Our Variant CF
0
: : : : : : : 34
3.3 Logical System CF
0
With Strong Negation : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 36
3.3.1 Language L of CF
0
. : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 36
3.3.2 Persistent Formulas : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 38
3.3.3 Formal Semantics : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 40
3.3.4 Axiomatic System for CF
0
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 45
3.3.5 Derived Rules for CF
0
. : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 47
3.4 Completeness of CF
0
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 50
3.5 First-Order Logic CF
0
and Infon Logic : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 55
4 Deductive Databases 58
4.1 From Relational to Deductive Databases : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 58
4.2 Logic Programs and Deductive Databases : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 61
4.3 Why Negation? : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 65
4.3.1 Nonmonotonicity of not : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 70
4.3.2 Strong Negation in Logic Programs : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 72
5 Non-monotonic Negation 74
5.1 Introduction : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 75
5.2 Semantics for Denite Logic Programs : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 76
5.3 Program Completion and Negation as Failure : : : : : : : : : : : : : 79
iv
5.4 Fitting Semantics : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 81
5.5 Closed World Assumption : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 84
5.6 Well-founded Semantics : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 88
5.7 Stable Semantics : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 95
5.7.1 Two-valued Stable Semantics : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 95
5.7.2 Three-valued Stable Semantics : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 100
6 Quasi-stable Semantics 105
6.1 The Quasi-stable Semantics : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 106
6.1.1 Informal description of the Quasi-stable semantics : : : : : : : 106
6.1.2 Formal Denition of Quasi-stable Semantics : : : : : : : : : : 110
6.2 Properties of Quasi-stable Semantics : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 118
6.3 Examples : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 124
6.4 Discussion : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 128
6.4.1 Supportedness : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 128
6.4.2 Inference Forms in the Quasi-stable Semantics : : : : : : : : : 130
6.5 Related Work : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 132
6.5.1 WFS Extensions : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 132
6.5.2 Stable Model Semantics and Its Variants : : : : : : : : : : : : 133
6.6 Concluding Remarks : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 135
7 Quasi-stable Semantics with Strong Negation 136
7.1 Strong Negation in Logic Programs : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 137
7.2 Extended Logic Programs : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 138
7.3 Semantics of Extended Programs : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 140
7.3.1 The Answer Set Semantics : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 140
7.3.2 The Quasi-answer Set Semantics : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 142
7.4 Why Not Classical Negation? : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 145
v
7.5 Knowledge Representation Using Strong Negation : : : : : : : : : : : 147
7.6 Relation between Strong Negation and Non-monotonic Negation : : : 150
8 Conclusions and Future Work 153
8.1 Conclusions : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 153
8.1.1 Strong Negation : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 153
8.1.2 Nonmonotonic Negation : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 154
8.2 Further Work : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 155
8.2.1 Possible Extensions of CF
0
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 155
8.2.2 Issues Relevant to the Quasi-stable Semantics : : : : : : : : : 156
8.2.2.1 Non-WFE-based Quasi-stable Semantics : : : : : : : 156
8.2.2.2 Non-ground Quasi-stable Semantics : : : : : : : : : : 157
8.2.2.3 Implementation of the Quasi-stable Semantics : : : : 158
vi
Chapter 1
Introduction
The notion of negation is basic not only to any formal or informal logic system (see
[43]) but also to logic programming and deductive databases (see [87]). Historically,
there were serious objections against the use of negation in intuitionistic mathemat-
ics by Griss (see [56] and related citations there). However, it was argued by Heyt-
ing [56] that, without negation, there would be no calculus of propositions because
only true propositions make sense, and thus the logic of negationless mathematics
would be dicult to formalise. In the contexts of logic programming and deductive
databases, logic programs without negation would have a limited expressive power
(see [1]). Thus we take it for granted that the use of negation is indispensable.
Our task is to have a good understanding of negation from the logical and prag-
matic viewpoints. In this introductory chapter, we have a brief informal look at
various kinds of negation in dierent logics, in logic programming, and in deductive
databases. We assume basic familiarity with logic, and logic programming.
1
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1.1 Negation in Logic
1.1.1 Negation in Classical Logic
In logic, the most important form of negation is probably the negation in classical
rst-order logic, called classical negation. The importance of classical negation de-
rives from the importance of classical rst-order logic, which has been widely applied
to various subjects, including mathematics and its foundations, physics, computer
science, etc.
Informally, classical negation as a unary operator expresses something like \it is
not the case that ... " in natural language. A negative sentence :p is true whenever
p is false, and false whenever p is true.
It is worth noting that the above simple form of classical negation is based on the
assumption that any sentence is either true or false, which in turn is connected with
the two basic assumptions implicitly made in the semantics of rst-order logic. One
is that every name in a rst-order language must refer to an object in the domain of
quantication, that is there are no denotation failures. We call this the denotation
assumption. The other is that all predicates p(x) are completely dened in the sense
that for any individual a, p(a) is either true or false. In other words, models used in
rst-order logic are assumed to represent a complete scenario of states of the whole
world. We shall call the second assumption the completeness assumption. Under
these two assumptions, rst-order logic is semantically two-valued. A rst-order
sentence is either true or false. On this the bivalence is built the notion of classical
negation: the negation of a true sentence is false, and the negation of a false sentence
is true. An important feature of classical negation is that it satises the principle
of the excluded third and the principle of the double negation.
The two semantic assumptions, among other things, have been criticised from
dierent perspectives. Free logic and partial logic have resulted by dropping one or
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both of the assumptions respectively (see [14] and [18]). The denotation assumption
is somewhat philosophical. From the database viewpoint, we need not worry about
it. By restricting interpretations to Herbrand interpretations, this assumption will
be automatically satised. As to the completeness assumption, we shall argue that
it is not necessary to give up the simple bivalence of classical rst-order logic if we
drop the assumption. We shall show this in the next chapter.
1.1.2 Negation in Intuitionistic Logic
The use of classical logic, though spread wide, is not without any problems even
in mathematics itself. We mentioned in the previous section that criticism of the
semantic assumptions of rst-order logic resulted in two non-classical logics: free
logic and partial logic. The principle of the excluded middle is criticised from the
Brouwerian constructive approach to mathematics, known as intuitionism
1
.
One of basic tenets behind intuitionism is that any mathematical proposition
must have a mathematical construction with certain given properties. A proposi-
tion p is asserted if we have a mathematical construction of the proposition; and
a negative proposition  p can be asserted if and only if there is a construction
which from the assumption that a construction for p were carried out leads to a
contradiction. Furthermore, all other logical connectives and quantiers also need a
constructive meaning. As a result, the principle of the excluded middle cannot be
acceptable from the constructive viewpoint (see [56], pp. 97-99, [13], pp. 404-408,
and [100], pp. 8-11).
Interestingly, through the work of Gentzen [50], it is known that the natural
deduction system for intuitionistic logic can be obtained by removing just the prin-
ciple of the excluded middle from the natural deduction system for classical logic.
1
For an introduction to intuitionism, see [56], and for a concise but more comprehensive survey
to various principal constructivist schools, see [100].
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The resulting negation, which we shall call intuitionistic negation, is stronger than
classical negation.
Along with the principle of the excluded middle, the other classical principles
of double negation, de Morgan, etc have also to be partially dismissed from intu-
itionistic logic. For example, it is known that intuitionistic logic has the disjunction
property (see [102]):
p _ q is provable i p is provable or q is provable.
But the following does not hold for intuitionistic logic:
:(p ^ q) is provable i :p is provable or :q is provable,
which seems necessary for a truly constructive negation. Because of this unsymmet-
ric characteristic, we may say that intuitionistic negation does not completely adhere
to constructivity despite its constructive demand for negatively asserted mathemat-
ical propositions. This shortcoming and other undesirable features of intuitionistic
negation have been overcome by another kind of negation, called strong negation
which we discuss in the next subsection.
1.1.3 Negation in Constructive Logics
In the logic community, strong negation was introduced by Nelson [76], based on a
distinction between two proof methods for the negation of a sentence: a sentence
can be refuted either by reductio ad absurdum or by construction of a counter-
example. Essentially, strong negation expresses the notion of directly established
falsity. Independently, Markov [68] also introduced strong negation from the point
of view of constructive logic.
Strong negation was later incorporated into various logical systems, Nelson's
propositional systems N and N
1
, that is, the propositional parts of Nelson's system
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N
1
of constructible falsity (see [76], and Routley [94]), and their rst-order exten-
sions are initial examples (see Almukdad and Nelson [4]
2
). Two similar systems F
and G, or equivalently,HF and HG (using Routley's notation), have been studied
by Fitch [39]. For the dierence between Fitch's systems and Nelson's systems, see
[94], and see also Thomason's footnote on page 255 of [98]. There are also an intu-
itionistic logic with strong negation H by Gurevich [54], constructive predicate logic
with strong negation S by Akama [2], and rst-order logic CF by Thomason [98],
constructive propositional calculus with strong negation by Vorob'ev [107] and the
semantics of the calculus in terms ofN -lattices in Rasiowa [89]. Furthermore, Wans-
ing [114] has systematically investigated the whole family of substructural subsys-
tems of Nelson's systems from the point of view of the ne-structure of information
processing.
3
We shall refer to the resulting logics loosely as constructive logics with strong
negation. In comparison to intuitionistic logic, these logic systems demonstrate
several satisfying features, including symmetry, and partiality. See Chapter 3 for
details. Constructive logics have another important feature { persistence, which is
also shared by intuitionistic logic but not by classical rst-order logic. We shall
discuss this feature in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
Compared with intuitionistic negation, it turns out that strong negation is sim-
pler and more straightforward. Moreover, the notion of directly established falsity
expressed by strong negation lends itself to the explicit expression of negative infor-
mation in logic programming and deductive databases. We shall discuss this utility
of strong negation in the context of logic programming in Chapter 7.
2
In [4], Almukdad and Nelson use N and N
 
for their rst-order systems, where N
 
is the
proper subsystem of N without the axiom schema '  ( '   ).
3
Wansing uses N
 
and N instead of N and N
1
respectively. N
 
and N are formulated in
symmetrical sequent calculus (see pp. 24-25 of [114]).
1. Introduction 6
1.2 Situation Theory and Negation
Recently, classical rst-order logic has also been challenged by situation theorists
(see [10] and [32]). The basic insight of situation theory is that cognitive activities
such as thought, speech, communication, and inference are all situated relative to a
situation or context. Situations are introduced to model limited portions of the world
in which agents carry out their activities. As information sources, situations can be
seen as concise representations of various kinds of context sequences in possible world
semantics. Another related novel characteristic of situation theory is its emphasis
on information content. More generally, situation theory concerns the development
of a general theory of meaning and information, in particular, the development of
an information-based theory of inference.
In [10], Barwise and Etchemendy put forward a model of information content
called infon algebra in order to develop an information-based theory of inference. An
infon algebra I = hSit; I;); j=i consists of a non-empty collection Sit of situations,
a distributive lattice hI; j=i on infons, together with the makes-factual or support
relation j= between situations and infons satisfying certain additional conditions.
In an infon algebra I, infons represent pieces of information, and situations are
intended to be limited portions of the world. Thus situations provide us with a
kind of incomplete information; that is to say, the support relation j= is essentially
partial: a situation may support some infons and refute others but remain silent
on many. It follows that any algebraic theory of infons is denitely not Boolean.
Furthermore, they argue that the situation-theoretic model of infons is at least a
complete distributive lattice, that is Heyting algebra. Therefore, they conclude that
algebraic structure of infons satises the axioms for Heyting algebra but not all
the axioms for a Boolean algebra. Thus, the logic for situation theory is at least
intuitionistic but not classical.
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This argument immediately poses at least two questions. One is about negation,
the other about the interpretation of quantiers. Here we only consider the question
about negation, leaving the other one to Chapter 3.
We recall that in situation theory there are two kinds of basic infons: one is
 R; a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
; 1 , the other  R; a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
; 0 , where R is an n-place
relation, a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
are objects with a restriction of appropriateness. Note that
a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
need not necessarily be individuals. 0 and 1 are the polarity of infons.
For basic infons, negation is dened through a dual operation as follows:
 R; a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
; 1 =  R; a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
; 0 (1.1)
 R; a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
; 0 =  R; a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
; 1 (1.2)
So, we have
 R; a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
; 1 =  R; a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
; 1 (1.3)
 R; a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
; 1 =  R; a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
; 1 (1.4)
However, it is well-known that intuitionistic negation does not satisfy (1.3) though
it satises (1.4).
Furthermore, the negation of compound infons in situation theory is dened by
the following version of de Morgan's laws (see Barwise [8], p. 235, and Fernando [38],
p. 108). Even in [10], p. 55, Barwise and Etchemendy do mention that (1.5) is
sometimes assumed in situation theory. However, (1.5) does not hold though (1.6)
does for intuitionistic negation.
 ^  =  _  (1.5)
 _  =  ^  (1.6)
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Therefore, we conclude that the situation-theoretic negation is not intuitionistic.
Moreover, the above way of treating negation by situation theorists to some extent
suggests that the negation used in situation theory is in fact strong negation. More
importantly, it turns out that intuitionistic negation can in fact be simulated by
strong negation (see [68] and [2]).
In light of this, we are inclined to see constructive logic with strong negation as
the underlying logic for situation theory rather than intuitionistic logic.
We shall argue in Chapter 3 that the intuitionistic interpretation of universal
quantiers is not satisfying either from the situation-theoretic viewpoint. In fact,
universal quantiers used in related situation theory literature are classical as in the
rst-order logic. This motivates the construction of a logic with strong negation and
classical quantiers. See Chapter 3 for details.
1.3 Negation in Deductive Databases
The notion of negation in logic programming and deductive databases is more com-
plicated and involved than that in logic. This as we shall see later is mainly because
logical negation has proved unsuitable to application domains where the form of
reasoning is usually nonmonotonic. A dierent kind of negation has been intro-
duced through semantics associated with a logic program. Roughly speaking, the
main idea behind is that a piece of negative information is implicitly or \by default"
assumed whenever there is no sucient evidence to the contrary, where the exact
meaning of \sucient evidence" depends on what semantics is associated with a
logic program. Whatever semantics is used, a common characteristic of this new
form of negation is nonmonotonicity, that is a piece of assumed-by-default negative
information could be given up later when more information is available. So, we may
1. Introduction 9
as well call this kind of negation nonmonotonic negation
4
.
Two initial examples of nonmonotonic negation developed in logic programming
languages are the THNOT construct in PLANNER [55] and the not operator in
PROLOG (see [25] and its citations). Both of them express something which was
later termed by Clark [25] as the negation as failure (NAF) inference rule. It states
to the eect that a negative conclusion not p is inferred if any search for a proof of p
fails nitely. Here, the niteness condition is indispensable unless a system has some
mechanism for detecting an innite process. So the rule is sometimes also called the
negation-as-nite-failure rule.
First formalisations of nonmonotonic negation include Reiter's closed world as-
sumption (CWA) [90] and Clark's program completion semantics [25]. The CWA is
essentially an inference rule, stating that if a ground atom p is not a logical conse-
quence of a program, then infer not p. The completion semantics is introduced with
the aim of reducing the negation-as-nite-failure rule to a derived rule of rst-order
logic so as to justify the use of the rule.
In Chapter 5 we shall show that both the CWA and the completion semantics
have serious shortcomings. They can only be applied to a limited class of logic
programs without causing any inconsistency or other problems. In the past two
decades, various kinds of more ne-grained semantics for logic programs have been
proposed, including the Fitting semantics [40], the stratied semantics [21], the
stable semantics [47], the default semantics [16], and the well-founded semantics
[105]. These semantical theories to a great extent draw on nonmonotonic logic
developed in early 1980's
5
. For example, the default semantics is based on default
4
In the literature, it is also called negation as failure [25], negation by default [16] or simply
negation when there is only one kind of negation is involved [1]. There is even a further classication
of this kind of negation according to specic semantics used [73]. We prefer to use nonmonotonic
negation because nonmonotonicity captures the essential characteristic of negation in question,
and is more general in comparison to other terms.
5
The history of nonmonotonic logic traces back to the work by McCarthy [69] in the late 1950's.
The initial formal theories of nonmonotonic logic were collected in an issue of the Articial Intel-
ligence Journal (1980), devoted exclusively to nonmonotonic reasoning. An important reference
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logic [91], and the stable semantics has its root in autoepistemic logic [74].
In logic programming and deductive databases, the stable model semantics and
the WFS have become two dominant semantical theories. We shall see in Chapter
5 that they are more ne-grained than the CWA and the NAF. The introduction
of these two semantics is an important step towards understanding nonmonotonic
negation. Nevertheless, it can be argued that they are still not fully satisfying. In
particular, we shall argue that the underlying denition of stable models in the stable
model semantics is to some extent inconsistent with the essential characteristics of
nonmonotonic negation used in logic programs. Based on the WFS and hypothetical
reasoning, we shall propose a novel semantics in Chapter 6. It turns out that the
newly introduced semantics is very similar to the stable model semantics but avoids
its shortcomings. So we call it the quasi-stable semantics.
1.4 Outline of the Thesis
In addition to this introductory chapter, the thesis includes a further seven chapters.
We summarise the contents of these chapters as follows.
Chapter 2: Negation in rst-order logic. We begin with the analysis of
classical negation at the semantic and proof-theoretic levels, showing that classical
negation at the semantic level is entirely dierent from the negation at the proof-
theoretic level. Given the discrepancy, we had better divide classical negation into
two notions: one is the semantical notion of classical negation, and the other proof-
theoretical one. We also show that, more generally, there exists a sharp dierence in
rst-order logic between the semantical and proof-theoretic levels. Although rst-
order logic is proof-theoretically monotonic, nevertheless, it is non-persistent at the
semantical level. The monotonic inference of rst-order logic is not suitable for
book on the subject is Nonmonotonic Logic by Marek and Truszczynski [67]. For a survey of
nonmonotonic logic, see [72].
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the retrieval of negative information even in the context of relational databases.
Instead it is the semantic notion of classical negation that is used in relational
databases. These arguments will be used in Chapter 4 to facilitate understanding
of the relationships among various dierent kinds of negation, and to enable us to
see what is needed to be done if we are going to use the deductive approach to
databases.
Chapter 3: First-order Logic CF
0
We study the logic of strong negation. A
rst-order logic CF
0
with strong negation and bounded quantiers is constructed.
The logic is based on constructive logics, in particular, Thomason's logic CF. How-
ever, unlike constructive logic, quantiers in our system as in Thomason's are static
rather than dynamic. The usual Kripke formal semantics is dened for the logic
CF
0
, based on situations instead of conventional possible worlds. A sound and
complete axiomatic system of CF
0
is established based on the axiomatic systems of
constructive logics with strong negation and Thomason's completeness proof tech-
niques. CF
0
is proposed as the underlying logic for situation theory. Thus the
connection between CF
0
and infon logic is briey discussed. The work on the logic
CF
0
has been previously published in [112].
Chapter 4: From Relational to Deductive Databases In this chapter,
we rst consider the limited expressive power of the conventional relational model
of databases and briey discuss how the deductive approach to databases gives a
straightforward solution to the expressive problem of the relational model. It is then
followed by the formal denitions of logic program and deductive database. Finally,
we give some arguments to show why negation is one of central problems in the
deductive approach.
Chapter 5: Nonmonotonic Negation. This chapter is to review some main
semantic theories for logic programs, including the semantics of denite logic pro-
grams mainly by van Emden and Kowalski [103], Clark's program completion se-
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mantics and the associated SLDNF[25], Reiter's closed world assumption [90], Fit-
ting's semantics [40], the well-founded semantics by Gelder, Ross and Schlipf [105],
stable semantics by Gelfond and Lifschitz [47], and a three-valued version of the
stable model semantics by Przymusinski [85]. There is no doubt that these seman-
tic theories give us instructive insights into understanding nonmonotonic negation.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that they all to some extent have shortcomings of
one sort or another. We shall argue that the stable model semantics and its three-
valued version are conceptually awed, based on the observation that the stable
model semantics has no mechanism whatsoever for revising provisionally assumed
negative information in light of newly discovered information while it aims to model
an essentially nonmonotonic negation. The critical argument on the stable model
semantics has been previously reported in [113].
Chapter 6: Quasi-stable Semantics. Based on the study of some main
existing semantic theories, we proposed a novel semantics for logic programs, called
quasi-stable semantics. An important characteristic of the quasi-stable semantics
is the introduction of a mechanism of consistency-recovery. As a result, the quasi-
stable semantics is able to revise tentatively held negative information whenever
conicts occur. It has been proved that (i) every logic program has at least one
quasi-stable extension, (ii) a quasi-stable extension of a logic program P is a total
model of P, (iii) a quasi-stable extension of P is minimal in the sense that no positive
literal can be replaced in the extension by a negative one without its ceasing to be a
model of P, (iv) the well-founded partial model for a logic program P is included in
every quasi-stable extension of P, (v) every stable model is a quasi-stable extension.
The work in this chapter has been previously reported in [111].
Chapter 7: Quasi-stable Semantics with Strong Negation. Normal logic
programs are extended with strong negation, resulting in logic programs with both
nonmonotonic negation and strong negation. Such logic programs are called extended
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logic programs. The dominant Semantics for extended logic programs is the so-called
answer set semantics [48], which is derived from the stable model semantics [47].
However, the stable model semantics is problematic as we shall show in Chapter 5,
we instead dene a semantics for extended logic programs, based on our quasi-stable
semantics.
Chapter 8: Conclusions and Future Work Finally we give a brief summary
about the our research on both strong negation and nonmonotonic negation, and
discuss some potential extensions of the logic CF
0
and related issues about the
quasi-stable semantics.
Chapter 2
Negation in First-order Logic
In this chapter, we are going to analyse the notion of negation at the semantic and
proof-theoretic levels. The analysis will reveal that classical negation at the semantic
level is entirely dierent from the negation at the proof-theoretic level. Given the
dierence, we had better divide classical negation into two notions: the semantical
notion of classical negation, and the proof-theoretical one. More generally, the
analysis will show that, partly as a consequence of the dierence, there exists a
sharp discrepancy in rst order logic between the semantical and proof-theoretic
levels.
The main purposes of the analysis are to facilitate the understanding of relation-
ship among various dierent kinds of negation, and to enable us to see what needs
to be done if we are going to use the deductive approach to databases.
2.1 Two levels of rst-order logic
It is well-known that rst-order predicate calculus is semantically complete, as shown
by Godel's semantic completeness theorem [51]. That is to say logical consequence
in rst-order logic has a neat correspondence with theoremhood: a sentence is a
14
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theorem of a theory if and only if it is the logical consequence of the theory.
But logical consequence is a very strong notion. We have to consider all possible
models. For a formula ' is a logical consequence of a theory T if and only if whenever
T is true of a model, so is '. Here, specic semantic elements are abstracted away.
In practical applications such as the eld of databases, however, we are usually more
concerned with what is true of specic databases than what is true of all the possible
databases. The above neat correspondence given by the Godel completeness theorem
no longer holds when specic semantic elements come into focus. Instead, what we
see is a sharp discrepancy between the semantic level and the proof-theoretic level
in rst-order logic:
(T1) The meaning of negation at the semantic level is dierent from that at the
proof-theoretic one.
(T2) Semantically, it is two-valued: a sentence is either true or false in a given
model. In contrast, any formal system of rst-order logic is \three-valued" in
the sense that a sentence may be provable or refutable or neither from a given
theory relative to the system.
(T3) Semantically, rst-order logic is not persistent whereas proof-theoretically it
is monotonic
1
.
In order to appreciate (T1), I shall show that in rst-order logic, negation ex-
presses a kind of \failure" at the semantic level whereas it expresses inconsistency
in the formal system. The notion of negation as failure is much weaker than that of
inconsistency. It is from this dierence that (T2) follows as we shall show below
2
.
It also partially contributes to (T3). We mentioned in Chapter 1 that negation as
1
See Section 2.4 for the denition of persistence and monotonicity.
2
Another factor contributing to (T2) is due to classical universal quantiers. But we only
consider negation here.
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failure was originally introduced by Clark in [25] as a procedural rule for deriving
negative facts in logic programming. We shall come back to this topic in Chapter 5
when we review some main semantic theories of logic programs. Here, by an abuse
of the phrase, I am using it for negation as failure to support.
The above dierence is reminiscent of another famous theorem by Godel, usu-
ally called the First Incompleteness Theorem (see the related historical remarks in
[13]). It says to the eect that \in a formal system satisfying certain precise con-
ditions there is an undecidable proposition, that is, a proposition such that neither
the proposition itself nor its negation is provable in the system." (cited from the
editor's comment [52], p. 592). The incompleteness theorem also highlights the gulf
between the semantic level and the theorem-proving level of rst-order logic. But
our emphasis here is that there exists crucial dierence even at the conceptual level.
2.2 Failure vs Inconsistency
Fix a rst-order language L. Let j= be the semantic satisfaction or support relation
between interpretations of L and L-sentences of rst-order logic, and ` the deduc-
tion relation between sets of L-sentences and L-sentences. An interpretation as usual
consists of some domain of discourse over which all constant and predicate symbols
of L are assigned a meaning. In rst-order logic an interpretation is articial, and
arbitrary in the sense that its domain can be any set of objects, and all constant
symbols can be assigned any elements of the domain. In the database context, we
need not consider arbitrary interpretations. Instead, much more restricted interpre-
tations called Herbrand interpretations, are used. In a Herbrand interpretation, the
domain of discourse consists of the constant symbols of L, and the constant symbols
are interpreted literally.
Usually, a Herbrand interpretation is identied with a set of positive atomic
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sentences [64]. An outstanding characteristic of a Herbrand interpretation is its
double status: it can be taken as a theory as well as a particular model. When
restricted to nite domains, a Herbrand model can also be taken as a relational
database, and vice versa in a straightforward way. We shall make use of the double
status characteristic of Herbrand interpretations in the following discussion.
2.2.1 Negation as Failure to Support
At the semantic level, the meaning of negation is determined by the well-known
Tarski truth denition (see [13]) as follows
3
:
(M1) I j= :' if and only if I 6j= '.
where I is a Herbrand interpretation, ' is a sentence. When I j= ', we say that I
supports ', and when I 6j= ', we say that I fails to support '. According to M1,
we may say that the meaning of negation at the model-theoretic level is failure to
support: :' holds relative to I if and only if I fails to support '.
For an atomic sentence R(a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
), I supports R(a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
) if and only
if R(a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
) is in I by the Tarski's truth denition again and the denition of
Herbrand interpretation (see [64]). It then follows that I supports :R(a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
)
if and only if I 6j= R(a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
) if and only if R(a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
) is not in I. So we
have
(M2) I j= :R(a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
) if and only if R(a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
) is not in I.
Since R(a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
) is either in I or not in I but cannot be in both, we have I
either supports R(a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
) or supports :R(a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
), but cannot support
both. In general, M2 does not hold for any sentence. However, it can be shown that
for any sentence ',
3
Our notation is slightly dierent from that used in [13] though.
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(M3) I j= ' or I j= :'.
(M4) Not both I j= ' and I j= :'.
The proof of M3 can be obtained easily from M1, which at bottom is based on M2.
To show M4, an induction on the complexity of ' is enough.
The above is a basic scenario about negation from the semantic viewpoint. We
shall refer to negation characterised by M1 - M4 as the semantic notion of classical
negation. In particular, we shall take M2 as a semantic inference rule for inferring
negative information given the form of M2. We now turn to the formal system to
see how classical negation is dealt with proof-theoretically, and see what deductive
inference mechanism is available for inferring negative information.
2.2.2 Negation as Inconsistency
There are many formal systems of rst-order logic, including Hilbert-style axiom
system, the tableau method (see [13] and relevant historical and bibliographical
remarks there), and Gentzen's natural deduction system [50]. They have all been
proved equivalent. So, without losing any generality, we consider Gentzen's calculus
NK [50] for simplicity. In this system, rules relevant to negation in one way or
another are listed as follows, where ? stands for the false proposition.
(R1)
'
.
.
.
?
:'
(R2)
?
'
(R3) ' _ :' (R4)
';:'
?
We have seen that negation at the semantic level is negation as failure to support.
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Given the above rules about negation, what does classical negation mean at the
theorem-proving level? Have these rules fully characterised the semantic notion of
classical negation? Let us begin with the rst question.
According to R1, only when the given set ? of sentences is not consistent with
R(a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
) can we conclude that :R(a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
) from ?. In fact, it can be
proved that, in a natural deduction system,
? ` :' if and only if ?; ' ` ?: (N)
So, we can derive :' from ? if and only if ? and ' are not consistent. If ? and '
are consistent, then we cannot deduce the negative conclusion :'.
By (N) we may say that classical negation expresses inconsistency at the proof-
theoretical level. This conclusion can be justied using a more formal argument
given by Gabbay. In [43], he investigates how to characterise negation in a logical
system. The basic idea in his denition of negation in a system is that ? ` :' holds
if and only if ? and ' together lead to some undesirable result, say a contradiction.
So we may take (N) as dening what classical negation means at the theorem-proving
level. For the detailed exposition, readers are invited to refer to [43].
Now we come to the second question about whether rules R1-R4 characterise
the semantic notion of classical negation. It is not very dicult to show that rules
R3 and R4 correspond with properties M3 and M4 of negation with semantic el-
ements being abstracted away. To see this, we note that M3 follows from R3 in
a straightforward way, and conversely, R3 also follows from M3 using the Godel's
semantic completeness theorem. A similar correspondence between M4 and R4 can
be established using the same argument.
However, the correspondence stops there. Unlike M3 and M4, we nd that M1
and M2 are not represented by the corresponding rules R1 and R2. Worse still, M1
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and M2 in fact are not characterised by the whole deductive system of rst-order
logic.
Given a set T of atomic sentences and an atomic sentence R(a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
), if
R(a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
) is not in T , then T as an Herbrand interpretation will fail to support
R(a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
), and thus will support :R(a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
). However, T as a theory
cannot be used to derive the negative fact at the proof-theoretical level since T is
in fact consistent with R(a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
).
Therefore, we conclude that the formal system of rst-order logic provides us with
only a very weak inference mechanism for inferring negative information. The weak
mechanism only partially reects the semantic notion of negation. In particular,
rules R1 - R4 together only partially characterise the semantic notion of negation,
and it does not capture the semantic inference mechanism of M2 at all.
Before moving on to the next dierence of rst-order logic between the semantic
and proof-theoretic levels, we give some comments about rules R1 and R2. It is
natural to ask what role R1 and R2 play in the deductive system since that they do
not characterise the corresponding semantic rules M1 and M2?
Although rule R1, according to its form, can be used to derive a negative con-
clusion, the resulting notion of negation is that of inconsistency as we pointed out
before. In other words, its function in essential is to characterise classical negation
as inconsistency at the proof-theoretical level, a notion stronger than that of failure
to support.
The rule R2 is relevant to negation since ' may be any sentence. In particular '
may be a negative sentence. It says to the eect that, from absurdity, we can infer
everything. In reality, it is certainly not the case. The discovery of contradictions,
say in a database, does not enable us to derive everything but only signals that
there is the violation of integrity constraints. So, it is hardly acceptable from the
perspective of information retrieval. Moreover, we would not lose anything without
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the rule. Then, we may wonder why the rule is there in the deductive system of
rst-order logic? Briey, it has a great deal to do with the semantic interpretation
of material implication and the ideal requirement of semantic completeness. An
implication proposition with the false antecedent is vacuously valid, and thus for
the sake of semantic completeness, a similar rule is required for the proof of such
implication propositions in a deductive system. So, the purpose of rule R2 is only
to reect the semantic constraint of material implication.
2.3 Two-valued vs Three-valued
2.3.1 Two-valuedness
At rst glance, it seems that the two-valuedness of rst-order logic at the semantic
level is a straightforward consequence of the semantic property M3. However, in fact
it is the other way around. That is to say, it is on two-valuedness that the simple
semantic concept of classical negation is built. As to the two-valuedness itself, it
is connected with the two basic assumptions as we mentioned in Chapter 1: the
denotation assumption and the completeness assumption.
The denotation assumption originally comes from Frege's requirement of a log-
ically perfect formal language [42]. The assumption alone is no more than an ex-
pedient to avoid unnecessary complications that may arise otherwise. Nevertheless,
the assumption has the important ontological commitment that every singular term
denotes an existing object when combined with Quine's famous dogma [86]: to be
is to be a value of a bound variable, endowing the quantiers with existential im-
port. It is objection to these commitments that leads to the development of free
logics (see [14]). Our concern here is not the related philosophical arguments but
the use of logic in the database area. From the database viewpoint, it suces to
consider Herbrand interpretations. For such interpretations, denotation failures are
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automatically avoided since every constant symbol denotes itself. That is to say,
as far as the application of logic to databases is concerned, it will not make any
dierence whether the assumption is made or not.
In contrast, the completeness assumption seems doubtful from the database view-
point. Given a relational database, taken as a Herbrand interpretation, there is no
reason to assume that the interpretation represents a complete scenario of states
of the whole world. So, a relation r in the database is not necessarily complete; it
may be partial, that is, for a certain individual a, it may be the case that neither
r(a) nor :r(a) holds. Various logical theories have been developed to accommodate
partiality, including partial logic and constructive logics. We shall consider how to
use strong negation to deal with partiality in Chapter 3 and Chapter 7.
Nevertheless, the introduction of strong negation does not mean that we have to
give up classical negation, in particular, its semantical component. Although strong
negation as we shall see has proved very useful in some application domains, the
semantical notion of classical negation also has its own advantages which is closely
associated with the way in which negative information is represented. It is well-
known that, in a relational database, only positive facts are explicitly expressed. A
negative fact is implicitly assumed provided its positive counterpart is not explicitly
available. The implicit representation certainly has one great advantage. As pointed
out by Reiter [90], the number of negative facts about a given domain is in general
much greater than the number of positive ones. So, it is not practical to include
negative facts in a database explicitly.
How can we still have the semantical notion of classical negation without the
completeness assumption? An alternative to the assumption is to borrow an idea
from nonmonotonic logic. When a complete knowledge about a given domain is not
available, we simply jump to the negative conclusion in any case whenever its positive
counterpart is not present. The consequence is that negative information concluded
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in this way is defeasible. When more information is available, the conclusion may
have to be given up. In other words, rule M2 is now taken as a non-persistent rule
4
rather than a semantic condition based on the completeness assumption. We shall
give another argument to support our view on rule M2 in the next section.
Given a Herbrand model I and an atomic sentence ', I supports either ' or not
'. If I supports ' then ' is true relative to I; otherwise we simply jump to the
conclusion that ' is false relative to I even without the completeness assumption.
So, any atomic sentence is either true or false relative to a Herbrand model. It
follows that any sentence will also be either true or false relative a Herbrand model.
As a result, we still have the simple semantical notion of classical negation while
giving up the completeness assumption.
2.3.2 Three-valuedness
Now we consider the \three-valuedness" of rst-order logic from the proof-theoretic
viewpoint. We have seen that to infer the negation of a sentence ' from a theory T
is equivalent to proving that ' is not consistent with T . From which it follows that
to infer ::' from T is equivalent to proving that :' is not consistent with T . By
the principle of double negation, we have that to infer ' from T if and only if :' is
not consistent with T . So, given a theory, we can neither infer :' if ' is consistent
with the theory, nor infer ' if :' is consistent with the theory. Since it is possible
not only that a sentence is consistent with a theory but also that its negation is
consistent with the theory, we conclude that a sentence may neither be proved nor
refuted from a theory.
So, though it is always the case that either ' or :' is true relative to any model,
it may be the case that we can prove neither of them. To prove ' (or :') from a
theory requires that ' (:' respectively) be true across all the models of the theory
4
We use non-persistent instead of nonmonotonic to emphasise the semantic aspect.
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by the Godel's completeness theorem. The uniformity condition is very strong from
the database viewpoint. In the context of databases, we need not consider any
interpretation beyond Herbrand interpretations (see [1]). So it is not surprising to
see that the uniformity requirement makes the inference mechanism of rst-order
logic not suitable for the retrieval of negative information in the area of databases
5
.
Let us consider an example by way of illustration.
Example 2.3.1 Consider a situation s, consisting of a database DB of an imaginary
mathematics department. Suppose that DB contains the following facts:
teach(frege;rst-order-logic):
teach(cantor; set-theory):
teach(tarski;model-theory):
teach(turing; recursion-theory):
teach(godel; proof-theory):
Take DB as a theory with only atomic sentences. We can add to DB
teach(turing;rst-order-logic) or its negation without causing any contradiction,
so we have neither teach(turing;rst-order-logic) nor its negation. In other words,
it is impossible from the theory to infer either teach(turing;rst-order-logic) or its
negation.
But from the semantic viewpoint, DB can also be taken as a Her-
brand interpretation. Then from DB we may reach the conclusion that
:teach(turing;rst-order-logic) using M2. Moreover, this conclusion is what we
want when we make a query to the database DB about whether or not Turing
teaches rst-order logic. 2
5
As far as positive information is concerned, it does not make any dierence whether we consider
all the interpretations or just Herbrand interpretations. See [64] for related discussion in the context
of denite logic programs.
2. Negation in First-order Logic 25
The example underlines the weakness of rst-order logic as a deductive mecha-
nism for inferring negative information. The weak deductive mechanism has to be
strengthened somehow if we are going to take a deductive approach to databases.
2.4 Non-persistence vs Monotonicity
In this section, we look at another pair of properties of rst-order logic: persistence
and monotonicity. We shall see that classical rst-order logic is monotonic but it is
not persistent.
Persistence is a model-theoretic property. It means whatever is supported by a
model is still supported by a larger one. Formally, persistence can be formulated as
follows:
if I j= '; I  I
0
then I
0
j= '.
where I and I
0
are Herbrand interpretations, ' is a L-sentence, and  is the subset
relation. In the general context,  should be replaced with the sub-model relation
.
In comparison to persistence, monotonicity is a proof-theoretic property. It ex-
presses the cumulativity of deductive consequences: what is proved is still proved
when more information is added. Formally, monotonicity can be formulated as
follows:
if ? ` ' and ?  ?
0
then ?
0
` '
where ?; are sets of L-sentences, and ' is a L-sentence, and ? ` ' means there is
a deduction of ' from ?.
From the informational viewpoint, both persistence and monotonicity express
a kind of the preservation of information. The discussion in the previous sections
suggests that, in rst-order logic, the way in which information is dealt with at the
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semantic level is dierent from that at the proof-theoretic level. As a result, we have
another pair of dierences between the semantics of rst-order logic and its formal
system. Let us consider non-persistence rst.
2.4.1 Non-persistence
We have shown that negation at the semantic level means failure to support. For
atomic sentences, the failure can be reduced to absence according to the semantic
rule M2. In the previous section, we argued that we had better take M2 as a non-
persistent rule rather than as a rule based on the completeness assumption. It is
the non-persistence of the rule that contributes to the non-persistence of rst-order
logic: with the addition of new facts, what is originally absent may become present,
and thus what is originally not true may become true. More generally, by induction
on the complexity of ', it is not dicult to show that :' is not usually persistent
either.
Consider the departmental database DB in the last section again. We
know that s supports that Turing does not teach rst-order logic since
teach(turing;rst-order-logic) is not in DB. But when we move to a larger sit-
uation, say a situation s
1
of the university which contains another database DB
2
of a philosophy department in addition to DB
1
. If Turing happens to be a joint
professor in the two departments, and DB
2
does have the fact that Turing teaches
rst-order logic, then s
1
will support this fact, and as a result, s
1
no longer supports
that Turing does not teach rst-order logic. Thus, with the addition of the new
facts to s, what is originally not true now becomes true.
It is interesting to note that the non-persistence of rst-order logic explains the
non-persistence
6
of rst-order queries to relational databases (see [1]). Conversely,
6
In [1], term monotonic is used. But monotonic is usually used to describe the property of the
formal system of rst-order logic. Since the property in question is semantic, we prefer to use term
persistent.
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the fact that there exist non-persistent queries gives us another argument to support
our view on rule M2. Had we insisted that M2 be based on the completeness
assumption, then it would be meaningless to talk about non-persistent queries. Since
our knowledge about the given domain is complete, there would be no space for the
addition of new information, and thus there would be no non-persistent queries.
2.4.2 Monotonicity
Now consider the monotonicity of rst-order logic. Given a formal system of rst-
order logic, conceptually, the monotonicity follows directly from the characterisation
of the deduction relation ` among sentences relative to the system. Alternatively,
the monotonic property has been used in the dening characteristic of a formal
system such Gentzen's natural deductive system NK. So, the monotonicity holds
automatically.
Specically, any deductive consequence of a theory relative to a formal system is
determined by the theory and inference rules, and also the axioms of the system if it
is a logistic calculus. Applications of an inference rule solely depend on the explicit
presence of information both in the theory and derived from the theory. The use of
inference rules is not sensitive to the absence of any information as the use of M2 is.
The point is that all inference rules in the system are monotonic: with the addition
of new information to the theory, more information will be inferred, and previously
inferred information cannot be retracted or revised in any way. A logic with only
monotonic inference rules can only be monotonic.
The discrepancy between the monotonicity of rst-order logic and its non-
persistence once again indicates that the rst-order formal system only partially
characterises its semantics.
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2.5 Concluding Remark
We have shown that classical negation in fact should be divided into two dierent
notions: one is semantic, and the other proof-theoretic. The semantic notion of clas-
sical negation expresses failure to support whereas the proof-theoretic one expresses
inconsistency. The notion of negation as failure to support is much weaker than
that of negation as inconsistency. More generally, we have shown that, in rst-order
logic, there exists a big discrepancy between the semantic and proof-theoretic levels.
One the one hand, rst-order logic is semantically two-valued and non-persistent.
On the other hand, it is proof-theoretically three-valued and monotonic.
In the area of relational databases, it is the semantic not proof-theoretic notion
of classical negation that is used to deal with the retrieval of negative informa-
tion. First-order logic only provides us with a monotonic deductive mechanism,
which is not adequate for dealing with negative information even in the area of re-
lational databases. This implies that if we are going to take a deductive approach
to databases, then we have to extend the inference mechanism of rst-order logic so
as to at least accommodate non-persistent inferences in one way or another. This is
a topic we shall cover in later chapters.
Chapter 3
First-Order Logic CF
0
The purpose of this chapter
1
is to study strong negation in formal logic systems.
We shall construct a rst-order logic CF
0
with strong negation and bounded quanti-
ers. The logic is based on constructive logics, in particular, Thomason's logic CF.
However, unlike constructive logics, quantiers in our system as in Thomason's are
static rather than dynamic.
For the logic CF
0
, the usual Kripke formal semantics is dened but based on
situations instead of conventional possible worlds. Situations as limited portions of
the world seemmore suitable than possible worlds for characterising the partiality of
constructive logics with strong negation. A sound and complete axiomatic system of
CF
0
is established based on the axiomatic systems of constructive logics with strong
negation and Thomason's completeness proof techniques. With the use of bounded
quantiers, CF
0
allows the domain of quantication to be empty and allows for non-
denoting constants. CF
0
is proposed as the underlying logic for situation theory.
Thus the connection between CF
0
and infon logic is briey discussed.
1
This chapter mainly is based on the work published in [112].
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3.1 Constructive Logics with Strong Negation
In the rst chapter, we noted that strong negation was introduced independently by
Nelson [76] and Markov [68] from the constructive perspective. Various constructive
logics with strong negation have been developed. In comparison to intuitionistic
logics, these logic systems demonstrate some satisfying features, including symmetry
and partiality.
First of all, since negative information is treated as of equal importance with pos-
itive information, such logics are more symmetrical than intuitionistic logics and sat-
isfy very natural duality laws. In particular, strong negation avoids non-constructive
features possessed by intuitionistic negation (see [54], and [114]). Secondly, con-
structive logics with strong negation can be provided with a more satisfying inter-
pretation than the well-known Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov(BHK) interpretation
for intuitionistic logics (see [114], and Lopez-Escobar [65]). Moreover, they permit
a sentence to be undetermined and thus can accommodate the partiality of infor-
mation (see [98], and [114]).
Another desirable characteristic of constructive logics with strong negation is the
heredity or persistence of information,
2
to the eect that what is true at a state of
information is still true at all later states. This is also true of intuitionistic logic.
3.2 Motivations behind Logic CF
0
Since that we have already various constructive logics with strong negation, it is
natural to ask why we need to construct another one. In this section, we give some
arguments to show why the existing constructive logics are not satisfying. Two is-
2
The terminology of the heredity of information is used in [114] whereas the persistence of
information is the situationists' parlance. Note that [114] is only concerned with propositional
logics. For the property of predicate logic, see lemma 3.1 on page 53 of [54]. In intuitionistic logic,
the property is called monotonicity (See the lemma on page 78 of [100]).
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sues are to be addressed briey. One is about the the semantic interpretation of
quantication, and the other about domains of quantication. The basic philosoph-
ical stance here is taken from Situation Theory. Indeed, as we pointed out in the
beginning, CF
0
originally is intended as an underlying logic for Situation Theory.
See section 3.5 for the discussion about the connection between CF
0
and infon logic.
3.2.1 Dynamic vs. Static Quantiers
There are two main semantic interpretations of universal quantiers: dynamic and
static. In the dynamic interpretation, a sentence 8x'(x) is true at a state of infor-
mation s only when '(a)
3
is true at all states of information t  s for all individuals
a in the domain of t (where  orders states by increasing information). In the static
interpretation, a sentence 8x'(x) is true at a state of information s provided that
'(a) is true for all individuals a in the domain of s. The dynamic interpretation of
universal quantiers at a state of information s requires us to look at all the states
beyond s and their domains. In contrast, the static interpretation of a sentence
8x'(x) at a state of information s only involves the state s and the individuals
in the domain of s. So, the satisfaction condition on universal quantiers by the
dynamic interpretation is much stronger than that by the static interpretation.
Which interpretation is more natural from the situation-theoretic viewpoint?
Consider the situation s of a room full of people. The sentence \All men here are
hungry" will be true at s provided that all the men in the room are hungry. Here
the quantier is taken as restricted to the men in that room. We do not look at
wider situations and (possibly) wider extensions of \men". So if we take a point s
in a Kripke model as a situation rather than a state of information, then it seems
we should evaluate the quantier statically.
Unfortunately, dynamic universal quantiers are used in most of existing rst-
3
Hereafter, we use a as a name for a.
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order constructive logics with strong negation, including Almukdad and Nelson's
rst-order systems [4], Gurevich's H [54], Akama's S [2]. It is not dicult to see
that these logics would not be persistent had the static universal quantiers been
used. In other words, the persistence of constructive logics is bought at the cost of
the very strong dynamic satisfaction condition on universal quantiers.
Thomason's rst-order logic [98] CF does interpret universal quantiers stati-
cally rather than dynamically. His semantical model is a hybrid of a Kripke model
for propositional intuitionistic logic (as the conditional is intuitionistic) and a clas-
sical model for predicate logic (as the universal quantier is static).
4
Nevertheless,
his semantical framework requires dierent stages to have the same domain. This
leads us to the issue of the domains of quantiers.
3.2.2 Expanding vs Constant Domains of Quantication
From the standpoint which treats stages as situations, it is obvious that this restric-
tion is inappropriate. From an intuitionistic viewpoint, it is not suitable either. As
is well-known, Kripke models for intuitionistic logic also require expanding domains.
But the connection of intuitionistic logic with expanding domains is both more com-
plicated and more tenuous than is the case with Situation Theory. In order to see
this, let us consider the following schema which we call the Distribution Schema:
(DS) 8x(' _  (x))  (' _ 8x (x)), where x is not free in '.
If we add to intuitionistic logic all instances of (DS), we obtain a logic whose models
are exactly the Kripke models with constant domain. Thus to motivate expanding
domains from an intuitionistic viewpoint is to motivate the rejection of this schema.
4
It should be pointed out that his model for propositional logic, strictly speaking, is not in-
tuitionistic since the falsity of an atomic sentence at a stage of construction is treated as being
discovered directly rather than being decided by later stages.
3. First-Order Logic CF
0
33
The BHK interpretation is of little help. According to that we need to show
how a proof of 8x(' _  (x)) could be extended to a proof of ' _ 8x (x). Well,
to have a proof of 8x(' _  (x)) is to have a construction C which transforms a
proof of a 2 D (D the intended range of the variable x) into a proof of ' _  (a).
If the construction C transforms a proof of a 2 D into a proof of ', then since x
is not free in ', we would have a proof of '. Otherwise, it transforms a proof of
a 2 D into a proof of  (a) and thus from the construction C we derive a proof of
8x (x). Either way we have a proof of ' _ 8x (x) (for the BHK interpretation,
see p. 9 of Troelstra and van Dalen [100]). The informal semantics of intuitionistic
logic does not, at least not obviously, show what is wrong with (DS). Why, then,
is (DS) rejected at all? Very briey, it happens that certain Brouwerian principles
of continuity which are more or less self-evident from an intuitionistic standpoint
are formally inconsistent in classical logic. These principles say roughly that an
assertion about an innite sequence  must be decided by a nite initial segment
of , and hence will be decided the same way for all sequences  that agree on
that initial segment. Adding (DS) to intuitionistic logic will restore inconsistency
with these same principles. Dummett [36] contains a treatment of the semantics of
intuitionistic logic which discusses these issues in detail.
There is a further point. Kripke models are not the only semantic structures for
intuitionistic logic. Beth trees may be used instead. In the Beth semantics we have
a more complicated rule (see p. 106 of Troelstra [99]) for evaluating disjunctions:
s j= ' _  i 8t  s9u  t(u j= ' or u j=  )
This evaluates a disjunction true provided that however knowledge is extended even-
tually one or other of the disjuncts will become true. With this it is easy to nd a
counter-example to (DS) that makes no appeal to expanding domains.
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The upshot is that expanding domains seem more an artifact of the Kripke
semantics than an essential part of the interpretation of intuitionistic logic. However,
they are quite central to Situation Theory, which to some extent supports our choice
not to use intuitionistic logic as a basis for Situation Theory (for more, see the nal
part below)
If we are to allow expanding domains, there is a technical problem to over-
come. Specically, the semantical completeness proof of CF depends on an aux-
iliary lemma, that is, lemma 2 on page 250 in [98], and the proof of the lemma
in turn makes use of the conditional introduction rule I. However, it is easy to
check that if dierent stages in the semantical models are allowed to have dierent
domains, then the rule is generally not sound since universally quantied sentences,
when interpreted statically instead of dynamically, generally are not persistent (see
below 2.2 and 2.5). So, the condition of a constant domain has to be imposed on his
models for the sake of CF's semantic completeness, that is to say, in order to have
static universal quantiers, we are forced to adopt a model with constant domain.
Conversely, from the model theoretic standpoint, the models forCF
0
are a special
case of the intuitionistic models. Accordingly, the dynamic condition for quantiers
collapses into the static one. Since the dynamic condition is not suitable and expand-
ing domains are desired as we said above from the situation theoretic viewpoint, it is
natural to ask if we can have a logic for situation theory with both static quantiers
and expanding domains.
3.2.3 From Thomason's Logic CF to Our Variant CF
0
Motivated by the above arguments, we propose a rst-order logical systemCF
0
with
strong constructive negation like Thomason's but that allows for expanding domains.
Our semantical analysis is still based on Kripke frames hS;;Di but we have it in
mind to interpret S as a collection of situations rather than conventional possible
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worlds. Accordingly,  is a pre-order on situations, and D is a function assigning a
set of individuals to each situation. Situations are limited parts of the world. Thus,
generally, situations provide us with only incomplete information. The partiality
of situations to some extent also justies the use of situations in our semantical
framework since, as we pointed out before, constructive logics with strong negation
are partial. In addition, we note that another source of the partiality of the logic is
from the use of inexact predicates (see [4], Wagner [109], and related citations there).
We treat universally quantied sentences statically instead of dynamically. And
since static unbounded universally quantied sentences are generally not persistent,
we instead consider bounded ones, say 8

x'(x) where  is a bounder. This is
reminiscent of Devlin's infon logic. Devlin [32] considers 8x 2 u where u is a set
and  is an infon. Such compound infons are persistent because the set u bounds
the quantier. In our framework the bounder  may itself be non-persistent in
the sense that the extension of  is liable to change from situation to situation,
and consequently 8

x'(x) is in general not persistent either. Thus, we further
distinguish persistent bounders from non-persistent ones (see the next section).
We summarise the various approaches to the universal quantier in the following
table, where INT is intuitionistic predicate logic,H is Gurevich's intuitionistic logic
with strong negation [54], and CF is Thomason's rst-order logic [98]. For a unifying
exposition of both Kripke and Beth models, see van Dalen [102].
Logics Quantiers 8x Models Domains
INT, H dynamic Kripke models expanding
INT static Beth models constant
CF static Kripke models constant
CF
0
static Kripke models expanding
3. First-Order Logic CF
0
36
In the following, we shall rst introduce the logical system CF
0
, and then prove
its soundness and completeness. Finally, we discuss its connection with situation
theory, its possible extensions as well as its potential applications.
3.3 Logical System CF
0
With Strong Negation
3.3.1 Language L of CF
0
.
The language
5
of our logical system CF
0
consists of an innite set V
L
of individual
variables (as metavariables for variables we use x; x
0
; x
1
; :::), a set C
L
of individual
constants (metavariables: c; c
0
; c
1
; :::), and for each n; n  0, a set P
n
L
of n-ary
predicate symbols (metavariables: R
1
; R
2
; R
3
; :::). In addition, L has a set B
L
of
bounders with a subset B
P
L
of persistent bounders (metavariables: ; 
0
; 
1
; ::: with
or without superscript P ), and a relation symbol 2.
The set T
L
of terms of L is V
L
[C
L
. We use t; t
0
; t
1
; ::: as metavariables for terms.
Atomic formulas of L are R(t
1
; t
2
; :::; t
n
) and c 2 , where t
1
; t
2
; :::; t
n
2 T
L
; c 2
C
L
; R 2 P
n
L
and  2 B
L
. The well-formed formulas of L are dened recursively
from atomic formulas using the connectives _;, and , and for each bounder  ,
a bounded universal quantier 8

as follows:
(i) atomic formulas are formulas;
(ii) if ' is a formula, then so is  ';
(iii) if '; are formulas, then so are ' _  ;'   ;
(iv) if ' is a formula, x is a variable, and  is a bounder , then 8

x'(x) is also a
formula. For simplicity, we write 8x 2 '(x) for 8

x'(x).
5
Function symbols introduce nothing new. For simplicity, we avoid them here.
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A formula of form 8x 2 '(x) is called a bounded universally quantied formula.
Such formulas can be used to express local generality since the bound variables
thereof are to range over a subset of the individuals in the universe. In contrast,
the generality expressed by unbounded universally quantied formulas is a kind
of overall generality (see Frege [41]). In order to express overall generality by a
variable, we only need a device for the scope of the variable whereas, in order to
express local generality, we need in addition the range of the variable. So, generally
speaking, in order to express generality via a variable, we need both a mechanism
for the scope of the variable and a parameter for its range. In other words, a logical
quantier consists of the scope of a variable and the range of the variable. From
the pragmatic point of view, it is clear that bounded formulas are more frequently
used than unbounded ones. In translating natural language, restricted quantiers
are usually represented as unrestricted quantiers over a material conditional or
something equivalent. Thus, \All birds y" is formalised as 8x( Bird(x)_Flies(x))
or 8x(Bird(x) ! Flies(x)) if the material conditional ! is dened. In CF
0
it is
represented as 8x 2 Flies(x), where  is a bounder for birds. We prefer our
approach to the usual one. In our opinion, it is tidy, and emphasises the two aspects
of local generality. More importantly, as we mentioned in the introduction, bounded
universally quantied formulas, can be used to express the persistence of information
(see below). That is the primary motive for our use of bounded formulas instead of
unbounded ones.
Syntactically bounders
6
are ags on quantiers. Semantically they are to be
interpreted as sets, that is in the same way as predicates are in classical rst-order
logic. Then, it may be asked, why do we have a special syntax for bounders instead
of treating them simply as unary predicates? The answer is that a predicate such
as \Flies(x)" gives three possibilities: an object may y, it may not y, or it may
6
It is worth pointing out that bounders are very similar to sorts in a sorted logic (see [31])
though we will not explore any connection between them in this thesis.
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be undecided whether it ies or not. But a bounder supplies only two possibilities:
an object is included in the bounder or it is not. The consequence is that 8x(
 (x)_'(x)) in fact says a little more than 8x 2 '(x) (see Formal Semantics below
for exact comparison). It is the latter that captures the informal reading of \All
birds y" rather than the former.
Conjunction and bounded existential quantication are dened as follows:
' ^  =
df
 ( ' _   )
9x 2 '(x) =
df
 8x 2   '(x):
The concept of free and bound variables is dened as usual. Bound variables are used
as position markers only and thus 8x 2 '(x) and 8y 2 '(y) would be counted
as the same formula. We use as above '; ; ; ::: as metavariables for formulas, and
?; (with or without subscripts) for arbitrary sets of formulas.
3.3.2 Persistent Formulas
We have met the concept of persistence in Chapter 2. Put it in terms of situations,
it says that what is true in one situation is still true in a larger situation. Formally,
there is the so-called persistence principle, stated as
If s  s
0
and s j= , then s
0
j= ,
where s; s
0
are situations,  is an infon, and j= is a support relation between situ-
ations and infons. If an infon  satises the persistence principle, we say that  is
persistent (see Barwise [8]). We have seen that in Chapter 2, one source of non-
persistence comes from the semantic notion of classical negation, which in essence
is a kind of negation as failure. In contrast, strong negation expresses a directly
established negative truth, and thus is both persistent and monotonic (see sections
2.3 and 2.4 for the formal characterisation).
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However there is another source of non-persistence which comes from static uni-
versal quantication. Informally speaking, universally quantied sentences in nat-
ural language are not persistent. \Everyone here is hungry" may be veried when
evaluated from the situation in one poor household, but falsied when evaluated
from a larger situation including comfortable ones. There is a tension between
quantication and persistence. If we take it that the persistence principle is true
of every infon, then it seems universally quantied sentences have to be excluded
from the category of infons. And conversely, if universally quantied sentences are
taken as infons then the persistence principle would only hold partially (see pp.
234{236 of [8]). However, quantied sentences are such important forms for ex-
pressing information that they can hardly be excluded from the category of infons.
We also want to retain the persistence principle because, as situation theorists have
argued, it captures our intuition \that what goes on in part of the world still goes
on when one has a broader perspective"(see p. 236 of [8]). For the sake of both
persistence and a rich algebraic structure of infons, we only consider bounded quan-
tied formulas for which these problems do not arise. However, as we pointed out
in the introduction, in our present framework, a bounder  in 8x 2 '(x) may be
non-persistent. So we introduce an auxiliary notion of persistent bounders. Syntac-
tically, persistent bounders are treated as a primitive notion. The semantic meaning
of persistent bounders will be given below (see condition (iii) on an interpretation
in Formal Semantics). Pragmatically, persistent bounders can be obtained by in-
corporating context into bounders in universally quantied sentences. Then we can
dene persistent formulas of L recursively as follows :
(i) R(t
1
; t
2
; :::; t
n
) and  R(t
1
; t
2
; :::; t
n
) are persistent for any n-ary predicate R,
terms t
1
; t
2
; :::; t
n
, and c 2  and  c 2 
P
are persistent for any bounders 
and 
P
;
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(ii) if '; are persistent, then so are ' _  and ' ^  ;
(iii) '   is persistent for any formulas '; ;
(iv) if ' is persistent, then 8x 2 
P
'(x) is persistent;
(v) if ' is persistent, then 9x 2 '(x) is persistent for any  2 B
L
.
Given a set ? of formulas, let ?
P
be f' 2 ? : ' is persistentg. So the persistent
formulas of L will be F
P
L
, where F
L
is the set of all L-formulas. Note that, in
the denition of persistent formulas, negation is restricted to only atomic formulas.
Nevertheless, this will not lose any generality since the negation of a compound
formula, according to related rules (see Derived Rules for CF
0
below), is equivalent
to another compound formula in which negation is applied to only atomic formulas.
By the denition, non-persistence of formulas is only due to the non-persistence
of bounders in universally quantied formulas. So, pragmatically, the persistence
of such formulas can be recovered by incorporating context into related bounders.
Nevertheless, there exists indeed a kind of unrecoverable non-persistence. In fact,
such non-persistence is the consequence of the partiality of situations. If a situation
is silent on  then it certainly does not preclude a larger more extensive situation
settling . In order to express the unrecoverable non-persistence, we need to add a
kind of modal operators such as \denitely" into our language. Such an extension,
however, is outside the scope of this thesis (for more, see Mott [75]).
The syntactic denition of persistence will be used in Derived Rules for CF
0
below.
3.3.3 Formal Semantics
Our semantical analysis is essentially similar to Thomason's, but it is based on
general Kripke frames instead of particular ones, that is, we allow dierent points
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in a Kripke frame to have dierent domains. A Kripke frame F is a triple hS;;Di
such that
(i) S is a non-empty set;
(ii)  is a pre-order on S, that is,  is a reexive and transitive binary relation
on S;
(iii) D is a monotone function assigning sets of individuals to the elements of S,
that is, for any s; s
0
2 S; if s  s
0
then D(s)  D(s
0
).
S is to be thought of as a set of situations,  is the containment relation among
situations, and for each s 2 S;D(s) is the set of individuals existing at situation s.
An interpretation I of language L on a Kripke frame F = hS;;Di is a function
such that: for any s; s
0
2 S; c 2 C
L
; R 2 P
i
L
; ; 
P
2 B
L
,
(i) I
s
is a partial function from C
L
intoD(s), and (a) if s  s
0
and I
s
(c) is dened,
then I
s
0
(c) is dened too and I
s
(c) = I
s
0
(c); and(b) for each d in D(s), I
s
(d) is
dened and I
s
(d) = d.
7
(ii) I
s
(R) is a partial function from the Cartesian product D(s)
i
into fT, Fg, and
if s  s
0
, then I
s
0
(R) is an extension of I
s
(R).
(iii) I
s
is a total function from B
L
into P(D(s)) such that if s  s
0
, then I
s
() 
I
s
0
() and I
s
(
P
) = I
s
0
(
P
).
Clause (iii) in the denition of interpretation gives us the semantic meaning of per-
sistent sets. In other words, it is the semantic requirement for a set of individuals
to be persistent. It is worth pointing out the restriction incorporated in (iii) is com-
patible with the situation theoretic viewpoint though it may look ad hoc. Anyway,
7
We are assuming that every object has a name. In eect we work with the expansion of
language L to accommodate all the objects of all the countable domains.
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situations are treated as rst-class citizens in situation theory. So, one possible way
to ensure the persistence of universal quantied formulas would be to incorporate
reference to situations into them (see p. 236 of [8]). In this paper, however, we
instead adopt the device of persistent bounders.
A Kripke model M is a pair hF ; Ii consisting of a Kripke frame F and an
interpretation I on F .
Before we continue the formulation of formal semantics, some remarks seem in
order about the denition of Kripke models. First, note that, in a Kripke model
M = hS;;D; Ii, D(s) can be empty for any (and all) s 2 S. The use of bounders
means that the usual restriction to non-empty domains is unnecessary. Thus CF
0
is inclusive in the sense that it allows the domain of quantication to be empty (see
pp. 379-382 of Bencivenga [14]).
Second, note that the function I
s
C
L
is partial. So CF
0
allows for non-denoting
constants as a free logic does (see [14]). In a free logic, an extra unary predicate E
or something equivalent is introduced to deal with reference failure. Nevertheless, in
CF
0
, we do not need such a special predicate. Bounders of quantiers can play the
role of the predicate E of free logic. It may be that bounders are preferable to an
existence predicate, at least if one wishes to conne existence to a purely semantic
role (as we would). Anyway, it will be no surprise that some axioms and inference
rules of CF
0
will correspond to axioms and inference rules of a free logic.
Next, note that the function I
s
P
n
L
(n  0) is also partial. That is to say, it may
be the case that a basic sentence R(c
1
; c
2
; :::; c
n
) is neither true nor false, so CF
0
allows truth value gaps. Such gaps may arise from the use of inexact predicates,
but we emphasise that there is another source of truth value gaps { the partiality
of situations.
When a predicate has truth value gaps, we call it a partial predicate, otherwise
a total predicate. A total predicate can be interpreted as a set, that is in the
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same way as predicates are in classical rst-order logic. With partial predicates,
however, we have to associate two sets: one is for the positive assertions, the other
for the strong negative assertions. So we might as well divide a partial predicate into
two parts, a positive part corresponding to the positive assertions, and a negative
part corresponding to the strong negative assertions. We recall that, syntactically,
bounders are ags on quantiers. Semantically, as can be seen from the clause (iii)
in the denition of interpretation, bounders are interpreted as sets. What sets, then,
should we associate with a bounder ? There are two natural candidates. We could
say that  was assigned all the objects in the current situation. Then 8x 2 '(x)
would be supported by s provided that s made true '(a) for each object a in D(s).
In this case, bounder  is nothing more than a denotational variant of the existential
predicate E of free logic (see pp. 251-252, Garson [45]). An alternative would see
bounders in a more restricted way as corresponding to the positive parts of particular
predicates, so that 8x 2 '(x) would be interpreted as asserting of all the objects
that were  in the current situation that they were also '. In fact, we choose here
not to restrict bounders beyond requiring that the objects a bounder  is associated
with in a situation s are all objects that belong to the situation s.
Given a Kripke model M = hS;;D; Ii, we dene a satisfaction relation j=
+
M
(or simply j=
+
) and a refutation relation j=
 
M
(or simply j=
 
) between situations
s 2 S and L-sentences ' relative to M as follows, by induction on the complexity
of ':
(i) s j=
+
R(c
1
; c
2
; :::; c
n
) i I
s
(c
1
); I
s
(c
2
); :::; I
s
(c
n
) are all dened and
I
s
(R)(I
s
(c
1
); I
s
(c
2
); :::; I
s
(c
n
)) = T
s j=
 
R(c
1
; c
2
; :::; c
n
) i I
s
(c
1
); I
s
(c
2
); :::; I
s
(c
n
) are all dened and
I
s
(R)(I
s
(c
1
); I
s
(c
2
); :::; I
s
(c
n
)) = F
s j=
+
c 2  i I
s
(c) is dened and I
s
(c) 2 I
s
()
s j=
 
c 2  i either I
s
(c) is not dened or
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I
s
(c) is dened and I
s
(c) 2 D(s) ? I
s
()
(ii) s j=
+
' _  i s j=
+
' or s j=
+
 
s j=
 
' _  i s j=
 
' and s j=
 
 
(iii) s j=
+
 ' i s j=
 
'
s j=
 
 ' i s j=
+
'
(iv) s j=
+
'   i for all s
0
such that s  s
0
if s
0
j=
+
' then s
0
j=
+
 
s j=
 
'   i s j=
+
' and s j=
 
 
(v) s j=
+
8x 2 '(x) i for all d 2 D(s), if s j=
+
d 2  then s j=
+
'(d)
s j=
 
8x 2 '(x) i for some d 2 D(s), s j=
+
d 2  and s j=
 
'(d).
Basic semantic notions such as consequence, satisability and validity can be dened
in the usual way in terms of the satisfaction relation j=
+
. For any sentence ' and
set ? of sentences, we write j= ' to indicate that ' is valid, ?  ' to indicate that
' is a semantic consequence of ?, and ?   to indicate that there is a subset
f'
1
; '
2
; :::; '
n
g of  such that '
1
_ '
2
_ :::_ '
n
is a semantic consequence of ?.
Lemma 3.3.1 (Persistence Lemma) Let M = hS;;D; Ii be a Kripke model,
' a persistent formula of L.
(i) if s  s
0
and s j=
+
' then s
0
j=
+
';
(ii) if s  s
0
and s j=
+
? then s
0
j=
+
?
P
.
Proof. For (i), routine induction on the complexity of '. (ii) is a straightforward
corollary of (i).
The persistence lemma (i) gives us the semantic meaning of persistence. It can
be viewed as a variant of the persistence principle.
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3.3.4 Axiomatic System for CF
0
Our axiomatic system CF
0
is based on the axiomatic systems for constructive logics
with strong negation (see [94], [54], and [2]). It takes as axioms the following list of
schemas:
(A1) '
P
 :   '
P
(A2) '  (  )  : '    : '  
(A3) ' ^   '
(A4) ' ^    
(A5) '
P
 :   '
P
^  
(A6) '  ' _  
(A7)   ' _  
(A8) '    :     : ' _   
(A9) '  :  '   
(A10) c 2  ^ '(c)  9x 2 '(x)
(A11) 8x 2 '(x)   c 2  _ '(c)
(A12) 8x 2 (' _  (x))  (' _ 8x 2  (x))
(A13)  (' ^  )   ' _   
(A14)  (' _  )   ' ^   
(A15)  '  '
(A16)  ('   )  ' ^   
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(A17)  8x 2 '(x)  9x 2   '(x)
(A18)  9x 2 '(x)  8x 2   '(x)
(A19) c 2  _  c 2 
In axioms A1 and A5, '
P
means that ' has to be persistent, which is the small price
we have to pay for the relaxation of the dynamic condition on universal quantiers
to the static one. In order to see why this restriction is necessary, let us consider
the following formula '
8x 2 R(x)  >  8x 2 R(x)
For this formula, our persistence condition on 8x 2 R(x) is actually to require that
 is a persistent bounder. If  is not persistent, it is not dicult to nd out that '
cannot be valid based on our formal semantics for CF
0
.
In axiom A12, x is required not to be free in '. In addition, note that axiom A12
is not assumed in constructive logics (see [54], and [2]). We emphasise our situation
theoretical standpoint rather than intuitionistic or constructive viewpoint. So there
seems nothing preventing us from assuming the axiom.
With axiom A19, we are assuming that, at any situation, we can always decide
if a constant c is in  or not. The assumption is consistent with the semantic
interpretation of  given above. In addition, note that axioms A13 and A18 can
in fact be derived from the other axioms and related denitions, and thus can be
omitted.
CF
0
has the following inference rules:
(R1)
'; '   
 
(R2)
c 2  ^ '(c)   
9x 2 '(x)   
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(R3)
  ( c 2  _ '(c))
  8x 2 '(x)
In rules R2 and R3, the constant c is required not to occur in  .
The axiomatic systemCF
0
is a rst-order modication of Almukdad and Nelson's
N as well as Thomason's CF.
8
If we delete axiom A9 fromCF
0
, denoted CF
0 
, then
we have a system which is a modication of Almukdad and Nelson'sN
 
. Since axiom
A9 is not available in CF
0 
, we need another axiom to the eect that c 2  and
 c 2  do not hold at the same time, say c 2  ^  c 2   ?. So, with logic
CF
0 
, inconsistent situations are allowed, but the inconsistency of situations does
not arise from the contradictory statements of form c 2  ^  c 2 .
Basic notions (relative to CF
0
) such as thesishood, consequence, and consistency
can be dened in the usual way. For any sentence ', and set ? of sentences, we write
` ' to indicate that ' is a thesis of CF
0
, ? ` ' to indicate that ' is a consequence
in CF
0
of ?, and ? `  to indicate that there is a subset f'
1
; '
2
; :::; '
n
g of  such
that '
1
_ '
2
_ ::: _ '
n
is a consequence of ?.
From the denition of thesishood and consequence, it is easy to prove the fol-
lowing lemma.
Lemma 3.3.2 Let ?; be sets of L-sentences. If ? ` , then ?
0
` 
0
for some
nite subsets ?
0
and 
0
of ? and , respectively.
3.3.5 Derived Rules for CF
0
.
In this section, we list some rules for the deducibility-relation ` of CF
0
between sets
of L-sentences that are needed in the proof of semantical completeness. It is not
dicult to derive them from the axioms and rules of CF
0
given before. We divide
these rules into three groups. Group I consists of two structural rules, and group II
8
Note that neither N nor CF is formulated in axiomatic formalism.
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some operational rules. For CF
0 
, rule  E is to be replaced by a rule equivalent
to c 2  ^  c 2   ?. Group III is about connection between strong negation
and other connectives. Lacking the -introduction rule, we have to use numerous
negation rules to connect negation and other connectives by driving strong negation
back and forth across them. Note that, because there is no rule of -introduction,
we are able to use multiple-conclusion rules without in general being able to derive
the Law of Excluded Middle (see the related remarks on p. 82 by Gentzen [50], and
the example about the derivation of the law on p. 85 of [50])
Group I.
R: If ? and  are not disjoint, then ? ` .
T:
? ` 
?; ` ;
Group II.
_I:
? ` '; ;
? ` ' _  ;
_E:
?; ' ` ; ?;  ` ; ? ` ' _  ;
? ` 
 I:
?
P
; ' `  
?
P
` '   
 E:
? ` '   ;; ? ` ';
? `  ;
 E:
? ` ';; ? `  ';
? ` 
8I:
? `  c 2  _ '(c);
? ` 8x 2 '(x);
8E:
? ` 8x 2 '(x);
? `  c 2  _ '(c);
In 8I, c has no occurrence in '(x), or in any member of ? or of ;
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Group III.
 _I:
? `  ';; ? `   ;
? `  (' _  );
 _E:
? `  (' _  );
? `  ';
? `  (' _  );
? `   ;
 I:
? ` ';
? `  ';
 E:
? `  ';
? ` ';
 I:
? ` ';; ? `   ;
? `  ('   );
 E:
? `  ('   );
? ` ';
? `  ('   );
? `   ;
 8I:
? ` c 2  ^  '(c);
? `  8x 2 '(x);
 8E:
? `  8x 2 '(x);; ?; c 2  ^  '(c) ` 
? ` 
In  8E, c does not occur in '(x), or in any member of ? or of .
Theorem 3.3.1 (Soundness of CF
0
) Let ? be a set of L-sentences, and ' a L-
sentence. and M = hS;;D; Ii a model of L, s a situation in M. If ? ` ', and
s j=
+
?, then s j=
+
'.
Proof. Proof is routine and thus omitted.
Note that the soundness of CF
0
would fail if we included a rule of -introduction
(-I) to the eect that from ?; ' `  we can infer ? ` ';. To see this, observe
that, by derived rule R of CF
0
, ' ` '. By -I it then follows that ` ';'. And so
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` ' _ ' by rule _-I. But it is not dicult to see that  ' _ ' is not valid in the
current semantic framework. This shows that -I is not sound in CF
0
.
3.4 Completeness of CF
0
In this section, we show that rst-order logic CF
0
is semantically complete, based
on Thomason's completeness proof techniques in [98]. We rst introduce related
denitions and prove some auxiliary lemmas.
Denition 3.4.1 A set ? of L-sentences is L-!-complete if for all L-formulas '(x),
we have ? ` 8x 2 '(x) if ? `  c 2  _ '(c) for all c 2 C
L
. And ? is L-saturated
if it meets the following ve conditions: for any L-sentences ',  ,
(i) ? is consistent;
(ii) ? is deductively closed, that is, if ? ` ', then ' 2 ?;
(iii) if ? ` ' _  , then ? ` ' or ? `  ;
(iv) if  8x 2 '(x) 2 ?, then for some constant c 2 C
L
, c 2  ^  '(c) 2 ?;
(v) ? is L-!-complete.
Lemma 3.4.1 (Saturation Lemma I) Let ? be a set of L-sentences, and ' a L-
sentence. Suppose ? 6` '. Let C = fc
0
; c
1
; c
2
; :::g be a countable set of constants
foreign to L, B a set of bounders of L [ C, and L
0
= L [ C [ B. Then there is a
L
0
-saturated set ?
!
such that ?  ?
!
and ?
!
6` '.
Proof. In order to obtain required ?
!
, we dene two sequences h?
i
i
i
and h
i
i
i
by
induction as follows. Let h'
i
i
i
enumerate all L
0
-sentences, and h'
i;1
_ '
i;2
i
i
, h8x 2

i
'
i
(x)i
i
and h 8x 2 
i
'
i
(x)i
i
enumerate with innite repetition all disjunctive,
bounded universal and bounded existential sentences of L
0
respectively.
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Let ?
0
= ? and 
0
= f'g. Suppose that ?
k
and 
k
have been dened. To
dene ?
k+1
and 
k+1
, we distinguish the following ve cases.
Case 1. k = 4n, ?
k
` '
n;1
_ '
n;2
, and '
n;1
62 ?
k
and '
n;2
62 ?
k
. Put
?
k+1
= ?
k
[ f'
n;i
g;

k+1
= 
k
;
where i is the least of f1; 2g such that ?
k
[ f'
n;i
g 6` 
k
.
Case 2. k = 4n + 1. ?
k
`  8x 2 
n
'
n
(x);
k
and for all constants c 2 C
L
0
,
(c 2 
n
^  '
n
(c)) 62 ?
k
. Put
?
k+1
= ?
k
[ fc
k
2 
n
^  '
n
(c
k
)g;

k+1
= 
k
;
where c
k
is the rst member of C
L
0
not to occur in '
n
(x) or in any member of ?
k
or of 
k
.
Case 3. k = 4n + 2, there are two subcases.
Case 3.1. ?
k
; '
n
` 
k
. Put
?
k+1
= ?
k
;

k+1
= 
k
[ f'
n
g;
Case3.2. '
n
62 ?
k
and ?
k
; '
n
6` 
k
. Put
?
k+1
= ?
k
[ f'
n
g;

k+1
= 
k
:
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Case 4. k = 4n + 3. ?
k
;8x 2 
n
'
n
(x) ` 
k
, and for all constants c 2 C
L
0
,
( c 2 
n
_ '
n
(c)) 62 
k
. Put
?
k+1
= ?
k
;

k+1
= 
k
[ f c
k
2 
n
_ '
n
(c
k
)g;
where c
k
is the rst member of C
L
0
not to occur in '
n
(x) or in any member of ?
k
or of 
k
.
Case 5. None of the cases above applies, put
?
k+1
= ?
k
;

k+1
= 
k
:
It is then not dicult to check by induction that for any k 2 !, ?
k
6` 
k
using
the derived rules for CF
0
. To illustrate, let us consider case 3.1. We need to show
that if ?
k
; '
n
` 
k
, then ?
k
6` 
k
[ f'
n
g. Suppose ?
k
` 
k
[ f'
n
g. We assume
that '
n
;
k
and 
k
[ f'
n
g are the same set of formulas. By rule T and rule _I,
we have ?
k
` '
n
_ '
n
;
k
. Since we are assuming that ?
k
; '
n
` 
k
, it follows that
?
k
` 
k
by rule _E. But this contradicts the induction hypothesis. So we have
?
k
6` 
k
[ f'
n
g.
Now let ?
!
= [f?
k
: k 2 !g and 
!
= [f
k
: k 2 !g. We can show
that ?
!
6` 
!
, ?
!
= F
L
0
? 
!
and ?
!
is L
0
-saturated as desired. The details of
verication are omitted.
Lemma 3.4.2 (Saturation Lemma II) Let ? be a set of L-sentences, and ' and
 L-sentences, and B
P
L
all the persistent bounders in L. Suppose '   62 ?. Let
C = fc
0
; c
1
; c
2
; :::g be a countable set of constants foreign to L, B a set of bounders
of L[C, and L
0
= L[C[B. Then there is a L
0
-saturated set ?
!
such that ?
P
 ?
!
,
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' 2 ?
!
but  62 ?
!
and ( c
j
2 
P
i
) 2 ?
!
for any c
j
2 C; 
P
i
2 B
P
L
.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Saturation Lemma I except that this time we
let ?
0
= ?
P
[ f'g [ f c
j
2 
P
i
: c
j
2 C & 
P
i
2 B
P
L
g and 
0
= f g.
Denition 3.4.2 (Canonical Model Construction) Let C
1
; C
2
; C
3
; ::: be a countable
sequence of disjoint countable sets of constants foreign to L. Let C

n
be C
1
[ C
2
[
::: [C
n
, and B
n
a set of bounders of L [ C

n
such that B
l
 B
m
for any l  m  n.
Then for language L
!
= L [ ([C
n
) [ ([B
n
) , we can dene a Kripke model M =
hS;;D; Ii as follows:
(i) S consists of all ? such that for some n, L
 
= L [ C

n
[ B
n
, and ? is
L
 
-saturated.
(ii) for any L
 
-saturated set ? and L

-saturated set  with L
 
= L[C

m
[B
m
and L

= L [ C

n
[ B
n
(m < n), ?   if and only if ?
P
  and for any
c 2 C

n
? C

m
and 
P
2 B
L
 
, ( c 2 
P
) 2 .
(iii) if ? is L
 
-saturated and L
 
= L [ C

n
[ B
n
then D(?) = C
L
[ C

n
.
(iv) I
 
(c) =
8
>
<
>
:
c if c 2 C
L
[ C

n
;
undened otherwise.
(v) I
 
() = fc 2 C
L
[ C

n
: (c 2 ) 2 ?g:
(vi) I
 
(R)(c
1
; c
2
; :::; c
n
) =
8
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
:
T if R(c
1
; c
2
; :::; c
n
) 2 ?;
F if  R(c
1
; c
2
; :::; c
n
) 2 ?;
undened otherwise.
Lemma 3.4.3 (Truth Lemma) Suppose M = hS;;D; Ii is a canonical Kripke
model associated with L. Then for all ? 2 S, and all L
 
-sentences , we have
? j=
+
 if and only if  2 ?.
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Proof. By induction on the complexity of .
Case 1.  is an atomic sentence R(c
1
; c
2
; :::; c
n
) or c 2 , the lemma holds by the
denition of a canonical Kripke model.
Case 2.  is an atomic sentence  R(c
1
; c
2
; :::; c
n
), the lemma holds again by the
denition of a canonical Kripke model. If  is  c 2 , suppose that ? j=
+
 c 2 ,
that is ? j=
 
c 2 . By denition, either I
 
(c) is not dened or I
 
(c) is dened
and I
 
(c) 62 I
 
(). In either case, (c 2 ) 62 ?. By axiom A19 and saturatedness of
?, we get ( c 2 ) 2 ?. For converse, let ( c 2 ) 2 ?. By axiom A9 and the
consistency of ?, we get (c 2 ) 62 ?. From this it follows that ? j=
+
 c 2 .
Case 3.  is ' _  . Straightforward and thus omitted.
Case 4.  is  (' _  ). Straightforward and thus omitted.
Case 5.  is '   . Suppose '   2 ?. We show ? j= '   . For any 
such that ?  , we have ?
P
 . Since '   2 ? and '   is persistent, we
get '   2 ?
P
 . It follows that if ' 2 , then  2  by rule  E. By the
hypothesis of induction, then, for all such , if  j= ', then  j=  ; and therefore
? j= '   .
Conversely, suppose '   62 ?, then '   62 ?
P
, so ?
P
[ f'g 6`  by rule
 I. Using the Saturation Lemma II, we can get a saturated set  2 S such that
?  ; ' 2 , but  62 . By the hypothesis of induction, we get  j= ' but
 6j=  . Thus ? 6j= '   .
Case 6.  is  ('   ). ? j=
+
 ('   ) if and only if ? j=
 
'   if and only
if ? j=
+
' and ? j=
 
 if and only if ? j=
+
' and ? j=
+
  , and this if and only if
' 2 ? and   2 ? by the hypothesis of induction. But ' 2 ? and   2 ? if and
only if  ('   ) 2 ? by rules  I and  E.
Case 7.  is  '. Straightforward and thus omitted.
Case 8.  is 8x 2 '(x). Suppose ? j=
+
8x 2 '(x), then for all c 2 D(?),
if ? j=
+
c 2 , then ? j=
+
'(c). But ? j=
+
c 2  _  c 2 . It follows that for
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all c 2 D(?), ? j=
+
 c 2  _ '(c), so ( c 2  _ '(c)) 2 ? by the hypothesis
of induction. Thus 8x 2 '(x) 2 ? by the L
 
-!-completeness of ?. Conversely,
suppose 8x 2 '(x) 2 ?, then for any c 2 D(?), ( c 2  _ '(c)) 2 ? by rule
8E, so  c 2  2 ? or '(c) 2 ? by the saturatedness of ?. Since ? is consistent, if
c 2  2 ?, then  c 2  62 ?, so '(c) 2 ?. That is, for any c 2 D(?), if ? j=
+
c 2 
then ? j=
+
'(c) by the hypothesis of induction, so ? j=
+
8x 2 '(x).
Case 9.  is  8x 2 '(x). The proof is similar to that for case 8 except that
we use condition (iv) of L
 
-saturatedness of ? and rule  8I, completing the proof.
Theorem 3.4.1 (Strong Completeness for CF
0
) Let ' be a L-sentence and ?
a set of L-sentences. If ?  ' then ? ` '.
Proof. Suppose ? 6` '. By canonical model construction, we can associate L
 
with
a canonical Kripke model M = hS;;D; Ii. Saturation Lemma I then guarantees
us that there is a  2 S such that ?   and ' 62 . By Truth Lemma,  j= ?
but  6j= '. Therefore, ? 6 '.
3.5 First-Order Logic CF
0
and Infon Logic
The main result of this chapter is the proposal of a rst-order logic CF
0
with strong
negation and bounded static quantiers, which is a variant of Thomason's logic CF.
Dierent from most constructive logics, quantiers in our system as in Thomason's
are static rather than dynamic. Our intention is to develop CF
0
further so that it
can serve as a logic for situation theory.
Originally, situation theorists were not much concerned with developing their
own logical systems. Their semantic theory of consequence emphasised the exter-
nal signicance of language and the role of non-linguistic contexts. Consequence is
for them no longer a relation between syntactic elements. There is no exact cor-
respondence between the information conveyed by an utterance and the sentence
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used to convey. In fact \... there can be no syntactic counterpart, of the kind
traditionally sought in proof theory and theories of logical form, to the [situation]
semantic theory of consequence." (see pp. 44-45 of Barwise and Perry [11]). How-
ever the desire to use situation theory and situation semantics to give an account
of inference eventually led Barwise and Etchemendy to construct a situation theo-
retical model of inference, emphasising information content. They called this infon
logic; that is a logic whose elementary formulas represent items of information and
whose compounds correspond to ways of compounding those items (see Barwise and
Etchemendy [10], [32]).
In [10], Barwise and Etchemendy argue that infon logic is at least intuitionistic
but not classical. This argument is problematic. There are at least two issues asso-
ciated with the argument as we pointed out in the rst chapter. One is about what
kind of negation is used in infon logic. Is intuitionistic or strong negation used in in-
fon logic? The other is about the form of universal quantiers. Are dynamic or static
quantiers used in infon logic? We have argued in the rst chapter that negation in
infon logic should be strong negation rather than intuitionistic one. As to universal
quantiers, from the situation-theoretic viewpoint, static universal quantiers are
more desirable than dynamic ones for the reasons we discussed in this chapter. In
fact, quantiers in related situation theoretical literature are interpreted in one way
or another statically rather than dynamically (see p. 271 of [8], pp. 134-136 of [32],
and p. 109 of [38]) though they are not treated in Barwise and Etchemendy's infon
logic [10]. Since it is intuitionistic negation and dynamic universal quantiers that
are used in intuitionistic logic, we conclude that infon logic cannot be intuitionistic
either.
Instead, we are inclined to use constructive negation, more generally, to use
constructive logic with strong negation as the underlying logic for situation theory
but to interpret quantiers statically rather than dynamically. That is the way we
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arrive at the logic CF
0
from situation theorists' work on infon logic. However, we do
not claim that our logic is fully-edged. For one thing, the components in a basic
formula R(a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
), or using the notation of infon logic, R; a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
; i
are still individuals whereas infon logic allows them to be any objects. Nevertheless,
we do intend to claim that our logic preserves many features of infon logic since
(i) CF
0
is partial in the sense that a formula can be neither true nor false; (ii)
it has a rich algebraic structure of persistent formulas; (iii) with strong negation
available, CF
0
has in fact two kinds of basic formula very similar to the two kinds
of basic infons of situation theory; (iv) the negation of compound formulas satises
DeMorgan's laws which are assumed to hold in situation theory; (iv) quantiers
in CF
0
are static, as is consistent with the situation theoretical interpretation of
quantiers.
Chapter 4
Deductive Databases
From this chapter onwards, we are going to discuss both nonmonotonic negation
and strong negation in deductive databases. The discussion will be in the more
general context of logic programming. Our emphasis, however, is on the database
viewpoint. In the present chapter, we rst of all briey consider one of limitations
in expressive power under the conventional relational model. This should motivate
the deductive approach to databases. Then we give the formal denitions of a logic
program and a deductive database. Finally, we consider one of central problems in
the deductive approach, that is the problem of negation, which is closely related to
nonmonotonic reasoning.
4.1 From Relational to Deductive Databases
In the area of database theory, the relational model, introduced by Codd in 1970s
in a series of papers [26], [27], [29], [28], [30], has become dominant. As its name
suggests, the model has relations as its data structures. Based upon relational
algebra or the equivalent relational calculus, manipulation of data in a relational
database is a model-theoretic process (see [77] and [92]): the database is treated as
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an interpretation of the query language, and queries and integrity constraints are
logical formulas that are to be evaluated over the interpretation using the well-known
Tarski's truth denition (see [13]). A typical characteristic of a relational system is
its declarativeness: the user may query or update a database in a declarative way by
saying what is wanted, rather than in a procedural way by saying how the operation
is computed. With its simplicity and declarativeness, the relational database model
has enjoyed widespread success. The leading database vendors produce relational
systems
1
, including IBM's DB2, Oracle, Informix, INGRES, Sybase, and Microsoft
Access.
However, it has long been recognised that the relational model is not perfect
and has one or another limitation (see [61] and [92]). One conspicuous deciency
is its expressive power
2
. In order to see this, we recall that non-recursive datalog
with negation is one of three syntactically dierent but equivalent relational query
languages, the other two being the relational algebra and relational calculus [1]. In
the non-recursive datalog with negation, recursion is explicitly forbidden, that is to
say the relational model itself does not provide any facilities for expressing general
rules. As a result, the transitive closure of a relation cannot be dened in a rela-
tional query language without interfacing with a host procedural language. Indeed,
practical relational query languages like Structured Query Language (SQL) are usu-
ally embedded in full programming languages such as C programming language to
express recursion (see [61] and [1]).
Although with SQL being embedded in a full programming language, SQL state-
ments are allowed to be coupled with host language programs, and thus recursion can
be provided by \while" loops in the host language; nevertheless, the declarativeness
of the relational systems is thereby compromised.
1
These systems may be object-oriented as well.
2
For the study of the expressive power of a relational query language in a formal framework,
see [1] and citations there.
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There has been much eort devoted to extending the relational model instead of
coupling a relational query language with a host programming language. Deductive
database systems are one such extension (see [44], [92], [71], [15], [87]). In com-
parison to relational systems, deductive systems adopt a proof-theoretic paradigm
rather than the model-theoretic one
3
. Accordingly, a database is not taken as an
interpretation but as a theory consisting of a set of rst-order sentences, and exe-
cuting a query or satisfying an integrity constraint is regarded as proving that some
specied formula is a logical consequence of the theory (see [77] and [92]).
Another important thrust to the development of deductive databases is owed to
logic programming, more generally to automatic theorem proving. See [71] for a his-
torical introduction of the development of deductive databases, and the relationship
between deductive databases and logic programming. Indeed, deductive databases
can be seen as the integration of relational databases with logic programs, with
relational query languages being extended to logic programming languages. For
non-recursive datalog with negation, this means that it is extended to (recursive)
datalog with negation (see [1]).
With the presence of general rules in deductive databases, the transitive closure
of a relation can be recursively dened in a straightforward way, and thus it be-
comes possible to query a deductive database about recursively dened relations.
So, deductive systems provide a simple solution to the weak expressive power of the
relational model. The increased expressive power of deductive database systems, as
pointed out in [87], \is important in a variety of application domains, including deci-
sion support, nancial analysis, scientic modeling, various applications of transitive
closure (e.g. bill-of-materials, path problems), language analysis, and parsing." (see
also [88]).
In addition to the stronger power, the proof-theoretic approach to database the-
3
In [92], it is shown that how the model-theoretic perspective on databases can be reinterpreted
in purely proof-theoretic terms.
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ory against the model-theoretic one has logic as a single uniform formalism for
describing facts and rules in databases, queries and integrity constraints, and for
a variety of other apparently dierent problems, including verication of integrity
constraints, program correctness proofs and many others (see [44]). More impor-
tantly, with logic programming languages as declarative database query languages,
deductive database systems preserve the important property of being declarative.
The proof-theoretic approach to databases despite its merits does have its own
diculties to overcome. Before we move on to discuss the problem of negation in
deductive databases, we give the main concepts and notations.
4.2 Logic Programs and Deductive Databases
From the database viewpoint, deductive databases are an extension of the traditional
relational databases. In a deductive database, there are not only ground atoms,
which correspond to tuples of the relations in relational databases, but also general
rules, which constitute the extended part.
From the logic programming viewpoint, deductive databases can also be equally
seen as logic programs. A major dierence between deductive databases and logic
programs is that deductive databases are usually restricted to function-free lan-
guages. Another dierence between deductive databases and logic programs is that
databases usually have more facts than rules whereas logic programs are other way
around. See [1] for a brief summary of the dierences between two elds. From
a theoretical viewpoint, these dierences are inessential and can be ignored. So
deductive databases and logic programs are often used interchangeably.
Although there is no great dierence between deductive databases and logic
programs at the theoretical level, we shall nonetheless dene logic programs and de-
ductive databases in a slightly dierent way. This as we shall see mainly is concerned
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with the representation of negative information.
Both deductive databases and logic programs use the language of rst-order logic
as their underlying language. But, the terminology and notations used are to great
extent dierent from that in rst-order logic. Following the convention of logic
programming, we shall use comma \," for conjunction, use \not" for non-monotonic
negation, and use uppercase letters X;Y;Z; :::: for variables, and lowercase letters
for predicates, constants and functions if there are any. The word ground is used to
mean variable-free.
Denition 4.2.1 A normal logic program or simply a program , consists of a nite
set of rules of the form
p :? q
1
; q
2
; :::; q
m
; not q
m+1
; : : : ; not q
n
:
where m;n  0, and p and q
i
are atoms. p is called the head of the rule, the q
i
make up the body of the rule. An atom is of form p(t
1
; t
2
; :::; t
n
), where p is an n-ary
predicate symbol and t
1
; t
2
; :::; t
n
are terms which are dened as usual.
If p is an atom, then p is a positive literal, notp is its negative literal, and they are
complements of each other. For any literal l, we use l for its complement. For any
rule r in a logic program, we use head(r) for its head, body(r) for its body. A literal
l 2 body(r) is called a subgoal. For a set L of literals, we use L
+
for positive atoms
in L, L
 
for atoms whose negative literals are in L. For a set  of atoms, we use
not for the set fnotp : p 2 g. Thus, we have body(r) = body(r)
+
[notbody(r)
 
.
If a rule has no negative literals in its body, then it is a denite rule. A normal
logic program is denite provided that the program consists of only denite rules.
Denition 4.2.2 The Herbrand universe of a program P, denoted HU
P
, is the set of
all ground terms constructed from only the constant symbols and function symbols
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in the program. In the case the program P does not contain a constant symbol, we
add an arbitrary one to the universe HU
P
so that HU
P
is not empty.
The Herbrand base of P, denoted HB
P
, is the set of all ground atoms constructed
from predicates in Pwhose arguments are in HU
P
.
We shall assume that all rules in a logic program are ground. That is to say,
we assume all variables in logic program P are already instantiated relative to its
Herbrand universe.
Denition 4.2.3 Given a normal logic program P, and a set L of ground literals
whose atoms are in the Herbrand base HB
P
of P. If there is no ground atom p such
that both p and notp are in L, then L is said conict-free; otherwise, it is conicting.
For a conict-free set L of literals, if L contains every atom of the Herbrand base
or its negation, then L can be taken as a Herbrand interpretation (see [64]) with the
understanding that missing atoms from a Herbrand interpretation are now explicitly
represented as the negative literals in L.
A literal l is said to be true in a set L of literals if the literal l is in L; and false
in L if its complement l is in L. For a Herbrand interpretation L, a rule of P is
satised in L if whenever all subgoals are true in L, the head is also true in L. If
every rule of P is satised in a Herbrand interpretation L, then L is a model of P.
In the above denition of logic program, facts are integrated with rules; facts are
taken as special rules with the empty body. In the following denition of deductive
databases, we shall have facts separate from rules, dividing information into two
categories: facts and rules (see [87]).
Denition 4.2.4 A deductive database DDB is a tuple hDB;Pi of a set DB of facts
(also called data), and a set of rules, that is a normal program P.
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Facts are represented by ground atoms. The data DB are referred to as the
extensional database and the normal logic program P as the intensional database.
Given a deductive database hDB;Pi, its predicates are accordingly divided into
two categories: extensional predicates and intensional predicates. An extensional
predicate is a predicate occurring either in DB or only in the body of a rule. An
intensional predicate is a predicate occurring as the head of some rule of P. Fur-
thermore, there is a similar division among atoms. An extensional atom is an atom
whose predicate is extensional. An intensional atom is an atom whose predicate is
intensional.
An extensional predicate may occur in the body of a rule but not the head of
any rule. In contrast, an intensional predicate may occur both in the head of a rule
and in the body of the same rule, but if an intensional predicate occurs only in the
head of a rule, we call it a simply intensional predicate. A simply intensional atom
is an atom whose predicate is simply intensional. The notion of simply intensional
atom will be used in the denition of quasi-stable semantics in Chapter 6.
Given a deductive database hDB;Pi, one of main tasks is to determine the ex-
tensions of intensional predicates, that is the semantics of its intensional component
P since the the meaning of its extensional component DB is clear cut: all exten-
sional atoms are taken as true if they are in DB, and false otherwise. Based on this
observation, we may as well assume that P is purely intensional in the sense that
there are not any extensional atoms occurring in the body of rules of P. If there is
any such extensional atom p, we can always reduce P based upon DB to a purely
intensional program in the following way:
(1) if p occurs in the body of some rule of P,
 if p is in DB then remove it from the rule;
 p is not in DB then remove the rule since then the rule will never be red
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to infer any information;
(2) if not p occurs in the body of some rule of P,
 if p is not in DB, then remove not p from the rule;
 if p is in DB, then remove the rule since then the rule will never be red
to infer any information.
For a purely intensional component P of a deductive database hDB;Pi, it is
not dicult to see that its meaning is independent of the corresponding extensional
component DB. So we may restrict our discussions to logic programs.
The point of separating facts from rules in a deductive database as we mentioned
earlier is concerned with the representation of negative information. This is a good
place to oer an explanation of this. In the extensional component of a deductive
database, positive facts are explicitly represented whereas negative facts are implic-
itly represented. In contrast, the same strategy of implicitly representing negative
information as we shall see in the next chapter is not always adequate for the in-
tensional component in the sense that the computation of extensions of intensional
predicates may involve explicit representation of negative information. With facts
and rules separated, we may still use the strategy of implicitly representing negative
facts for extensional databases.
4.3 Why Negation?
Given a database, we are concerned with what can be drawn from it from the in-
formational viewpoint. In the context of relational databases, information retrieval,
as we mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, is a model-theoretic process. A
relational database is taken as an interpretation. The truth of atomic queries, that is
atomic queries of form p against a relational database is determined by its presence
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or absence in the database. The truth of more complex queries is then evaluated
using Tarski's truth denition. In contrast, the information retrieval in the context
of logic programs is a proof-theoretic process. A logic program is taken as a theory.
The truth of a query against a deductive database is determined by its provability
from the database. Unfortunately, provability is a very strong condition which is
not suitable from the database viewpoint.
In the second chapter, with the analysis of classical negation at the semantic
and proof-theoretic levels, we have shown that on the one hand, a monotonic de-
ductive inference mechanism is not adequate for dealing with negative information
even in the area of relational databases. This is because classical negation at the
proof-theoretic level expresses inconsistency which is monotonic whereas negative
information concerned in the area of databases is usually nonmonotonic. On the
other hand, the semantic rule M2 does provide us with a mechanism for deriving
desired negative information in the context of relational databases.
Unfortunately, the semantic rule M2 is no longer valid in the context of deductive
databases. Consider the following logic program P, which is an extension of the
relational database we discussed in the second chapter:
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teach(frege;rst-order-logic):
teach(cantor; set-theory):
teach(tarski;model-theory):
teach(turing; recursion-theory):
teach(godel; proof-theory):
teach(tarski; proof-theory):
teach(turing; proof-theory):
teach(X; set-theory) :? teach(X;model-theory):
teach(X; set-theory) :? teach(X; recursion-theory):
teach(X; set-theory) :? teach(X; proof-theory):
and two queries to it,
q
1
: Who does not teach proof-theory?
q
2
: Who does not teach set-theory?
Intuitively, we want ffrege; cantorg to be the answer to q
1
since P contains neither
teach(cantor; proof-theory) nor teach(frege; proof-theory). But the nal rule of P is
only concerned with set-theory instead of proof-theory, so it cannot be used to in-
fer any information about teach(cantor; proof-theory) or teach(frege; proof-theory).
However, rst-order logic itself does not enable us to reach the intended an-
swers to the query q
1
. To logically infer that :teach(cantor; proof-theory) and
:teach(frege; proof-theory), we have to show that teach(frege; proof-theory) _
teach(cantor; proof-theory) is not consistent with P. From the given information,
however, this is impossible since we can nd a model for teach(frege; proof-theory)_
teach(cantor; proof-theory) and P. So we cannot logically reach the conclusion.
As to the second query q
2
, we want ffregeg to be the answer to it. Using
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the same argument as for q
1
, we know that this conclusion cannot be logically
reached either. But this time, we do not want to include tarski, or turing or
godel in the answer. Although Pdoes not directly contain teach(tarski; set-theory),
teach(turing; set-theory), or teach(godel; set-theory), nevertheless, they can be in-
ferred logically from P using the nal rule. That is to say, in the context of logic
programs, we cannot obtain desired negative information by simply employing a
simple rule like M2. In order to obtain intended answers to q
1
and q
2
, we have to
seek a dierent inference mechanism.
The logic program we just discussed is only an example of datalog. As we shall
see, the problem of negation in datalog is not very dicult. The real challenge
comes from logic programs with negation in their bodies, especially when negation
is involved in recursion. In order to see such logic programs do exist in practical
applications, let us consider an example, which is based on similar examples from
[105] and [1], It is worth pointing out that the example is one of the motivational
examples for both the stable model semantics [47] and the well-founded semantics
[105], and also closed related to a game described by Kolaitis [60].
Example 4.3.1 Consider a game between two players. The game consists of a series
of states. The possible moves of the game are held in an extensional relation moves,
where moves(a; b) means that a player, when in state a, may choose to move to b.
A player wins if the opponent has no moves. Let winning(X) denote X is a
winning state; that is a state has a winning strategy for a player. Then the winning
rule can be expressed by the following program P
w
:
winning(X) :? move(X;Y ); not winning(Y ):
Suppose the game has three states a; b; c, with the following sample instance of
relation moves:
moves = f(a; b); (b; a); (b; c)g
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which is graphically represented as
a b c
The Herbrand instantiation of the program is as follows:
winning(a) :? move(a; a); not winning(a):
winning(a) :? move(a; b); not winning(b):
winning(a) :? move(a; c); not winning(c):
winning(b) :? move(b; a); not winning(a):
winning(b) :? move(b; b); not winning(b):
winning(b) :? move(b; c); not winning(c):
winning(c) :? move(c; a); not winning(a):
winning(c) :? move(c; b); not winning(b):
winning(c) :? move(c; c); not winning(c):
where there are three rules in which winning depends negatively on itself. According
to the winning rule, it is not dicult to see that winning(b) should be true but not
winning(a) and winning(c). But, how shall we compute the set of winning states
for any instance of the relation moves? What we need is a general mechanism to
determine winning states. It turns out that in this case, the well-founded semantics
[105] does provide us with such a mechanism to nd the intended answer. 2
The treatment of negative information in deductive databases, more generally
in logic programming, turns out to be extremely dicult, especially when negation
is involved in recursion. In the past two decades, much eort has been devoted
to the research about negation in deductive databases and in logic programming
by proposing various kinds of semantic theories for logic programs. Indeed, as
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pointed out in [87], a very important thrust to the study of deductive databases
and logic programming, \has been the problem of coping with negation or non-
monotonic reasoning, where classical logic does not oer, through the conventional
means of logical deduction, an adequate denition of what some very natural logical
statements `mean' to the programmer."
4.3.1 Nonmonotonicity of not
Since logic does not help, it is inevitable for us to devise some non-logical mechanism
to deal with the use and retrieval of negative information in the context of logic
programs. More generally, we have to dene what can be inferred from a logic
program. From the semantic perspective, this is the same as determining what is true
and what is false relative to a given logic program. Consequently it will also provide
an interpretation of not. Dierent semantics may have dierent interpretations of
not in one way or another (see the next chapter for more details). This roughly
explains why we said in the rst chapter that the exact meaning of a piece of
negative information represented by not p depends on the specic semantics used.
Whatever semantics is used, however, nonmonotonicity is a common and essential
characteristic of this kind of negation.
It is interesting to note that the nonmonotonicity can in fact be envisaged in
advance independently of any semantics. Indeed, from the database viewpoint, the
nonmonotonicity of not can be argued quite directly. In relational databases, it is the
semantic notion of classical negation that we use to deal with negative information
in evaluating a query expressed in non-recursive datalog with negation. But we
have seen that classical negation at the semantic level is nonmonotonic, so is the
negation not used in non-recursive datalog. Equivalently, in the relational algebra
4
4
Recall the relational algebra and the non-recursive datalog with negation are two of three
dierent but equivalent relational query languages [1].
4. Deductive Databases 71
negation is expressed by exploiting the set dierence operation. The R's that are
not S's are just R?S. This notion of negation is clearly non-monotonic, for initially
x may be in R ? S but when more is learned of x we may add x 2 S and so lose
the previous negative item of information. When we extend non-recursive datalog
with negation to allow recursion we should preserve this non-monotonicity so that,
whenever the semantics is applied within a non-recursive datalog program, we still
have the same result as we would from a relational database using the conventional
relational theory. Thus not has to remain nonmonotonic.
Combining the examples in the previous section with the above argument, we
can now formulate the relationship between nonmonotonic negation and classical
negation. The examples in the previous section shows that nonmonotonic nega-
tion not should be dierent from classical negation at both the semantical and
proof-theoretical levels. On the one hand, compared with classical negation at the
semantical level, nonmonotonic negation not should be more general so that not will
be suitable in the context of logic program, a wider context than that of relational
databases. Moreover, the nonmonotonicity argument above shows that nonmono-
tonic negation should be in fact an extension of classical negation at the semantic
level. On the other hand, compared with classical negation at the proof-theoretical
level, nonmonotonic negation not should be much weaker so that the negative in-
formation required from the database viewpoint can be adequately inferred and
expressed by not. As a result, nonmonotonic negation should also to some extent
extend classical negation at the proof-theoretic level in the context of logic programs.
We shall see in the next chapter, such a proof-theoretic extension of classical nega-
tion is achieved through a kind of nonmonotonic reasoning introduced in a semantics
of logic programs.
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4.3.2 Strong Negation in Logic Programs
From the knowledge representation viewpoint, non-monotonic negation can only
represent indenite negative knowledge. A piece of nonmonotonically negative in-
formation might be given up later when more information is available. But there
are situations where such a negation is not adequate. When denitely negative
knowledge is required, a stronger negation seems indispensable.
Let us consider an example from [3]:
convicted(X) : ?charged(X); innocent(X):
The intended interpretation to the above formula is that a person charged with a
crime should be convicted if there is a direct evidence against him or her. Here we
cannot replace  with non-monotonic negation. Otherwise, it would mean that a
person charged with a crime should be convicted when there is no evidence showing
that he or she is innocent. This is certainly not consistent with judicial practice.
Since non-monotonic negation is not suitable in the above example, we have
to use a dierent one. Obviously, this dierent kind of negation has to be at least
monotonic so that when more information is added, what is originally negated should
not be overturned
5
. Classical negation at the proof-theoretical level is a candidate.
But the semantic principle of bivalence behind the classical negation makes it not
suitable. In addition, there are also computational diculties associated it (see [63]).
Without the restriction of bivalence, the classical negation becomes intuitionistic.
So, another choice may as well be intuitionistic negation. But in chapter 3 we
have shown that intuitionistic negation is less desirable than the strong negation of
constructive logics. In logic programming and deductive databases, the application
of strong negation for explicit representation of negative information is originally
proposed in [79]. See also [108], [109], [110]. Gelfond and Lifschitz in [48], [49]
5
W
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also proposed to extend logic programs with classical negation from the knowledge
representation viewpoint. But, as it is pointed out in [109], what is named classical
negation in [48] is in fact strong negation.
Back to our example, it turns out that strong negation can perfectly capture the
negation in question. A direct evidence against a person p will enable us to explicitly
assert that he or she is not innocent, that is  innocent(p). One might suggest to
replace  innocent(X) with guilty(X) to eliminate the use of strong negation at
all. The problem with the replacement, as it is pointed out by Wagner [109], is that
we will lose reasoning capabilities based on inconsistency.
Augmented with strong negation, logic programming can represent both de-
nitely positive and denitely negative knowledge. Without the restriction of biva-
lence, logic programs with strong negation may also deal with incomplete informa-
tion in the sense that the answer to a ground query need not be yes or no. It may
be neither. Motivated by the above, we shall also study extended logic programs,
that is logic programs extended by strong negation, after we study logic programs.
Chapter 5
Non-monotonic Negation
A great number of interesting semantic theories for logic programs with nonmono-
tonic negation have been proposed in the past two decades. The purpose of this
chapter is to review several main semantic theories for logic programs, showing how
non-monotonic negation is dealt with in them. The choice of reviewed semantic
theories is mainly based on their relevance to our proposed semantics in the next
chapter. So it is by no means intended to be a comprehensive overview of the area,
and does not imply any prejudice to other theories either. Readers are invited to
refer to [64] for an elementary introduction to logic programming, and [15], [72],
[33], and [34] for detailed surveys on negation in logic programming.
The semantics reviewed here include the semantics of denite logic programs
mainly by van Emden and Kowalski [103], Clark's program completion semantics
and the associated SLDNF[25], Reiter's closed world assumption [90], Fitting's se-
mantics [40], the well-founded semantics by Gelder, Ross and Schlipf [105], stable
semantics by Gelfond and Lifschitz [47], and a three-valued version of the stable
model semantics by Przymusinski [85]. The review is discussed in the context of
logic programs. We shall show that these semantics in spite of their shortcom-
ings in one way or another do give us an instructive insight towards understanding
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nonmonotonic negation.
5.1 Introduction
Semantics of Logic programs can be dealt with using many dierent approaches.
Here we concentrate on two dierent but related interpretations: the model-theoretic
interpretation and the deductive one. The model-theoretic interpretation, declar-
ative in nature, is to take a logic program as a rst-order theory. To dene the
semantics for the program is to choose some models of this theory and use them to
assign a meaning to the program.
The deductive interpretation, more procedural in nature, is to take a logic pro-
gram as a set of inference rules. To dene semantics for a logic program is to nd out
what can be inferred from the program; here inference is not necessarily logical rea-
soning: it may be non-monotonic reasoning or other forms. Using the terminology
of default logic
1
, the deductive approach is to take logic program rules as defaults.
That is a logic program is taken as a default theory. Then we use concepts like
extensions or weak extensions associated with the theory to provide the program
with a meaning (see [66]).
Note that there are various classications of dierent approaches to semantic
theories for logic programs with nonmonotonic negation. In [105], semantic theories
are classied into the \program completion" approach and the \canonical model"
approach. In [33] they are divided into logic-programming-semantics, which is based
on the idea of negation-as-nite-failure [25], and non-monotonic reasoning-semantics,
which is inspired by logics of common sense reasoning such as default logic [91], and
autoepistemic logic [74].
We are not attempting to give any classication of existing semantics. Instead
1
In [16], default logic has been used a uniform formalism for dening semantics of logic programs.
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we only consider the model-theoretic approach and the deductive approach with
the emphasis on the latter one. We shall make use of the concept of extensions
rather than that of models as much as we can. We take classical two-valued logic
as our underlying logic. As we shall see in this chapter, the Fitting semantics and
the well-founded semantics are in general partial in the sense that some atoms in a
logic program may be neither true nor false. From the model-theoretic perspective,
xpoints in the Fitting semantics and the well-founded semantics, when taken as
models, have to be viewed in the framework of three-valued logic. From the de-
ductive perspective, they can also taken as incomplete extensions as in default logic
[91]. This way, classical logic is augmented with logic programming rather than
being replaced by a three-valued logic.
5.2 Semantics for Denite Logic Programs
Semantics for denite logic programs is now well established. There are three dier-
ent but equivalent approaches to dening the semantics, resulting in model-theoretic
semantics, xpoint semantics, and procedural semantics
2
. Since procedural seman-
tics involves introducing some kind of refutation procedure based on the resolution
inference rule such as SLD-resolution [6], which we will not cover later in the discus-
sion of normal logic programs, we shall only have a brief look at the model-theoretic
and xpoint semantics. See [64] for a detailed introduction to the three approaches.
The model-theoretic semantics of logic programs is based on the semantics of
rst-order logic. The truth value of an atom relative to a logic program P is deter-
mined by the logical consequences of P, that is fp(t
1
; : : : ; t
n
) : P  p(t
1
; : : : ; t
n
)g,
where P  p(t
1
; : : : ; t
n
) means that P logically implies p(t
1
; : : : ; t
n
). It is shown in
[103] that the logical consequences of P are equal to the intersection of all Herbrand
2
In [1], it is also called proof-theoretic semantics since it is based on obtaining proofs of facts
from a logic program.
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models of P, which is itself a Herbrand model, and thus is called the least Herbrand
model for P. So we may reduce the logical consequences of a denite logic program
to its unique least Herbrand model, and determine the truth of an atom using the
least Herbrand model as follows: if an atom is in the model then it is taken as true;
otherwise taken as false. So it is natural to assign the least model as the declarative
meaning of a denite program.
Note that when we say an atom is taken to be false if it is not in the least model,
we are moving out of the realm of logical reasoning into that of nonmonotonic
reasoning. An atom is not in the least model of a denite program only means that
the atom is not a logical consequence of the program, which is dierent from that
the negation of the atom is a logical consequence of the program. When we assign
the truth-value false to all the atoms not in the least model, we are implicitly using
the CWA, which is nonmonotonic as we shall see later in this chapter.
The xpoint semantics is also based upon a theorem by van Emden and Kowalski
[103] (see also Apt and van Emden [6]). The theorem shows that the least Herbrand
model is equal to a least xpoint, which in turn can be characterised in a constructive
way, using xpoint theory, that is using Knaster-Tarski's and Kleene's theorems (see
[6] and [64] for details). To dene the xpoint characterisation, an operator T
P
on
HB
P
, now usually called the immediate consequence operator [1], is introduced as
follows:
T
P
(L) = fp 2 HB
P
: 9r 2 P(head(r) = p ^ 8q2 body(r)q 2 Lg.
It is easy to prove that T
P
is monotonic. In fact it can be proved more strongly that
T
P
is continuous. See [64] for relevant details. It then follows that T
P
has a least
xpoint lfp(T
P
), which can be computed in a constructive way. Since we shall use
the computation for other monotonic operators, we state it here as a lemma in a
general form for reference later.
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Lemma 5.2.1 Assume the underlying complete lattice is either HB
P
or (HB
P
[
not HB
P
) with the containment  as its natural and default ordering
3
, where P is a
logic program. For a monotonic operator ? on the complete lattice, the least xpoint
lfp(?) can be characterised by the following:
lfp(?) =
[
? " 
and there exists an ordinal  such that for any  > 
lfp(?) = ? " 
where
? " 0 = ;:
? "  = ?(? " ( ? 1)); if  is a successor ordinal.
? "  =
S
f? "  :  < g; if  is a limit ordinal.
Denition 5.2.1 The closure ordinal for the sequence h? " i

is the least ordinal 
such that ? "  = lfp(?).
Although it is universally accepted that for any denite logic program P, its
least Herbrand model can be used to dene the meaning of P, it is much more
controversial about how to assign an appropriate meaning to a normal logic program.
In comparison to a denite logic program, a normal logic program may have more
than one minimal Herbrand model. For example, P = fp :? not qg has fpg and
fqg as its minimal models.
The operator T
P
is usually not monotonic and may have no xpoint at all. For
example, let P = fp : ?not pg. T
P
is not monotonic. Indeed, T
P
"  alternates
between ; and fpg. The program also gives us an example of T
P
having no xpoint
at all. For some programs, even if T
P
has a least xpoint, the xpoint may not
3
Later in the discussion of 3-valued stable models, we shall see a dierent ordering.
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be approximated by the sequence T
P
" . See [1] for some more counterexample
programs.
So, various equivalent forms of semantics for denite logic programs cannot be
simply generalised to normal logic programs. In the following sections, we present
some main contributions to dening semantics of normal logic programs.
5.3 Program Completion and Negation as Failure
The program completion semantics and its associated SLDNF-resolution were initi-
ated by Clark in [25] and further developed by many others (see [64], [105] and its
citations there).
The notion of a program completion
4
, as its name may suggest, is to complete a
program by making explicit what is implicit in the program. Specically, the basic
point is to take a rule as a partial denition for the predicate in the rule head,
and use all rules with same head predicate to make a complete denition for the
predicate. But this viewpoint about a program is not explicitly represented in a
logic program due to the conditional form of rules in a program. The process of
completing a program is to make explicit the point that a program is taken as a set
of denitions.
So, given a program P, a completed program Comp(P) is dened as follow:
replace all rules with the same predicate in the head with a single bi-conditional
formula whose left operand is the head of the original rules and whose right operand
is a disjunction of the original rule bodies; for predicates not in the head of any rule,
a negative literal for the predicate is added. In addition, a theory of equality is also
required to impose restrictions on the possible interpretations of =. For the formal
details of the denition, see [25] and [64].
4
In [25] this was called the completion of a data base.
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The introduction of the completion of a program was used to provide a valida-
tion of negation as failure rule, a rule for augmenting SLD-resolution, resulting in
SLDNF-resolution. It is well-known that SLD-resolution is a particular refutation
procedure, but can only deal with positive literals (see [64] for details). For negative
literals, some additional mechanism is required. Negation as failure is such a one.
The basic idea is to dene a \proof" of a negative subgoal as nite failure to obtain
a proof of corresponding positive subgoal
5
. Such a way to deal with negation was
not novel. As it was pointed out by Clark in [25], it had already been used in both
PLANNER and PROLOG (see [25] and related citations there). Clark observed that
a negated fact inferred from a program by negation as failure can also be reached
through deduction by completing the original program. So he proposed to justify
the use of negation as failure by reducing the rule to a derived rule of rst-order
logic.
In [25], it is proved that for consistent completed programs, SLDNF is sound,
that is if all SLD derivations starting from p are nite and none of them produces
an SLD-refutation, then not p is a logical consequence of the completed program.
For an inconsistent completed program, the soundness is trivial. The completeness
of the SLDNF, as it is pointed in [25], does not hold in general since a query may be
a logical consequence of Comp(P), and at the same time neither succeed nor fail but
have an innite derivation tree. A limited form of completeness was proved in [25]
by imposing constraints on logic program and its queries. See also [64] for related
discussion about completeness of SLDNF.
It has been argued that neither program completion nor SLDNF-resolution is
satisfying. In comparison to the original program, the logical consequences of a
completed program do indeed include negative literals as well as positive literals.
But the program completion approach is completely based upon logical deduction.
5
This implies non-determinism when innite failure occurs.
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So it is not surprising to discover that it is still a very weak inference mechanism
for dealing with negative information. In addition, a completed program may be
either inconsistent or unintuitive. Moreover, SLDNF is also problematic. It does
not always terminate, and may run into innite looping. And the matching with
completion semantics, as we mentioned above, is not perfect.
We shall not involve SLDNF any more in our further discussion. Our interest is
mainly about the completion of a program. Various existing semantics are related
one way or another with completed programs. These connections will be pointed
out at suitable places later.
5.4 Fitting Semantics
The Fitting semantics [40] is taken as an important result in the program-completion
approach in [105]. We have seen in chapter 2 that classical logic is three-valued
from the deductive viewpoint. Since Clark's program completion semantics is based
upon logical deduction, it is then easy to see that this approach implicitly denes
a 3-valued interpretation
6
for a consistent completed program: truth value true
is assigned to those atom that are logical consequence of the completed program,
and truth value false to those atoms whose negations are logical consequences, and
(unknown) to all other atoms. Obviously, a 3-valued interpretation is equivalent to
a set of literals in a natural correspondence.
The 3-valued interpretations were made explicitly in Fitting's semantics [40].
Based upon a 3-valued constructive logic, it is shown in [40] that the completion
of every program has a unique minimum 3-valued Herbrand model, that is a set of
literals. Technically, the central point behind Fitting semantics is the introduction
of the following operator N
P
on sets of literals, which is used to generate negative
6
Given the fact that the truth of each literal is based on traditional 2-valued logic, a 3-valued
interpretation is also awkwardly called the 2-valued program completion interpretation in [105].
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facts:
Denition 5.4.1 N
P
(E) = fp 2 HB
P
: 8r 2 P(head(r) = p! 9l 2 body(r)l 2 E)g
Combining the operator N
P
with the operator T
P
dened in section 5.2, another
operator, denoted F
P
, on sets of literals can be dened as follows.
Denition 5.4.2 F
P
(E) = T
P
(E) [ not N
P
(E)
We shall call F
P
the Fitting operator. The operator T
P
is used to draw only positive
facts whereas the operator N
P
produces only negative facts. Combined together, the
operator F
P
can be used to conclude both negative and positive facts. It is an easy
exercise to show that F
P
is monotonic, and thus has a least xpoint lfp(F
P
), which
is also a 3-valued model of the completed program of P according to the following
theorem.
Theorem 5.4.1 (Fitting [40]) Given a logic program P. A 3-valued interpretation
E is a 3-valued model of the completed program of P if and only if E = F
P
(E).
Although the original denition of the Fitting semantics was carried out in a
3-valued logic, the use of a 3-valued logic is inessential. Instead of taking the least
xpoint lfp(F
P
) as a 3-valued model of the completion of a program P, and working
in a 3-valued logic, Fitting's semantics can be taken as extending the inference mech-
anism of classical logic for deriving negative information in 2-valued logic framework,
by complementing the operator T
P
with the operator N
P
. Such a view is no more
than to take a logic program as a set of inference rules, or using the terminology
from default logic [91], a set of defaults. And then the least xpoint lfp(F
P
) is used
to dene the extension associated with the default theory corresponding to the logic
program (see [16], and [67]).
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Some comments are in order. First of all, the inference based upon lfp(F
P
)
is non-monotonic. In particular, lfp(F
P
) extends the semantic rule M2 proof-
theoretically. For any extensional atom p, if p is not in the extensional database,
then the condition of N
P
will hold vacuously and thus p will be included in N
P
. So
not p in lfp(F
P
). Consider a simple example program Pwith following two rules
p :? not q:
r :? q:
Obviously, lfp(F
P
) = fnot q; p; not rg. But when P is augmented with q, we have
lfp(F
P[fqg
) = fq; r; not pg. So what is originally not true now becomes true when
more information is added. The example also illustrates that the non-monotonicity
applies not only to extensional atoms but intensional atoms as well, such as the
atom r in the present example. Moreover, what is originally true is aected too.
This is because of the use of the rule p : ?not q, by which p is infected with the
non-monotonicity of not q. We shall come back to this point later when we discuss
supportedness in the next chapter.
Secondly, the fact that the original denition of the Fitting semantics was carried
out in a 3-valued logic itself suggests that the inference mechanism of the Fitting
semantics is very weak since some atoms may have no truth value at all. As pointed
out by Bidoit in [15], the Fitting semantics does not generalise the xpoint semantics
for denite programs in the sense that what is not true in the xpoint semantics
may be undened in the Fitting semantics.
Thirdly, for nite logic programs, the closure ordinal of F
P
is nite. Otherwise,
the closure ordinal of F
P
may be beyond !; that is the computation of lfp(F
P
) may
go beyond ! because the operator F
P
is in general not continuous. A counterexample
claries the point.
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Example 5.4.1 Let p and q be two unary predicates, c a constant, and s a function
symbol. Let P be a logic program with the following three rules:
q(c) :? :
q(s(X)) :? q(X):
p(c) :? not q(X):
The Herbrand universe of PHU
P
= fs
0
(c); s
1
(c); s
2
(c); : : : ; s
n
(c); : : :g, where s
0
(c) is
for c, s
1
(c) for s(c), s
2
(c) for s(s(c)), and so on. Let P
0
be the instantiated program
of P relative to HU
P
. Then P
0
is not nite, and we have
F
P
0
" n = fq(s
m
(c)) : m 6 ng;
F
P
0
" ! = fq(s
m
(c)) : m < !g;
F
P
0
" ! + 1 = fnotp(c)g [ fq(s
m
(c)) : m < !g:
lfp(F
P
0
) = F
P
0
" ! + 1:
2
Last but not least, Kunen's work should be mentioned. In [62], Kunen describes a
variant, which does have at most ! iteration. The resulting 3-valued interpretation
is recursively enumerable but may not be a 3-valued model. What is signicant
is probably that Kunen's 3-valued interpretation characterises the 3-valued logical
consequences of the completed program. We emphasise the underlying two-valued
logic instead of 3-valued logic, so we shall not use Kunen's 3-valued interpretation
in the further discussion.
5.5 Closed World Assumption
The Closed World Assumption was introduced by Reiter in [90] in the the context of
deductive databases. As we mentioned earlier, the deductive approach to databases
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has to deal with negative information retrieval. In order to obtain a piece of negative
information, one straightforward way is to include various negative facts in addition
to positive ones in EDB. Unfortunately, this is not feasible since the number of
negative facts about a given domain generally far exceeds the number of positive
ones (see [90]). Instead, Reiter proposes to merely explicitly represent positive facts
of a database DB, and treat negative facts as implicitly present provided that their
positive counterparts are not provable from the database DB. This is the so-called
Closed World Assumption (CWA), or more preferably the Closed World Rule given
the form of its formulation [64]. It is a rule used to infer negative information from
a databases in proof-theoretic contexts.
Denition 5.5.1 Given a normal logic program P, the CWA states that one can infer
a negated atom not p from P if P 6` p:
CWA(P) = fnot p : P 6` pg
Note that, if a normal logic program P consists of a purely extensional database
EDB, that is P has an empty intensional database IDB and thus there is no de-
duction involved, the CWA is no more than a complement operation in a relational
database: P implicitly contains a negative fact provided its positive counterpart is
not explicitly present in P. For a general case, P with both EDB and IDB, a
positive fact not explicitly present in EDB may still be derived by rules in IDB, so
\not provable from P" in the CWA is crucial: a negative fact is taken as implicitly
present in P if its positive counterpart cannot be provable from P.
Another important point to note is that the CWA can lead to inconsistency.
For example, let P be a program with a single rule p :?not q. Then CWA(P) =
fnotp; notqg since we have both P 6` p and P 6` q. ButP
S
CWA(P) is not consistent.
Since the CWA is not consistent with all programs, the problem of consistency has
to be taken into account. This motivates the following denition.
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Denition 5.5.2 A logic program P is consistent with CWA if P
S
CWA(P) is con-
sistent.
A natural question is which programs are consistent with the CWA. Reiter has
shown that, if a logic program P is denite, then P is consistent with CWA. More
generally, it can be shown that various kinds of stratiable programs are consistent
with the CWA (see [1]).
Although the CWA can be applied to a large natural class of logic programs, such
as denite logic programs and stratiable programs, it can be argued that the CWA
is not satisfactory. There are many unstratiable programs. In fact, any programs
with a recursive application of negation is not stratiable since the stratication
condition prohibits such structure. A trivial example is P= fp! not q; q! not pg.
Instead of restricting logic programs to those consistent with the CWA, we can
restrict the CWA itself so that it is consistent for all programs. In [70], Minker
proposed a restriction of the CWA, called the Generalised Closed World Assumption
(GCWA), which can be applied to any normal logic program
7
. To understand the
GCWA, we need to know that the issues of logic program consistency with the
CWA can also be addressed from a semantic point of view. This was initiated by
van Emden (see [70] and its citations). He denes the notion of a \minimal model"
for a program as the intersection of all its models. If this minimal model is itself a
model of the program, then the program is consistent with the CWA. In [103] van
Emden and Kowalski show that denite programs have a minimal model and thus
are consistent with the CWA. However, the notion of minimal model is very strong
in the sense that, for non-denite logic programs, the minimal model may not be a
model and thus a non-denite logic program may not be consistent with the CWA.
In [70], Minker generalises the notion of minimal model, dening it with respect to
7
In [70] the GCWA is applied to both denite and indenite logic programs. Since we are
not going to discuss indenite logic programs in this thesis, we apply the GCWA to normal logic
programs.
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set inclusion instead of using the intersection of models.
Denition 5.5.3 Given a logic program, a model M of P is minimal if no smaller
subset M
0
of M is a model of P.
Denition 5.5.4 Given a normal program P, the GCWA states that not p may be
inferred from P if p is not in any minimal model of P:
GCWA(P ) = fnot p : for any minimal model M of P; p 62Mg
For any atom p, if it is not in any minimal model of P, then it is safe to assign
any truth value to the atom without any inconsistency. The GCWA chooses to
assign false to such atoms. As a result, the GCWA can be consistently applied to
any normal logic program. Although consistency is guaranteed, the price paid by
the GCWA is high. Indeed, it turns out that the GCWA is very restricted. Let us
consider an example from [105].
Example 5.5.1 Let P be the following program:
p(a) :? p(c);not p(b):
p(b) :? not p(a):
p(e) :? not p(d):
p(c):
p(d) :? q(a);not q(b):
p(d) :? q(b);not q(c):
q(a) :? p(d):
q(b) :? q(a):
It is not dicult to see that P has four minimal models:
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M
1
= fp(a); p(c); p(e)g
M
2
= fp(b); p(c); p(e)g
M
3
= fp(a); p(c); p(d); q(a); q(b)g
M
4
= fp(b); p(c); p(d); q(a); q(b)g
It can be seen that q(c) is not in any minimalmodel above. According to the GCWA,
q(c) is false. Obviously, p(c) is a logical consequence of P, so it is a common member
of all minimal models of P and is taken as true by the GCWA. However, the GCWA
is silent on all other atoms though it seems reasonable to treat fp(d); q(a); q(b)g
as false. So, though the GCWA can be consistently applied to all the programs,
its weak reasoning ability is hardly satisfactory. A more ne-grained mechanism is
needed for inferring negative information. 2
5.6 Well-founded Semantics
The WFS [105] can be seen as another approach to avoiding the inconsistency caused
by the application of the CWA to an arbitrary logic program. Instead of inferring
all the negated atoms from a given program according to the unprovability of their
positive counterparts, the WFS only accepts those negated atoms whose positive
counterparts satisfy a stricter and more specic condition than unprovability. Since
we shall use the WFS later, let us have a closer look at the denition of the WFS
to see how the WFS derives negative information.
The central notion of the WFS is that of unfounded sets, which nicely combines
together Fitting's approach to the derivation of negative literals and the notion of
closed sets (see [105] and citations there).
Denition 5.6.1 Given a program P, its associated Herbrand base HB
P
, and a set
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L of literals
8
, a set X  HB
P
is said to be an unfounded set of Pwith respect to L
if it satises :
X  ?
P;L
(X),
where ?
P;L
is dened by
?
P;L
(X) = fp 2 HB
P
:
8r 2 P(head(r)= p! (9q 2 body(r)q 2 L _ 9q 2 body(r)
+
q 2 X))g.
Informally, ?
P;L
(X) expresses all the atoms p satisfying one of the following condi-
tions:
(1) There is no rule r in P such that head(r) = p;
(2) The head of some rule r in P is p, and for each such rule,
(2.1) either some subgoal q of the body is false in L;
(2.2) or some positive subgoal of the body occurs in X.
The WFS uses unfounded sets to draw negative conclusions, inferring simulta-
neously all atoms in any unfounded set to be false. It is worth pointing out that
conditions (1) and (2.1) above are used by Fitting in his semantics [40] to draw neg-
ative conclusions. And condition (2.2) is used by Ross and Topor in [93] to dene
closed sets. The WFS integrates them together. Consequently, the WFS is able to
infer more negative information than either Fitting semantics or closed sets.
In order to capture all the atoms in every unfounded set of P with respect to
L, an operator U
P
(L) is introduced. It is the greatest unfounded set of P with
respect to L. Since the union of arbitrary unfounded sets is an unfounded set too,
the greatest unfounded set does exist and is equal to the union of all sets that are
unfounded with respect to P and L.
8
In [105], L is called an interpretation if it does not contain both an atom and its complement.
This is from the model-theoretic viewpoint. Since we shall emphasise the deductive viewpoint, we
use the general notion of set rather than interpretation.
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Denition 5.6.2 Given a logic program P, a set L of literals, U
P
(L) is dened as the
greatest set satisfying the condition:
X  ?
P;L
(X).
Some comments about U
P
(I) are in order. First of all, we note that the above
denition of U
P
(L) has the form of a coinduction rather than the form of an induction
(see [9]).
Secondly, note that the authors of [105] did not explicitly tell us how to obtain
U
P
(L) constructively. Subsequently, some equivalent constructions of well-founded
partial models were proposed. In [104], van Gelder dened the alternating xpoint
construction. In [16], Bidoit and Froidevaux used the notion of a potentially founded
set, the dual of the notion of unfounded sets. However, it is worth noting a con-
struction is in fact implicitly there in [105]. Since ?
P;L
is a monotonic operator on
the Herbrand base HB
P
and U
P
(L) is the greatest xpoint of ?
P;L
(see Lloyd [64],
p. 26), this can be constructed using the following well-known characterisation of
the greatest xpoint (see [64], pp. 27-28):
?
P;L
# 0 = HB
P
?
P;L
#  = ?
P;L
(?
P;L
# (? 1)); if  is a successor ordinal
?
P;L
#  =
\
f?
P;L
#  :  < g; if  is a limit ordinal
Generally speaking, the least ordinal  such that ?
P;I
#  = U
P
(I) can be beyond
! (see [64], p. 31). But for the cases in which programs are function-free and the
EDB is nite, the least ordinal is nite.
Finally, note that the main strength of an unfounded set, and thus the main
strength of the WFS, in comparison to Fitting semantics, lies its ability to deal with
circular atoms in a program P. This is owing to the use of both the condition (2.2)
above and the coinductive denition of U
P
(I). Then, what atoms are circular?
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Denition 5.6.3 Let p 
+
q if and only if p is the head of a rule in P and q is a
positive literal in the body of the same rule; and p 
 
q if and only if p is the head
of a rule in P and q is a negative literal in the body of the same rule.
A path beginning with p in P ending with q is a sequence hp; q
1
; : : : ; q
n
; qi such
that
p 

q
1


: : : 

q
n


p,
where 

is either 
+
or 
 
.
A circular atom is an atom p such that all the paths beginning with p in P lead
to itself positively:
p 
+
q
1

+
: : : 
+
q
n

+
p,
The following example about circuits is from [101], showing how circular atoms
may arise in real-life applications.
Example 5.6.1 Consider a circuit of an unusual sort of logic gates g(X;Y;Z), where
g(X;Y;Z) means that a gate has positive input X, negative input Y and positive
output Z. These inputs and outputs can be taken as terminals or wire nets. Let
t0(X) represent that input terminal X is externally set be 1 (\true"). Let t(X)
represent that input terminal X is \internally" set to be 1.
Given a gate g(X;Y;Z), the circuit value of Z is 1 if and only if X is 1 and Y is
0 (\false"). Then the following rules dene the operation of the gates:
t(Z) :? t0(Z):
t(Z) :? g(X;Y;Z); t(X); not t(Y ):
Suppose that the EDB consist of the following facts: t0(2), g(5; 1; 3), g(1; 2; 4),
g(3; 4; 5) which represents the following circuit
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3
2
1 5
4
t(2) :? t0(2):
t(3) :? g(5; 1; 3); t(5); not t(1):
t(4) :? g(1; 2; 4); t(1); not t(2):
t(5) :? g(3; 4; 5); t(3); not t(4):
It is easy to see that atoms t(3) and t(5) are circular. 2
As Barwise and Etchemendy pointed out in [9], when working with circular phe-
nomena (in this case nding out all circular atoms) it is the coinductive denition
that is more natural to use, suggesting the above denition of U
P
(I) and explain-
ing why the greatest xpoint of ?
P;I
is needed (see Barwise and Etchemendy [9],
pp. 53-54). In the same book, Barwise and Etchemendy gave an elegant informal
explanation about coinductive denition: \Instead of working from the bottom up
[since there is no bottom base when dealing with circular phenomena], asking which
objects are forced into the dened class, we work from the top down, asking which
objects are legitimately excluded. This feature guarantees that circular members ...
are not excluded." (see [9], pp. 62-63).
In order to dene the WFS, another operator is needed to decide what positive
conclusions can be drawn from P. The operator used in [105] is the same as the
immediate consequence operator T
P
except that it is dened on sets of literals rather
than sets of atoms. By abuse of notation, we still use T
P
to denote the operator:
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Denition 5.6.4 T
P
(L) = fp 2 HB
P
: 9r 2 P(head(r) = p ^ 8q2 body(r)q 2 L)g.
With the operators U
P
and T
P
available, we can now dene another operator
W
P
.
Denition 5.6.5 W
P
(L) = T
P
(L) [ not  U
P
(L)
The three operators U
P
; T
P
;W
P
are all monotonic on HB
P
[ not  HB
P
. There-
fore, there is a least xpoint lfp(W
P
). It is the least xpoint that is used to dene
the well-founded semantics of a logic program P in [105].
In [105], it is pointed out that T
P
treated positive and negative subgoals sym-
metrically in the sense that, in deciding whether a negative subgoal not q is true,
the presence of not q rather than the absence of q is required. The point can be
misleading.
9
We need to bear in mind that this symmetry is dierent from that
between positive and strong negative information. A piece of negative information
inferred through U
P
is still nonmonotonic whereas a piece of strong negative infor-
mation established through direct observation is monotonic. So it would have been
better to say we need to explicitly keep all negative information inferred through
U
P
in the process of computing lfp(W
P
).
In [105], the least xpoint lfp(W
P
) is called the well-founded partial model.
Because we adopt a deductive rather than a model-theoretic viewpoint, we shall
call it the well-founded extension (WFE) instead. An advantage with the deductive
viewpoint is that we can still use two-valued logic as our underlying logic. It is well-
known that the well-founded semantics is in general partial in the sense that some
atoms in a logic program may be neither true nor false. As a result, the well-founded
partial model of a logic program has to be viewed as a model in three-valued logic.
From the deductive viewpoint, however, we can still work in two-valued logic.
9
Note that in [1], p. 385, there is a similar misleading comment about the supercial symmetry
between positive and negative information.
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The WFS demonstrates many desirable features. It is dened for all logic pro-
grams. For any logic programP, there exists a unique well-founded partial extension,
dened as the least xpoint lfp(W
P
) ofW
P
. Using the characterisation of a least x-
point, the well-founded partial extension of a logic program can then be dened in a
constructive way although the construction might be a process of possibly transnite
iteration.
As we mentioned before, the WFS extends the Fitting semantics, inferring more
negative information and thus possibly more positive information than the Fitting
semantics. The WFS also naturally extends the semantics for a large class of logic
programs, including denite logic programs, stratied programs, and locally strati-
ed programs. (see [83] and [105]).
Despite its merits, it can be argued that the WFS is too \sceptical". The infer-
ence mechanism provided by WFS is still not strong enough. Indeed, the extension
given by the WFS is usually partial, leaving some atoms undened. For many pro-
grams it even gives the empty set as their intended meaning. Incompleteness itself is
not very problematic given that the information in a program is itself not complete.
So, it is understandable that we may still not be able to reach any conclusion about
some atoms even though we are allowed to use non-monotonic inference mechanism.
The problem with WFS is that, in many programs, it seems reasonable to expect
to derive some information but WFS is silent on them. The following example from
[105] illustrates the problem.
Example 5.6.2 Let P be the logic program with the following four rules:
a :? not b:
b :? not a:
p :? a:
p :? b:
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The program P has the empty set as its well-founded partial extension. But it is
reasonable to expect that p should hold since it is a logical consequence of P. This
example indicates that the WFS does not allow case-based reasoning. 2
There are many proposals for extending the WFS, such as the generalised well-
founded semantics GWFS [7], the well-founded-by-case-semantics WFS
C
[97], the
extended well-founded semantics WFS
E
[57], the strong well-founded semantics
WFS
S
[22], and the O-semantics [81]. The relationship between these semantic
theories for logic programming is also studied in [33] and [34].
5.7 Stable Semantics
The stable model semantics was introduced in Gelfond [46], further developed by
Gelfond and Lifschitz in [47], and also by Marek and Truszczynski in [66]. The
original stable model semantics is based on a two-valued framework. Subsequently,
various dierent but equivalent three-valued versions of stable model semantics were
proposed, including 3-stable models [85], partial stable models [95] and preferred ex-
tensions [37]. In this section, we only consider the two-valued stable model semantics
by Gelfond and Lifschitz [47] and its three-valued version by Przymusinski [85].
5.7.1 Two-valued Stable Semantics
Stable model semantics has its root in Moore's autoepistemic logic [74]. In [46],
Gelfond observed that rules of logic programs can be naturally translated into for-
mulas of autoepistemic logic. For example, the rule p : ?q; r can be expressed
as q ^ :Lr ! p in autoepistemic logic, where L is the belief operator of the logic.
Through this kind of translation, the declarative semantics of a logic program can
then be characterised in terms of expansions of autoepistemic theory associated with
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the program (see [46] and [66]). The basic idea is to dene a stable model of a logic
program P as one that is able to reproduce itself from P in a certain sense.
Alternatively, stable model semantics can also be dened without reference to
autoepistemic logic as it is shown by Gelfond and Lifschitz [47]. This is achieved by
using a dierent transformation, called Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation, based on
the same idea that a stable model of a logic program P is a set of atoms that is able
to reproduce itself from P (see the dening equation of stable model below). In the
following, our discussion will be based on this transformation.
Denition 5.7.1 Given a logic program P, and a set  of atoms in HB
P
. The
stability transformation of P with respect to , denoted by S
P;
, is the denite
logic program obtained from P by deleting:
(i) any rule that has a negative literal not q in its body with q 2 ;
(ii) all negative literals not q in the bodies of the remaining rules.
The transformation above makes use of the information from  only to decide
negative subgoals
10
in rules of P. If a negative notq occurs in a rule body and q 2 
then we eliminate the rule as it depends on an item of negative information when
 supplies the positive. If a negative not q occurs in a rule body and q =2  then
the negative subgoal is considered satised because failure to be in  commits to
falsehood.
For any set  of atoms, the transformed program S
P;
is a denite logic program,
so it has a unique minimal model [103], which coincides with the least xed point of
the immediate consequence operator T
P
[103]. Recall that the least xpoint lfp(T
P
)
of T
P
can be computed via the so-called ordinal powers of T
P
. The computation is
10
It is worth pointing out that a stable model could not be guaranteed to be a minimal Herbrand
model had we also made use of the information from  to decide positive subgoals in rules of P
though otherwise there seems no reason to prevent us from doing so.
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a process of successively adding information. We shall use this observation shortly
in our criticism of the stable model semantics.
A set  of atoms is a stable model of a logic program Pprovided it is the minimal
model of the stability transformation of P [47]:
Denition 5.7.2 Given a logic program P. A set  of atoms is called a stable model
of P if and only if  is the minimal model of S
P;
, that is  satises the following
stable equation:
lfp(T
S
P;
) = .
In the above stable equation,  represents an initial global decision as to what
is false (everything not in ). However, the process of computing the lfp of S
P;
consists in adding truths. This process of adding new positive information should
result at times in a reduction of the existing negative information, just as increase
in the size of S results in decrease in the size of R ? S in the relational algebra
model of negation. But the structure of the stable model semantics is such that
this reduction cannot occur. The negative facts are xed once and for all at the
outset. Despite the increase of information, what is not true cannot be revised. Yet
we aim to model an essentially nonmonotonic negation. This tension is, we suggest,
at the heart of the existence problem(s) and anomalies of the stable semantics. Let
us consider some examples by way of illustration.
Example 5.7.1 Consider a trivial but typical example program P
1
with the following
rules:
q :? not p:
p :? q:
It is not dicult to check that P
1
has no stable model. We need to consider the four
complete assignments to p and q to see this. In each case we start with an initial
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assignment (left column), compute the stability transformation for this assignment
(centre column), and then the least xed point of the transformed program (right
column) which represents the nal assignment. The initial assignment is a stable
model provided it is the same as the nal assignment. The table below shows that
no assignment satises this so that there is no (two-valued) stable model for this
program.
 Transform Fixpoint
q :? :
; p :? q: fp; qg
fpg p :? q: ;
q :? :
fqg p :? q: fp; qg
fp; qg p :? q: ;
Our point is not that none of these proposed models turn out to be stable. It
is that the computational process over the transformed program never manages to
generate the correct solution fpg so that stability or otherwise can be tested for
it. This we contend is inevitable because there is no element of revision within
the process, it is strictly monotonic and you cannot hope to adequately represent a
nonmonotonic negation with a strictly monotonic process.
We admit that we cannot prove this. Nevertheless, we shall show in the next
chapter that the introduction of an appropriate revising mechanism does enable us
to assign the proper meaning to the program P
1
(see also [111]). 2
Example 5.7.2 Consider the program P
2
with the following four rules, which is bor-
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rowed from [105]:
a :? not b:
b :? not a:
p :? not p:
p :? not b:
It is easy to see that the program P
1
2
with only the rst two rules has two stable
models: fa; notbg and fnota; bg. But when the third rule is added to P
1
2
, the resulting
program P
2
2
has no stable models at all. Such an eect is certainly undesirable since
the third rule is independent of the rst two in the sense that atoms p and a; b are
not related each other in any rule. Moreover, note that p :? not p logically implies
p, so it is reasonable to expect that P
2
2
should have fa; not b; pg and fnot a; b; pg as
its intended meaning.
As pointed out in [105], the fourth rule also has an anomalous eect on P
2
2
in the
stable semantics. Since p is already a logical consequence of P
2
2
, the addition of the
fourth rule to P
2
2
should not have any eect. Nevertheless, it stabilises one of two
minimal models of P
2
2
, giving us a unique stable model for the full program P
2
. 2
The second example shows a sort of oscillating behaviour, sometimes we have a
stable model, sometimes not, and there seems no motivation for it to be one rather
than the other. It is our belief that these anomalies arise because we are trying to
compute a non-monotonic negation via a process that does not allow the retraction
of previously assumed negative information in the light of new positive conclusions.
A non-monotonic negation such as is required for logic programs (at least in a
database context) should be computed by a non-monotonic, revision process. In the
next chapter, we shall propose a model of negation that owes much to the stable
semantics but allows, through a mechanism of consistency-recovery, for just this
withdrawal of previously assumed negative information. We shall show that the
example just given is not anomalous in this system.
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5.7.2 Three-valued Stable Semantics
In the last section, a stable model was represented as a set of ground atoms. An
atom is true of a model if it is in the model; otherwise, it is taken false by default.
So, the original denition of the stable models is in the two-valued framework.
In [83], a three-valued version of stable model semantics is introduced. Three-
valued stable semantics requires us to extend the basic notion of denite logic pro-
grams by introducing into the bodies of rules special atoms 0, 1/2, 1 to represent
truth-values false, unknown and true respectively, which gives us 3-denite logic
programs.
Given a 3-denite logic program, a least xpoint can be constructed by using a
variant of Fitting operator. The variant operator will not operate on the natural
topology but a dierent one of HB
P
[ not  HB
P
, which is dened as follows:
Denition 5.7.3 Let E
1
and E
2
be sets of literals. Dene an ordering  among a set
of literals by
E
1
 E
2
i E
+
1
 E
+
2
& E
 
1
 E
 
2
.
Equipped with the ordering , HB
P
[not HB
P
now has as the bottom member
not  HB instead of the usual empty set ;. The variant Fitting operator F
P
will
operate on HB
P
[ not  HB
P
with the ordering . We shall use F
P;
to denote the
variant operator:
Denition 5.7.4 F
P;
(L) = T
P;
(L) [ not N
P;
(L)
where
T
P;
(L) = fp 2 HB
P
: 9r 2 P(head(r) = p ^ 8q2 body(r)(q 2 L _ q = 1))g
N
P;
(L) = fp 2 HB
P
: 8r 2 P(head(r) = p! 9q 2 body(r)(q 2 L _ q = 0))g
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For any 3-denite logic programs, it is easy to prove that F
P;
is monotonic with
respect to , and thus has a least xpoint, computed iteratively:
lfp(F
P;
) =
S
F
P;
" 
where
F
P;
" 0 = not  HB
P
F
P;
"  = F
P;
(F
P;
" (? 1)); if  is a successor ordinal
F
P;
"  =
S
f(F
P;
" )
+
:  < g [
T
f(F
P;
" )
 
:  < g;
if  is a limit ordinal
As in the two-valued case we now proceed by transforming a logic program into
a denite program. But this time the transformation is with respect to a set of
literals rather than a set of atoms, and the transformed program is a 3-denite logic
program, that is to allow the inclusion of the truth-values 0, 1/2, 1 in the bodies of
the rules of the transformed program.
Denition 5.7.5 Given a logic program P, and a set L of literals inHB
P
[notHB
P
.
The stability transformation of P with respect to L, denoted by S
P;L
11
, is the 3-
denite logic program obtained from P by replacing:
(i) any negative subgoal not q in a rule such that q 2 L
 
with truth value 1;
(ii) any negative subgoal not q in a rule such that q 2 L
+
with truth value 0;
(iii) any negative subgoal not q in a rule such that q 62 L
+
and q 62 L
 
with
1/2.
Denition 5.7.6 Given a normal logic program P. A set L of literals is called a
3-valued stable model of P if and only if L satises the following stable equation:
11
We rely on context to distinguish which transformation we are refer to.
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lfp(F
S
P;L
;
) = L.
In the previous subsection, we have argued that the underlying denition of
stable models is to some extent inconsistent with the essential characteristics of
negation not used in logic programs. It is this kind of inconsistency that underlies
the existence problem(s) of the stable model semantics. It can be argued that our
criticism continues to apply to the three-valued version of the stable semantics,
indeed is perhaps stronger against the three-valued than the original two-valued
version.
Our general contention is that a fully satisfactory account of a non-monotonic
negation must allow the retraction of what was previously assumed false \by default"
in the light of newly discovered information. The 2-valued stable semantics does not
do this since the stable equation requires that the negative facts are eectively xed
as true for the duration of the computation. The same criticism applies to the
three-valued semantics.
Let us consider the example program P
1
in the last section again. This time,
however, let  = fnot pg, that is explicitly assume that p is false. Relative to , P
1
is now transformed into:
q :? 1:
p :? q:
Similarly three-valued stable semantics simply excludes  as a three-valued stable
model of P
1
instead of revising the initial assumption so as to reach the intended
conclusion that p is true.
Note that although this program does not have any two-valued stable model, it
does have a unique three-valued model. This is not accidental. In fact it has been
proved that each normal logic program has at least one 3-stable model (see [1]). It
seems that 3-valued stable model semantics solves the existence problem of 2-valued
stable semantics. However, it can be argued that the solution is not fully satisfying.
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Indeed, the unique three-valued stable model of P
1
is the empty set though it is
reasonable to expect that p is true. It seems that the non-existence property of
two-valued stable semantics is just converted to a truth-value gap of atoms in the
three-valued stable semantics. The three-valued stable semantics does not really
solve the non-existence problem of two-valued stable semantics.
The program P
2
considered in the previous subsection can also be used to show
that three-valued stable semantics has similar anomalies. Moreover, the introduction
of a third truth-value 1/2 is not without cost. There are at least two problems,
showing that the three-valued stable semantics can be worse than the original one.
One is illustrated by the following example.
Example 5.7.3 Let P
3
be the logic program with the following two rules:
a :? not b:
b :? not a:
p :? a:
p :? b:
The program P
3
has fp; ag and fp; bg as its stable models. Note that p is a logical
consequence of P
3
, so it is reasonable to expect that p should be always true. In
the three-valued stable semantics, unfortunately, P
3
has as its three-valued stable
models the empty set ; in addition to fp; a; not bg and fp; b; not ag. 2
The other problem concerns the transformation of a logic program relative to a
set of literals. In the three-valued semantics the atoms q such that neither q nor
not q are in  are taken to be \unknown" and are replaced by the value 1/2. The
three-valued immediate consequence operator allows us to infer both positive and
negative information. Thus it should allow us to infer q or not q on occasions even
when q was initially unknown. That notq could well occur in the body of a rule, but
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even though q or not q is subsequently established the rule may not be used because
it has been "frozen" with replacing not q by a constant 1/2 which, of course, no
amount of reasoning can ever establish or refute. It is even less appropriate to x
what is \unknown" at the outset of a computation than it is to x what is \false by
default". Also to x q as unknown at the outset and then infer q or notq subsequently
is almost like assigning an atom incompatible truth-values.
Chapter 6
Quasi-stable Semantics
In the last chapter we have reviewed some of main semantic theories proposed in
both the logic programming community and the deductive database community. In
particular, we have shown that the two dominant semantic theories, the well-founded
semantics and the stable model semantics, are not fully satisfying. In this chapter,
we describe a new semantics for logic programs which we term the \quasi-stable
semantics"
1
given its close relationship with the stable model semantics. We shall
show that our new semantics maintains the desired features of both the well-founded
semantics and the stable model semantics while overcoming their shortcomings.
Our general contention is that a non-monotonic negation such as is required for
logic programs should be computed by a non-monotonic revision process. Only a
process that allows one to withdraw by revising provisionally held negative infor-
mation can hope to be adequate to model a non-monotonic negation. Motivated
by this, we propose a model of negation that owes much to the stable semantics
but allows, through a mechanism of consistency-recovery, for just this withdrawal
of previously assumed negative information.
In the following, we shall rst give an informal introduction to the quasi-stable
1
The work on quasi-stable semantics have been previously reported in [111].
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semantics, followed by its formal denition, and then prove some main results about
the semantics to show the relationship among the quasi-stable semantics, the well-
founded semantics and the stable model semantics. In the Example section, we
consider some example programs from the literature to show how the quasi-stable
semantics has overcome the shortcomings of the well-founded semantics and the
stable model semantics. In the Discussion section, we argue why the so-called sup-
portedness property cannot be justied though it has been taken as a indispensable
feature of a proper semantics for logic programs in the logic programming commu-
nity. Finally, we discuss some related work on the extensions of the WFS and the
stable model semantics.
6.1 The Quasi-stable Semantics
6.1.1 Informal description of the Quasi-stable semantics
The basic idea behind the quasi-stable semantics is extremely simple. Essentially
it is to iteratively extend the WFE using hypothetical reasoning. We may roughly
formulate the quasi-stable semantics as follows:
Quasi-stable Semantics = WFE + hypothetical reasoning.
Given a logic program P, we rst of all compute its WFE. Note that, by doing this,
we are using both deductive and non-monotonic reasoning based upon the operator
W
P
. When we nd the well-founded extension of P, we will not be able to infer any
more information using only the operators T
P
and U
P
. Then, it is the time to apply
hypothetical reasoning: choose an atom among the atoms undetermined so far, and
assume that it is false.
2
We emphasise the assumption consists of only a single
literal rather than a set of literals. As soon as an assumption is made, it is natural
2
Note that we are implicitly using a variant of the closed world assumption [90].
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to continue reasoning using W
P
. Unfortunately, things are not so straightforward.
To begin with, we need to understand a problem that exists when we continue
reasoning with W
P
. The problem is that, although the unique well-founded exten-
sion is consistent, any further derivation based upon W
P
may contain contradictions
when an assumption is made. Further, it would not be clear whether it is the as-
sumption or the non-monotonic reasoning based upon U
P
that is causing the trouble.
Let us consider the logic program P with the following rules to see how the
ambiguity may actually come come up:
a :? not b:
b :? not c:
c :? not a:
It is easy to check that the well-founded extension is the empty set. Choose an
undened atom, say b, and assume not b. Using the assumption, it follows from
P that a holds, and thus not c by U
P
, and thus b by T
P
, a contradiction. The
contradiction may be caused either by the assumption notb or by the non-monotonic
reasoning. We cannot be sure which is causing the trouble.
Secondly, we need to make decision about how to deal with such ambiguity.
We choose to avoid the ambiguity. Our strategy is to make use of a more restricted
operator for non-monotonic reasoning instead of W
P
based on the notion of a simply
intensional atom which we introduced in Chapter 4 (see page 64). We note that, for
any simply intensional atom p, if all the rules of Pwhose head is p have a false body,
then p can be taken to be false without causing any contradiction. This motivates
the following denition of an operator N
P;L
for non-monotonically inferring negative
information, which is a variant of the negative component N
P
of Fitting operator
F
P
. For convenience of formulation, we shall use the notion of coveredness from [78].
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Denition 6.1.1 Given a logic program Pand a set L of literals. An atom p is covered
by L if p is in L
+
[ L
 
; otherwise it is uncovered by L.
Denition 6.1.2 Given a logic program P, a set L of literals, we dene two operators
N
P
and F
P
on HB [ not  HB as follows:
N
P;L
(E) = fp 2 HB
P
: p is simply intensional & not covered by L &
8r 2 P(head(r) = p! 9l 2 body(r)l 2 Eg
F
P;L
(E) = L [ T
P
(E) [ not N
P;L
(E)
where E  HB[not HB, and the operator T
P
is dened as in the previous section.
Theorem 6.1.1 The operator F
P;L
dened above is monotonic and thus there exists
a least xed point lfp(F
P;L
).
Note that, with the use of the operator N
P;L
, assumptions may be restricted to
the atoms in the body of a rule in P since any simply intensional atom can then be
dealt with by either T
P
or N
P;L
.
Generally, the least xed point lfp(F
P;L
) for any set L of literals may still contain
contradictions. This time, however, we may be sure it is the assumptions in L
that are to be blamed not the non-monotonic reasoning (see lemma 6.1.4), thus
eliminating the ambiguity.
With the ambiguity removed, the next step of the rening process is to note that
lfp(F
P;L
) may contain no explicit contradiction even though P is not consistent with
L. For example, consider the following program P
p :? a:
p :? b:
a :? not b:
b :? not a:
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Let L = fnot pg. Then we have lfp(F
P;L
) = fnot pg with no contradiction. But P
logically implies p and thus is not consistent with L. Note that the contradiction
comes up if we add either a or not a. In order to make this explicit, we introduce
the notion of conict-freeness and that of consistency with respect to P. We show
that conict-freeness is weaker than consistency in lemma 6.1.4.
Denition 6.1.3 Given a logic program P, and a set L of literals.
(i) L is said to be conict-free with respect to P if lfp(F
P;L
) is conict-free.
(ii) L is said to be consistent with respect to P if there is no atom p such that
P;L ` p and P; L ` not p.
where ` is the deductive relation of the full propositional logic.
Finally, with the restricted operator F
P;L
, the related notions of conict-freeness
and consistency, we are ready to nish the process of rening our basic idea by
informally reformulating our semantics as follows. Given a logic program P and
a sequence
3
H = hq
1
;    ; q
n 1
; q
n
i of assumptions, we set the least xed point
lfp(F
P;H
) = lfp(F
P;L
), where L is the set corresponding to the sequence H, and q
is either a negative literal with q as its atom or just the atom q.
Suppose that lfp(F
P;H
) contains both an atom p and not p. Since we know
that it is the assumptions in L that are to be blamed, then in order to remove
the conict, we have to change some assumptions. We choose to change the latest
assumption made, that is the last element q
n
in the sequenceH. We call the process
consistency-recovery for H, and proceed as follows.
Case I. The last element q
n
is a negative literal. In this case, we do not simply
withdraw the assumption. We assume the atom instead. In this way, the sequence
of assumptions may contain both negative and positive literals. But positive literals
3
We use sequence instead of set in order to emphasise the order of assumptions made. We shall
make the use of the order when we withdraw an assumption for the convenience of formulation.
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only appear where negative ones may not be assumed. So negative literals have
priority. When the negative assumption is replaced by the corresponding positive
assumption, we then do reasoning based upon F
P;H
0
, and do consistency-recovery
again if necessary, where H
0
= hq
1
;    ; q
n 1
; q
n
i.
Case II. The last element of H is a positive literal. Since the only way the
positive literal is assumed is that its negative literal cannot be, we conclude that the
subsequence H
0
= hq
1
;    ; q
n 1
i is not consistent even though it is conict-free.
We then drop the assumption and do consistency-recovery for H
0
.
When lfp(F
P;H
) is conict-free (either immediately or after consistency-
recovery), we make another assumption by choosing another uncovered body atom
and assuming it is false. Continue this process until no body atoms are left uncov-
ered in the Herbrand base HB
P
. As a result, we obtain a total extension, which we
call a quasi-stable extension.
6.1.2 Formal Denition of Quasi-stable Semantics
Although the informal formulation of the quasi-stable semantics is not dicult, it
turns out that its formal denition is somehow involved. This mainly is due to
the process of consistency-recovery, a process which we insist is indispensable for
modeling non-monotonic negation (see [113]).
Before we give the formal denition of quasi-stable extension, we need the fol-
lowing denition and a series of related results.
Denition 6.1.4 Given a logic program P, the well-founded extension WFE for P,
and some ordering O of the body atoms of P, we dene by induction the following
sequence of sets:
Let H
0
= ; and E
0
= WFE. Suppose E
n
and H
n
have been dened, and H
n
=
hq
1
;    ; q
i 1
; q
i
;    ; q
m
i. If all body atoms are covered by E
n
then E
n+1
= E
n
,
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H
n+1
= H
n
. Otherwise, let q be the rst uncovered body atom. Let H
n+1
and E
n+1
be dened by the following:
H
n+1
=
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
H
n
^
hnot qi if lfp(F
P;E
n
[fnot qg
) is conict-free;
H
n
^
hqi if lfp(F
P;E
n
[fnot qg
) is not conict-free
but lfp(F
P;E
n
[fqg
) is conict-free;
H
0
n
otherwise.
E
n+1
= lfp(F
P;E
0
[H
n+1
):
where
^
stands for the concatenation of two sequences, and H
0
n
= hq
1
;    ; q
i 1
; q
i
i
is derived from H
n
in the following way: i is the greatest index of H
n
such that
q
i
= not q
i
and hq
1
;    ; q
i 1
; q
i
i is conict-free.
For example, for the following program P
p :? a:
p :? b:
a :? not b:
b :? not a:
we have H
0
= ; and E
0
= ; since the well-founded extension WFE of P is ;. So,
body atoms a and b are not covered by E
0
. Take the body atom a, it is easy to see
that lfp(F
P;E
0
[fnot ag
) is conict-free, so we have H
1
= hnotai and E
1
= lfp(F
P;H
1
) =
hnota; b; pi. Now all the body atoms have already been covered by E
1
. By the above
denition, we thus have E
n+1
= E
n
, H
n+1
= H
n
.
Usually a semantics is given by the least xed point of an operator or equivalently,
as a union of sets. In our case this second option is not immediately available because
the sequence hE
n
i is not increasing and the union of all its members is anyway likely
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to be inconsistent with P. Instead we prove the existence of an increasing, consistent
subsequence hH
n
i
i of hH
n
i and thus the existence of an increasing, conict-free
subsequence hE
n
i
i of hE
n
i. We then use these two subsequences to dene the quasi-
stable extension of P with respect to an ordering O of body atoms. We must rst
show, however, that denition 6.1.4 is correct.
We need to show that E
n
and H
n
are properly dened for each n. For this we
need the consistency of E
0
with respect to P and some lemmas.
In [105], it is shown that WFE can be extended into a model of P by adding to
WFE all atoms uncovered by WFE. It then follows:
Lemma 6.1.1 (Van Gelder et al. [105]) Given a logic program P. Let WFE be
the well-founded partial extension of P, and  = HB
P
? (WFE
+
[WFE
 
). Then
WFE [  is consistent with respect to P. In particular, WFE is consistent with
respect to P.
The following lemma states the relationship between literals in lfp(F
P;L
) and
the consequences of P[ L.
Lemma 6.1.2 (i) If a literal l 2 lfp(F
P;L
) and l is not simply intensional then
P[ L ` l. (ii) If an atom p 2 lfp(F
P;L
), then P[ L ` p.
Proof. (i) By induction on  with  = 0 trivial. For a limit ordinal , the
lemma is also trivial. Suppose l 2 F
P;L
"  + 1. As l is not simply intensional,
the N
P;L
operator was not used. If l 2 L the result is trivial. Otherwise there is a
rule l : ? l
1
;    ; l
m
with fl
1
;    ; l
m
g  F
P;L
" . Using the induction hypothesis
P[ L ` l
i
for 1  i  m and hence P[ L ` l.
(ii) By lemma 5.2.1, lfp(F
P;L
) =
S
F
P;L
" . If p 2 lfp(F
P;L
), then there is a
ordinal  such that p 2 F
P;L
"  + 1 = L [ T
P
(F
P;L
" ) [ N
P;L
(F
P;L
" ). As p
is an atom, p cannot be in N
P;L
(F
P;L
" ). If p 2 L the result is trivial. Otherwise
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there is a rule p :? l
1
;    ; l
m
with fl
1
;    ; l
m
g  F
P;L
" . Since none of l
i
is simply
intensional, by lemma 6.1.2 (i), P[ L ` l
i
for 1 6 i 6 m and hence P[ L ` p. 2
The following is a technical lemma needed for the proof of theorem 6.1.3.
Lemma 6.1.3 Given a logic program P. Let L be a set of literals and l a body literal
such that L [ flg is consistent with respect to P. Let L
0
= lfp(F
P;L
) We have
lfp(F
P;L
)  lfp(F
P;L[flg
) (6:1)
lfp(F
P;L[flg
) = lfp(F
P;L
0
[flg
) (6:2)
Proof. (i) We prove (6.1) by proving the following:
F
P;L
"   F
P;L[flg
"  (6:3)
By induction on  with limit ordinals trivial. Obviously L  L [ flg. Using the
induction hypothesis and the monotonicity of T
P
, T
P
(F
P;L
" )  T
P
(F
P;L[flg
" ).
Since any simply intensional atom p uncovered by L is also uncovered by L [ flg,
we have N
P;L
(F
P;L
" )  N
P;L[flg
(F
P;L[flg
" ) by the induction hypothesis. Thus
F
P;L
" + 1  F
P;L[flg
"  + 1.
(ii) In order to prove (6.2), we rst prove lfp(F
P;L[flg
)  lfp(F
P;L
0
[flg
). For this
we prove by induction the following:
F
P;L[flg
"   F
P;L
0
[flg
"  (6:4)
For limit ordinals, (6.4) holds trivially. Since L  lfp(F
P;L
), L [ flg  L
0
[ flg. By
the induction hypothesis and monotonicity of T
P
, T
P
(F
P;L[flg
" )  T
P
(F
P;L
0
[flg
"
). Now for any p 2 N
P;L[flg
(F
P;L[flg
" ), if notp 2 L
0
then notp 2 lfp(F
P;L
0
[flg
) "
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+1. Suppose not p 62 L
0
. p cannot be in L
0
either, otherwise p 2 L
0
= lfp(F
P;L
) 
lfp(F
P;L[flg
) and thus lfp(F
P;L[flg
) is not conict-free, contradicting the assumption
of L [ flg being consistent with respect to P. So for any p 2 N
P;L[flg
(F
P;L[flg
" ),
if not p 62 L
0
, then p is not covered by L
0
[ flg and thus p 2 N
P;L
0
[flg
)(F
P;L
0
[flg
" )
by the induction hypothesis. Thus, (6.4) holds for + 1.
In order to prove the converse of (6.2), we prove
F
P;L
0
[flg
"   lfp(F
P;L[flg
) (6:5)
Once again we prove (6.5) by induction on . Limit ordinals are trivial. By (6.1)
L
0
[ flg  lfp(F
P;L[flg
). Using the induction hypothesis and monotonicity of T
P
,
T
P
(F
P;L
0
[flg
" )  T
P
(lfp(F
P;L[flg
))  lfp(F
P;L[flg
). Since L  L
0
, any sim-
ply intensional atom uncovered by L
0
[ flg is also uncovered by L [ flg. Thus
not  N
P;L
0
[flg
(F
P;L
0
[flg
" )  not  N
P;L[flg
(lfp(F
P;L[flg
))  lfp(F
P;L[flg
) by the
induction hypothesis. It then follows that (6.5) holds for + 1. 2
The following lemma shows that the notion of being conict-free w.r.t. P is
weaker than that of consistency w.r.t. to P. Moreover, it also shows that whenever
a conict occurs in lfp(F
P;L
) then L is to be blamed.
Lemma 6.1.4 Given a logic program P. Let L be a set of literals If L is consistent
with respect to P, then L is conict-free with respect to P, that is lfp(F
P;L
) is conict-
free.
Proof. lfp(F
P;L
) =
S
F
P;L
"  and we prove that each F
P;L
"  is conict free.
Suppose that F
P;L
"  is the least  which is not conict free. Clearly  > 0,
but  > 1 as well because F
P;L
" 1 = L [ T
P
(;) [ not N
P;L
(;) = L [ T
P
(;), P [ L
is assumed consistent and T
P
draws only logical consequences. Now F
P;L
"  =
L[ T
P
(F
P;L
" ? 1)[not N
P;L
(F
P;L
" ? 1). If this is not conict free it contains
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p and not p for some atom p. We consider three cases:
Case I. not p 2 L and p 2 T
P
(F
P;L
"  ? 1). There must be some rule p :
? l
1
;    ; l
m
2 P with fl
1
;    ; l
m
g  F
P;L
" ?1. As none of l
i
are simply intensional
we can apply lemma 6.1.2 (i) to conclude that P[ L ` l
i
for each 1 6 i 6 m. Thus
P[ L ` p contradicting our assumption that P[ L is consistent.
Case II. p 2 L and not p 2 not N
P;L
(F
P;L
" ? 1). But then L covers p and no
inference using N
P;L
can be made.
Case III. p 2 T
P
(F
P;L
" ? 1) and p 2 N
P;L
(F
P;L
" ? 1). Then, by the rst of
these, for some rule p :? l
1
;    ; l
m
2 P, we nd fl
1
;    ; l
m
g  F
P;L
" ? 1. But by
the second, some l
i
must be in F
P;L
"  ? 1 again contradicting the leastness of .
2
Theorem 6.1.2 Given a logic program P, H
n
and E
n
are properly dened for all n.
Proof. Suppose that H
n
and E
n
are dened, and there remain atoms uncovered by
E
n
. Let q be the rst uncovered atom. If not q or q can be added we are done.
Suppose then that neither can be added. Thus lfp(F
P;E
0
[H
n
[fqg
) is not conict-free.
There must therefore be some negative literal in H
n
. For otherwise H
n
[ fqg is a
set of atoms which by construction are not covered by E
0
, and hence E
0
[H
n
[ fqg
is consistent with respect to P by lemma 6.1.1. By lemma 6.1.4 it follows that
lfp(F
P;E
0
[H
n
[fqg
) is conict-free. Since there is some negative literal in H
n
there is a
least such and by the argument just given if that is replaced by its atom a conict-
free least xed point will result. Thus we may choose the greatest j such that H
n
includes hq
1
;    ; q
j 1
; not q
j
i and where lfp(F
P;E
0
[hq
1
;;q
j 1
;q
j
i
) is conict-free.
Then we set H
n+1
= hq
1
;    ; q
j 1
; q
j
i and E
n+1
= lfp(F
P;E
0
[H
n+1
). 2
Once we have seen that hE
n
i and hH
n
i are properly dened, the next task is to
show how to extract two canonical subsequences respectively from hE
n
i and hH
n
i
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to be used in dening the quasi-stable extension of P. We begin with two auxiliary
lemmas.
Lemma 6.1.5 Given a logic program P. Let E
0
= WFE, H = hq
1
;    ; q
m
i be a
sequence of assumptions, E = lfp(F
P;E
0
[H
). If E is conict-free and all the atoms
HB
P
are covered by E, then E is a Herbrand model of P and thus consistent with
respect to P.
Proof. Since E is conict-free and all the atoms in HB
P
are covered, E is a Herbrand
interpretation. By E = lfp(F
P;E
0
[H
), we know E is closed under T
P
. Then it follows
that every rule inPis satised by E and hence E is a Herbrand model of P. Obviously,
E as a set of literals is satised by E as a Herbrand model. So both P and E have E
as their model, and thus E is consistent with respect to P. 2
Lemma 6.1.6 Given a logic program P and an ordering O of the body atoms
of P. Let hH
n
i and hE
n
i be as in denition 6.1.4. Suppose that H
n
=
hq
1
;    ; q
i 1
; not q
i
; q
i+1
;    ; q
m
i is a sequence of assumptions, where i is the
greatest i such that H
0
n
= hq
1
;    ; q
i 1
; not q
i
i is not consistent with P [ E
0
but hq
1
;    ; q
i 1
; q
i
i is conict-free, then there is an n
1
> n such that H
n
1
=
hq
1
;    ; q
i 1
; q
i
i.
Proof. Since H
0
n
= hq
1
;    ; q
i 1
; not q
i
i is not consistent with P[ E
0
, there must
be some nite set P
fin
of rules of P such that H
0
n
is not consistent with P
fin
[ E
0
.
Let O
fin
be the smallest fragment of O containing all body atoms in P
fin
. We now
prove the lemma by induction on the number of atoms in O
fin
.
If kO
fin
k = 1, let q be the uncovered atom in O
fin
. Since H
0
n
is not consis-
tent with P
fin
[ E
0
and H
0
n
is a subsequence of H
n
, neither lfp(F
P
fin
;E
n
[fnot qg
) nor
lfp(F
P
fin
;E
n
[fqg
) can be conict-free by lemma 6.1.5. It then follows that neither
lfp(F
P;E
n
[fnot qg
) nor lfp(F
P;E
n
[fqg
) can be conict-free So by the denition of hH
n
i,
H
n+1
= hq
1
;    ; q
i 1
; q
i
i.
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Suppose that the lemma holds for kO
fin
k 6 k. We show that the lemma holds
for kO
fin
k = k + 1 too. Let q be the rst uncovered body atom in O
fin
. There are
three cases to consider.
Case I. H
n
^
hnot qi is conict-free. According to denition of hH
n
i, H
n+1
=
H
n
^
hnot qi. We further consider two sub-cases. (i) H
n
^
hqi is conict-free too.
Then we have H
0
n+1
= H
n+1
. By applying the induction hypothesis to H
n+1
, there
is an n
1
> n+1 such that H
n
1
= H
n
^
hqi. Now by applying the induction hypothesis
to H
n
1
and H
0
n
1
= H
0
n
, there is an n
2
> n
1
such that H
n
2
= hq
1
;    ; q
i 1
; q
i
i. (ii)
H
n
^
hqi is not conict-free. Then we have H
0
n+1
= H
n
. By applying the induction
hypothesis to H
n+1
, there is an n
1
> n+ 1 such that H
n
1
= hq
1
;    ; q
i 1
; q
i
i.
Case II. H
n
^
hnot qi is not conict-free but H
n
^
hqi is conict-free. Accord-
ing to the denition of hH
n
i, H
n+1
= H
n
^
hqi. Then we have H
0
n+1
= H
0
n
. By
applying the induction hypothesis to H
n+1
, there is an n
1
> n + 1 such that
H
n
1
= hq
1
;    ; q
i 1
; q
i
i.
Case III. Neither H
n
^
hnot qi nor H
n
^
hqi is conict-free. According to the de-
nition of hH
n
i, H
n+1
= hq
1
;    ; q
i 1
; q
i
i. 2
Theorem 6.1.3 (Canonical Subsequences) Given a logic program P, there exists
an increasing subsequence hE
n
i
i of the sequence hE
n
i and an increasing subsequence
hH
n
i
i of hH
n
i such that (i) E
0
[H
n
i
is consistent with respect to P, (ii) and thus E
n
i
is conict-free, and (iii) E
n
i
covers q
1
;    ; q
i
in the ordering O of body atoms.
Proof. By lemma 6.1.1 E
0
is consistent with P. Set n
0
= 0. Both (ii) and (iii)
are trivial.
Now suppose that n
i
be dened, Let q
j
be the rst body atom uncovered by E
n
i
.
By the induction hypothesis j > i + 1. (If there is no such atom, then E
n
i+1
= E
n
i
and the theorem holds.) We consider two cases.
Case I. P;E
0
[ H
n
i
` q
j
. Since E
0
[ H
n
i
is consistent with respect to P, it
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follows that E
0
[H
n
i
[ fq
j
g is also consistent with respect to P. By (6.2) of lemma
6.1.3 and lemma 6.1.4, lfp(F
P;E
n
i
[fq
j
g
) is conict-free. We further consider two
subcases. (i) lfp(F
P;E
0
[H
n
i
[fnot q
j
g
) is conict-free. Then H
n
i
+1
= H
n
i
^
hnot q
j
i. By
lemma 6.1.6, there exists an integer m > n
i
+ 1 such that H
m
= H
n
i
^
hq
j
i. Set
n
i+1
= m. (ii) lfp(F
P;E
0
[H
n
i
[fnot q
j
g
) is not conict-free. Then H
n
i
+1
= H
n
i
^
hq
j
i.
Set n
i+1
= n
i
+ 1. In either subcase, E
0
[H
n
i+1
is consistent with respect to P, and
E
n
i+1
= lfp(F
P;E
0
[H
n
i+1
) is conict-free.
By (6.1) of lemma 6.1.3, E
n
i
 E
n
i+1
. Since q
j
was the rst atom uncovered by
E
n
i
, E
n
i+1
covers q
1
;    ; q
j
. As j > i+ 1, E
n
i+1
covers q
1
;    ; q
i+1
.
Case II. P;E
0
[H
n
i
6` q
j
. Then E
0
[H
n
i
^
hnot q
j
i is consistent with P. By lemma
6.1.4, lfp(F
P;E
0
[H
n
i
^
hnot q
j
i
) is conict-free. By denition 6.1.4,H
n
i+1
= H
n
i
^
hnotq
j
i,
and E
n
i+1
= lfp(F
P;E
0
[H
n
i
^
hnot q
j
i
). So set n
i+1
= n
i
+ 1. E
0
[ H
n
i+1
is consistent
with respect to P, and E
n
i+1
is thus conict-free. And by the argument above E
n
i+1
covers q
1
;    ; q
i+1
. 2
Finally we may dene the quasi-stable extension (QSE) of a logic program P
with respect to an ordering O of the body atoms of P. Let hE
n
m
i and hH
n
m
i be the
canonical subsequences of P. Set H =
S
H
n
m
. Then QSE = lfp(F
P;E
0
[H
).
6.2 Properties of Quasi-stable Semantics
Theorem 6.1.3 shows that the QSE always exists for arbitrary logic programs and
is unique for a given ordering. We can also conclude:
Corollary 6.2.1 The QSE of a logic program P is a Herbrand model of P.
Proof. As each E
0
[H
n
i
is consistent with respect to P, so is E
0
[H. It then follows
that QSE is conict-free.
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By (6.1) of lemma 6.1.3, E
n
i
 QSE. By part (iii) of theorem 6.1.3, QSE covers
all the body atoms of P. We show QSE also covers each head atom.
If p is a simply intensional atom there is a rule p :? l
1
;    ; l
n
in P. If for some
such rule, each l
i
2
S
E
n
i
then p 2
S
E
n
i
by the T
P
operator. Otherwise, for each
such rule, some l
i
2
S
E
n
i
 QSE then not p 2 QSE by the N
P;L
operator. In
either case QSE covers all atoms of the Herbrand base of P. So QSE is a Herbrand
interpretation.
Since QSE is a xed point of F
P;E
0
[H
, QSE is closed under T
P
. That is to say
each rule of P is satised by QSE. Therefore, QSE is a Herbrand model of P. 2
Corollary 6.2.2 If an atom p is a logical consequence of P, then p is in any quasi-
stable extension of P.
Proof. This is immediate from corollary 6.2.1. 2
It is proved in [47] that any stable model of a logic program P is a minimal
Herbrand model of P. It can be shown that any quasi-stable extension also has the
same property. An auxiliary result is rst needed about the well-founded partial
extension of a logic program.
Lemma 6.2.1 Given a logic programP. Let E
0
be the well-founded partial extension
of P. For any atom p 2 E
0
, there is a rule r 2 P such that head(r) = p and body(r)
is satised by E
0
? fpg.
Proof. By lemma 5.2.1, E
0
=
S
W
P
" . For any atom p 2 E
0
, let  be the least
ordinal such that p 2 W
P
" . Since p 2 W
P
" , there must be a rule r 2 P such
that head(r) = p and body(r)  W
P
"  ? 1. By the leastness of , p 62 body(r). It
then follows that body(r) is satised by W
P
"  ? 1  E
0
? fpg. 2
Theorem 6.2.1 Any quasi-stable extension of P is a minimal Herbrand model of
P.
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Proof. Let QSE be a quasi-stable extension of P. We show that QSE is also a
minimal Herbrand model. We only have to show QSE is minimal. In order to do
so, we show that, for any atom p in QSE, (QSE?fpg)[fnot pg is not model of P.
We rst note that for any atom p 2 QSE, P;E
0
[H ` p by lemma 6.1.2 (ii). It
then follows that there exists a least n
i
such that P;E
0
[ H
n
i
` p. We show that
there exists an integer j such that
P; E
0
[H
n
j
` p and p 62 H
n
j
: (6:6)
If p 62 H
n
i
, we are done. If p 2 H
n
i
. By the choice of n
i
, it must be the case
that H
n
i
= H
n
i 1
^
hpi and p 62 H
n
i 1
. It follows from the denition of hH
n
i that
P;E
0
[H
n
i 1
` p. So we have shown that (6.6) holds.
Now let E
0
= (E ? fpg) [ fnot pg. If p 2 E
0
, by lemma 6.2.1, there is a rule
falsied by E
0
? fpg and hence by E
0
. So E
0
is not a model of P. If p 62 E
0
, then we
have E
0
is a Herbrand model of E
0
[H
n
j
but it is not a model of p, it follows from
(6.6), E
0
is not a model of P. 2
The reverse is not true. For a counterexample, see the program P
4
in the next
section.
In [105], it is shown that the well-founded semantics has a very close relationship
with the stable semantics. Specically, it is shown that well-founded total models
are unique stable models, and the well-founded partial model of a logic program P is
a subset of every stable model of P. This relationship holds between the well-founded
semantics and the quasi-stable semantics, as is immediate from the denition of the
quasi-stable semantics. We put the facts about the relationship in the following two
theorems:
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Theorem 6.2.2 If a logic program P has a well-founded total model, then the model
is the unique quasi-stable extension of P.
Theorem 6.2.3 The well-founded partial model of P is a subset of every quasi-stable
extension of P.
We have shown that the quasi-stable semantics has as close a relationship with
the well-founded semantics as the stable model semantics does. Furthermore, we
can show that there is a sense in which the quasi-stable semantics is a generalisation
of the stable model semantics.
We recall that, in its original form, a stable model is two-valued. Any stable
model is represented as a set of positive atoms, with missing atoms from the model
being taken as its negative literals. If we explicitly represent its negative literals, we
obtain a natural representation of a stable model as a set of literals. In the following,
for any stable model , we shall use 
1
for its representation as a set of literals.
That is 
1
=  [ not , where  = HB
P
?.
In denition 5.7.2, a stable model is dened by the stability transformation. But
it can also be characterised using a parametric form of the operator T
P
as follows.
Lemma 6.2.2 Given a logic program P, and a set  of atoms, let S
P;
be the sta-
bility transformation of P relative . Then  is a stable model i  = lfp(T
P;not
),
where T
P;not
(E)) = T
P
(E [ not )
Proof. By the denition of stable model,  is stable if and only if  is the minimal
model of S
P;
, which can be characterised as the least xed-point of T
S
P;
[103].
By lemma 5.2.1, we have the following:
lfp(T
S
P;
) =
[
T
S
P;
" 
lfp(T
P;not
) =
[
T
P;not
" 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So, in order to prove the lemma, we show that for each ,
T
S
P;
"  = T
P;not
"  (6:7)
For limit ordinals, (6.7) holds trivially. Suppose that (6.7) holds for . We show
that it also holds for  + 1. For any p 2 T
S
P;
"  + 1, there must exist a rule in
S
P;
such that head(r) = p and body(r)  T
S
P;
" . By the induction hypothesis,
we have body(r)  T
P;not
" . But for a rule r in S
P;
, there must exist a rule r
0
in P such that head(r
0
) = head(r) and body(r
0
)
+
= body(r) and body(r
0
)
 
 . It
then follows that p 2 T
P;not
" + 1. So we have T
S
P;
"   T
P;not
" .
Similarly, we can show T
P;not
" +1  T
S
P;
" +1. So, (6.7) holds for +1.
2
The following indicates a relationship between the least xed point of F
P;L
and
the representation of a stable model  as a set 
1
of literals.
Lemma 6.2.3 Given a logic program P. For any stable model 
1
of P, If L  
1
,
then lfp(F
P;L
)  
1
.
Proof. By lemma 5.2.1, lfp(F
P;L
) =
S
F
P;L
" . So, we have to show that for each
,
F
P;L
"   
1
(6:8)
For limit ordinals, (6.8) holds trivially. Suppose that (6.8) holds for . We need
to show (6.8) holds too for  + 1. For any literal l 2 F
P;L
"  + 1. We have to
consider three cases.
Case I. If l 2 L, then by the given assumption in the lemma we have l 2 
1
.
Case II. If l 2 T
P
(F
P;L
" ), then l is a positive literal p, and there exists a rule
r 2 P such that p = head(r) and body(r)  F
P;L
" . By the induction hypothesis,
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we have F
P;L
"   
1
. So we have that body(r)  
1
. By lemma 6.2.2, it then
follows that p 2   
1
.
Case III. If l 2 not N
P;L
(F
P;L
" ), let l = not p. Then for any rule r 2 Pwith
head(r) = p, either there exists an atom q
i
such that not q
i
2 F
P;L
"  or there
exists a literal not q
j
such that q
j
2 F
P;L
" . By the induction hypothesis, we have
either q
i
62  or q
j
2 . In either sub-case, we conclude by lemma 6.2.2 that the
rule will not contribute to the derivation of p from P relative to  [ not . So we
have l 2 not . 2
With the representation of a stable model as a set of literals and the above two
lemmas, we can now state the relationship between the stable model semantics and
the quasi-stable semantics.
Theorem 6.2.4 Given a logic program P. If  is a stable model of P, then 
1
is
a quasi-stable extension of P.
Proof. We rst construct a sequence hE
n
i of extensions and a sequence hH
n
i of
sequences as follows:
Let E
0
= WFE, and H
0
= ;, where WFE is the well-founded partial extension
of P. Suppose E
n
and H
n
have been dened. Let E
n+1
and H
n+1
be dened by the
following:
H
n+1
= H
n
^
hnot qi
E
n+1
= lfp(F
P;E
0
[H
n+1
):
where q is an atom in  that is not covered by E
n
.
According to a result about the relationship between stable models and WFS
partial models [105], we have E
0
 
1
. From the above construction of hH
n
i,
H
n
 
1
. It then follows that each E
0
[H
n
is consistent with respect to P, and thus
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E
n
is conict-free. So, H
n
and E
n
are in fact the canonical subsequences of P.
To nish the proof, we have to prove that the construction above will end up
with 
1
. We show that 
1
= QSE.
Since E
0
 
1
and H
n
 
1
, by lemma 6.2.3, QSE  
1
. We have shown
that QSE covers all the atoms of P in corollary 6.2.1, so it must be the case that
QSE = 
1
. 2
Note that the converse of theorem 6.2.4 is not necessarily true. We say that the
quasi-stable semantics generalises the stable model semantics. For a counterexample,
see the program P
3
in the next section.
6.3 Examples
In this section, we consider some example programs often used in literature.
Example 6.3.1 Let P be the logic program with the following four rules:
a :? not b:
b :? not a:
p :? a:
p :? b:
We have seen in Chapter 5 that the program Phas the empty set as its well-founded
extension though it is reasonable to expect that p should hold.
In order to nd its quasi-extensions, we start from the empty set ;, choose the
atom a from the uncovered body atoms a and b, and assume it false
4
; that is not a.
Using this assumption, it follows that b and p from P. So fnot a; b; pg is a quasi-
stable extension of P. Through backtracking, we get another quasi-stable extension
fa; not b; pg of P.
4
Recall that our assumptions can be restricted to body atoms.
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Note that this program also has fnot a; b; pg and fa; not b; pg as its stable mod-
els. This evidence can also be used to strengthen our claim that the quasi-stable
semantics is similar to the stable model semantics. 2
Example 6.3.2 Although the quasi-stable semantics may coincide with the stable
model semantics for some logic programs, the two semantics may behave quite dif-
ferently for other programs. The stable model semantics may have some unpleasant
features for certain programs. One of the problems associated with the stable seman-
tics, as we shown in Chapter 5, is the non-existence property. This seems inevitable
given the conceptual aw of the stable model semantics. An often cited example is
the program P
2
with the following single rule:
p :? not p:
The two-valued stable semantics is not dened for the program P
2
, that is to say P
2
has no stable model. The three-valued stable semantics is dened for P
2
. But the
unique three-valued stable extension of P
2
is the empty set. So the non-existence
property of two-valued stable semantics is converted to truth-gap of atoms in the
three-valued stable semantics. The three-valued stable semantics does not really
solve the non-existence problem of two-valued stable semantics.
In contrast, the quasi-stable semantics has fpg as its unique quasi-stable ex-
tension. Obviously not p cannot be assumed without inconsistency, one step of
consistency-recovery enables us to establish p, giving us the unique quasi-stable
extension fpg. 2
Example 6.3.3 Consider another program P
1
with the following rules:
q :? not p:
p :? q:
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We have shown in Chapter 5 that this program has no two-valued stable model
though it does have the empty set ; as its unique three-valued stable model. Given
the fact that p is a logical consequence of P
1
, it is reasonable to require that any
semantics should assign truth-value true to p.
In the quasi-stable semantics, P
1
has fpg or equivalently fp; not qg as its unique
quasi-stable extension. To see this, rst we compute the well-founded extension of
P
1
. It is the empty set ;. Then we make a negative assumption say not p from the
uncovered atoms p; q. It follows that we have q and thus p, a contradiction. By
revising the assumption, we get p. Since we cannot infer anything from P
1
using p,
we make another assumption not q. There is no further contradiction and there is
no atom left, so we conclude with fp; not qg as desired. Note if our rst assumption
is not q instead of not p, we still get the same result. 2
Example 6.3.4 Consider the program P
3
with the following four rules:
a :? not b:
b :? not a:
p :? not p:
p :? not b:
We have seen in Chapter 5 that the program P
1
3
with only the rst two rules has
two stable models: fa; not bg and fnot a; bg. Anomalously, when the third rule is
added to P
1
3
, the resulting program P
2
3
has no stable models at all. The addition of
the fourth rule to P
2
3
also has an anomalous eect; it stabilises one of two minimal
models of P
2
3
, giving us an unique stable model for the full program P
3
.
Given the fact that the third rule is independent of the rst two, and the fact
that that p :? not p logically implies p, it is reasonable to expect that P
2
3
should
have fa; not b; pg and fnot a; b; pg as its intended meaning.
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Since p is already a logical consequence of P
2
3
, the addition of the fourth rule to
P
2
3
, should not have any eect on its meaning; that is both P
2
3
and P
3
should have
the same meaning.
In the quasi-stable semantics, P
1
3
has two quasi-stable extensions: fa; not bg and
fnot a; bg, both P
2
3
and P
3
still have two quasi-stable extensions fa; not b; pg and
fnot a; b; pg as expected. 2
Example 6.3.5 Let P
4
be the logic program with the rule
p :? not q:
The minimalmodels of P
4
, represented as sets of literals, are fnotq; pg and fnotp; qg.
In the community of logic programming, it is fnot q; pg that is accepted as the
intended meaning of P
4
. The WFE of P
4
is fnot q; pg. So, in this case, the well-
founded semantics can capture the intended meaning of P
4
. Since all the atoms in
P
4
are covered by fnot q; pg, P
4
has fnot q; pg as its unique quasi-stable extension,
giving us a simple counterexample to the converse of theorem 6.2.1.
Recall that the inference mechanism behind the quasi-stable semantics is the
combination of non-monotonic and hypothetical reasoning as well as deductive one.
It is the use of non-monotonic reasoning that enables us to capture the intended
meaning of P
4
. Without appealing to non-monotonic reasoning, some extra criteria
such as admissibility [37] are needed in order to assign an appropriate meaning to
P
4
. 2
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6.4 Discussion
6.4.1 Supportedness
In the community of logic programming and deductive databases, the notion of a
supported model introduced in [5] has been claimed to be an important one. A set
L of literals is supported by a logic program if for any positive literal p 2 L, there
is rule r in P such that head(r) is p and body(r)  L.
In [15], supportedness is taken as a desirable property of the intended meaning
of a logic program although it is recognised that the property itself is not a sucient
condition for assigning an appropriate meaning to a logic program.
The quasi-stable semantics is not supported in the sense that a quasi-stable
extension is not necessarily supported. For instance, consider a program Pwith the
following rules:
q :? not p:
p :? q:
The program P has an unique quasi-stable extension fp; not qg. But the extension
is not supported since p is not any immediate consequence of P and fp; not qg, that
is there is no rule r in P such that head(r) is p and body(r)  L.
However, the fact that the quasi-stable semantics is not supported does not mean
that the quasi-stable semantics is not an adequate model of nonmonotonic negation.
Indeed, it can in fact be argued that the supportedness cannot be justied in the
context of nonmonotonic reasoning.
To begin with, we note that to insist that proper models of logic programs be
supported is to restrict inference forms whereby positive information can be inferred.
In particular, the requirement of supportedness implicitly prevents us from using any
possible non-monotonic reasoning to infer positive information. However, this seems
not consistent with the fact that non-monotonic reasoning is one of main features
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of logic programming.
We have said many times before that the essential characteristic of negation not
is nonmonotonic. A piece of negative information such as notq may be given up later
when more information is available. However, we should not neglect the fact that
positive information may also be infected with the non-monotonicity of negative
information, a fact which we noted in the discussion of the Fitting semantics before.
This fact is still true of the stable model semantics as the same example illustrates
as follows.
Let P
3
consist of following two rules
p :? not q:
r :? q:
P
3
has fp; not q; not rg as its unique stable model. When P
3
is augmented with q,
its stable model changes to fq; r; not pg. So what is originally not true now becomes
true when more information is added. Moreover, like that in the Fitting semantics,
what is originally true is also aected. Once again, this is because of the use of the
rule p : ?not q, by which p is infected with the non-monotonicity of not q.
Since positive information can be nonmonotonic just as negative information
even in the stable model semantics (which is supported), there seems no reason
to forbid us from nonmonotonically inferring a piece of positive information. In
other words, it would not be unreasonable for us to conclude p if the assumption
not p is not consistent. Recall that the main feature of the quasi-stable semantics is
the introduction of consistency-recovery mechanism, which in turn is based on the
Classical Reductio ad absurdum (RAA): p is inferred whenever not p cannot be con-
sistently assumed. The non-supportedness of the quasi-stable semantics in essential
is the consequence of RAA. Since the inference form of RAA is not unreasonable as
we just argued, there seems no reason to rule out non-supportedness.
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Moreover, there is another point to consider. Remember that one of the main
motivations for the use of nonmonotonic negation is that classical logic only provides
us with a monotonic mechanism for inferring negative information. And further the
non-persistent semantic rule M2 is not adequate in the context of logic programming.
A logic program can be regarded as a default theory to extend classical logic. As
such, it is natural to require that any adequate semantics for a logic program should
assign the truth-value true to those atoms which are logical consequences of the
program as we did in the quasi-stable semantics. Unfortunately, the supportedness
condition may prevent us from doing so. Hence we conclude that to require models
of logic programs to be supported is to violate but not extend classical logic, and
thus once again cannot be justied.
6.4.2 Inference Forms in the Quasi-stable Semantics
Another characteristic of our semantics is its use of both hypothetical and non-
monotonic reasoning to extend classical logic. The non-monotonic reasoning we use
is in a very specic form. It is based upon the operations used in the WFS [105]
and the Fitting semantics [40], that is the operator U
P
and a variant of the Fitting
operator F
P
.
Our use of hypothetical reasoning is reminiscent of Poole [82] and Dung [37]. In
[82], Poole applies hypothetical reasoning to extend classical logic for dealing with
non-monotonic reasoning. He argued that if one allows hypothetical reasoning, then
rst-order logic itself is adequate to handle non-monotonic reasoning.
In logic programming, there is a similar proposal based upon abduction. By
incorporating abducibles into the rules of a logic program, logic programming is
extended to allow abductive reasoning, resulting in abductive logic programming
[58]. In an abductive framework for logic programming, negative literals are in-
terpreted as abducible hypotheses that can be assumed to hold subject to certain
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integrity constraints. Based upon the abductive interpretation of negative literals,
an argumentation-theoretic framework for logic programming has been proposed in
[37]. Furthermore, in [19] it is claimed that the framework can be further abstracted
so as to provide an argumentation-theoretic approach to default reasoning in general.
However, the use of hypothetical reasoning in [82] and [37] is somewhat limited
in one sense. Deductive reasoning is carried out from the given theory augmented
with a set of assumptions. No non-monotonic reasoning is involved. Indeed, the
motivation for the use of hypothetical reasoning is to replace non-monotonic reason-
ing [82]. In the context of logic programming, as a result, additional criteria such
as admissibility [37] for choosing among sets of assumptions are needed in order
for the argumentation-theoretic framework to properly dene the semantics of logic
programming. The resulting semantics called preferred extension semantics in [37],
however, still has similar problems to the three-valued stable semantics (see the next
section).
In contrast, our use of hypothetical reasoning does not have the above restriction.
We shall use not only hypothetical but also non-monotonic reasoning in addition to
deductive reasoning. Consequently, we do not need to appeal to any extra criteria
such as admissibility for choosing among dierent sets of assumptions. We shall
show by example that this is because of the use of non-monotonic reasoning.
In addition, the use of hypothetical reasoning for us is also dierent. Assumptions
are made individually. That is to say, each time, we only consider a single assumption
rather than a set of assumptions as in [82], [37]. If an assumption results in a
contradiction, we may modify or withdraw it, depending on whether it is negative
one or positive one.
For us, deductive reasoning, non-monotonic reasoning and hypothetical reason-
ing are interleaved, subject to the constraint that assumptions be made only when
logical reasoning and non-monotonic reasoning can no longer infer any more infor-
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mation. In other words, we have implicitly used the following priority relation
5
among the dierent kinds of reasoning in the denition of quasi-stable semantics:
Logical Reasoning  Hypothetical Reasoning
Non-monotonic Reasoning  Hypothetical Reasoning
where the left hand side of the relation  has priority over the right hand side.
6.5 Related Work
In the study of semantics for logic programs, a whole spectrum of semantic theories
for logic programs with nonmonotonic negation have been proposed, ranging from
those that may infer very little information from a logic program (\sceptical") to
those that always infer a great deal (\credulous"). At the sceptical extreme there
is the well-founded semantics WFS [105] while at the credulous one is the stable
model semantics [47]. The WFS and the stable model semantics are usually taken
as two dominant ones. In this section, we briey discuss some related work on the
extensions of the WFS and the stable model semantics.
6.5.1 WFS Extensions
On the one hand, we have seen in the last chapter that the WFS has many desirable
features, and based on this we have chosen the WFS [105] as our starting point. On
the other hand, the WFS despite its merits has been criticised for being too \scep-
tical" since, for many programs, it gives the empty set as their intended meaning.
We have shown by example in Chapter 5 that the WFS may be silent on all atoms
5
For us, logical reasoning and non-monotonic reasoning are independent of each other in the
sense they cannot be applied to the same rule. So we shall not impose any priority relation on
them though it is reasonable to require that logical reasoning have priority over non-monotonic
reasoning.
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which are logical consequences of a logic program.
It is the sceptical characteristic of the WFS that motivates its various extensions
including the generalised well-founded semantics GWFS [7], the well-founded-by-
case-semantics WFS
C
[97], the extended well-founded semantics WFS
E
[57], the
strong well-founded semantics WFS
S
[22], and the O-semantics [81]. The relation-
ship between these semantic theories for logic programming is also studied in [33]
and [34]. Furthermore, an abstract axiomatic framework for dening semantics of
logic programs is introduced in [34]. In particular, a well-behaved semantics is pro-
posed. All these semantic theories have to some extent extended the WFS in one
way or another so that more information can be inferred from a logic program. A
common feature among these theories is that they are all deterministic.
The quasi-stable semantics proposed in this chapter gives another extension of
the WFS. Without exception, our extension is also motivated by the sceptical char-
acteristic of the WFS. However our approach to extending the WFS is dierent.
We use nonmonotonic and hypothetical reasoning in our approach, which is a main
feature of the quasi-stable semantics as we discussed before. Consequently it is not
surprising to see that the quasi-stable semantics diers from the semantical theories
mentioned above in that it is non-deterministic. We do not know what relationship
holds between the deterministic part of the quasi-stable semantics, that is the inter-
section of all quasi-stable extensions, and the existing deterministic extensions. It
is worth further investigation.
6.5.2 Stable Model Semantics and Its Variants
The other dominant semantic model for logic programs is the stable model seman-
tics [47]. Compared with the WFS, the stable model semantics is \credulous": it
derives much more information than the WFS though this is non-deterministic or
\disjunctive" in the sense that there may be several stable models for a given logic
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program. In the previous chapter, we have shown that a stable model is not dened
for all logic programs and the stable model semantics may give rise to anomalies
in some circumstances. These shortcomings, we have argued, arise because the un-
derlying denition of stable models is to some extent inconsistent with the essential
characteristics of negation not used in logic programs. It is this kind of tension that
underlies the existence problem(s) of the stable model semantics.
A modication of the stable model semantics is the three-valued stable seman-
tics [84]. In this three-valued version, all logic programs have at least one model.
The three-valued version seemingly solved the existence problem. But the solution
is rather supercial. Although each program has at least one three-valued stable
model, the model may leave all atoms undetermined for some programs, which is
not fully satisfying as it seems once again to say that nothing can be concluded.
The non-existence of the stable model semantics is now converted to truth gaps in
the three-valued version. It is our opinion that the problem is still there though in a
somewhat dierent form. More importantly, our criticism concerning the conceptual
aw of the stable model semantics continues to apply to the three-valued version.
There are also other variants of the stable model semantics, including partial
stable model semantics [95] and preferred extension semantics [37]. Although we
did not discuss these variants, we believe that our criticism is still true of them since
it has been proved that they are in fact equivalent to each other. For the equiva-
lence between partial models and three-valued models, see [96]; for the equivalence
between partial stable models and preferred extensions, see [59]. In [34] and [35]
two other variant of stable model semantics, STABLE' and STABLE
+
are proposed
respectively by combining the well-founded semantics and stable models in dierent
ways. Like the stable model semantics, neither STABLE' nor STABLE
+
has any
mechanism for revising provisionally assumed negative information when inconsis-
tency occurs. Moreover, both STABLE' and STABLE
+
are somewhat articial.
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It turned out that the quasi-stable semantics we described in this chapter has
a close relationship with the stable model semantics, as was shown by theorems
6.2.2, 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 in section 6.2. It is based on this close connection that we
called our semantics the quasi-stable extension semantics or simply the quasi-stable
semantics. In comparison to the stable model semantics, our semantics avoids its
diculties. This is because of the introduction of consistency-recovery mechanism
which allows us to revise tentatively-made negative assumptions if necessary in light
of newly discovered information. Such a mechanism we believe is indispensable to
model nonmonotonic negation.
6.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have introduced a new semantics, called the quasi-stable seman-
tics. It naturally extends the well-founded semantics using hypothetical reasoning.
We have shown that the quasi-stable semantics solves the non-existence problem,
and demonstrated by example that it also dissolves anomalies associated with the
stable semantics.
In summary, the quasi-stable semantics has the following features (i) every logic
program has at least one quasi-stable extension, (ii) a quasi-stable extension of a
logic program P is a total model of P, (iii) a quasi-stable extension of P is minimal
in the sense that no positive literal can be replaced in the extension by a negative
one without its ceasing to be a model of P, (iv) the well-founded partial model for
a logic program P is included in every quasi-stable extension of P, (v) every stable
model is a quasi-stable extension.
Chapter 7
Quasi-stable Semantics with
Strong Negation
The normal logic programs we studied in the last two chapters have only one kind
of negation: non-monotonic negation. In this chapter, we study the semantics of
logic programs with two dierent kinds of negation: non-monotonic negation and
strong negation. Our discussion shall be mainly based on the work in Gelfond and
Lifschitz [48], [49], Pearce and Wagner [80], Wagner [110], and our own work in
the last chapter. In the following, we shall rst of all review the main motivations
behind the two kinds of negation, and then give the denition of an extended logic
program, followed by a review of the answer set semantics and its modication under
the quasi-stable semantics. Then we consider some examples from the literature
to argue why the term classical negation in [48] and [49] is a misnomer and to
show how strong negation can be used in extended logic programs for knowledge
representation. Finally we briey discuss the relation between strong negation and
non-monotonic negation.
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7.1 Strong Negation in Logic Programs
Gelfond and Lifschitz in [48] and [49] point out that a ground query against a
normal logic program will always return a denite yes or no. However (as we noted
in Chapter 2) classical logic allows three possibilities: the query can be proved, it
can be refuted or neither is the case. The third possibility should be admitted into
logic programs: it should be possible to answer unknown to a ground query.
To achieve this they proposed to extend logic programs with what they called
\classical negation". This results in extended logic programs.
Although their criticism is true of denite logic programs, it is in general not
true of normal logic programs. Under the WFS, a ground query against a normal
logic program may be undetermined. Under the stable model semantics there is
indeterminacy because a logic program may have more than one stable model.
The problem with traditional logic programming, in our opinion, is not so much
whether it is able to deal with incomplete information but how incomplete informa-
tion is dealt with.
Normal logic programs provide negative information through one or another
non-monotonic inference mechanism. Negative instances of extensional predicates
are implicitly assumed through closed-world reasoning. Negative instances of in-
tensional predicates are obtained in a much more complicated way, depending on
what semantics is used. Under the quasi-stable semantics, non-monotonic inference
is the combination of the operator U
P
, the Fitting operator F
P;L
, and hypothetical
reasoning. Whatever semantics is used, information expressed by non-monotonic
negation is defeasible.
In Chapter 4, we briey argued that there are situations where non-monotonic
negation is not suitable. Instead, what is needed is a kind of negation which can be
used to express negative information in a monotonic (that is persistent) way. This
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consideration led us to the use of strong negation. The idea of using strong negation
in logic programming and deductive databases is not novel. It was proposed by
Pearce and Wagner in [79] and [80], and further developed by Wagner in [108], [109]
and [110]. Although [48] and [49] call the second negation \classical negation",
it is argued in [109], that this is in fact strong negation. See section 7.4 for the
argument and related example in [109]. We shall give further arguments to show
term \classical negation" is indeed a misnomer.
In contrast to non-monotonic negation, the strong negation of an atomic fact
is to be established directly just as positive atomic facts are. From the database
viewpoint, this requires the explicit inclusion of strong negative facts in extensional
databases. In other words, strong negation can be used to express explicit negative
information. One signicant implication is the persistence of strong negative infor-
mation; a piece of strong negative information will not be subject to change when
more information is added.
Another desirable characteristics of strong negation is its capacity for handling
incomplete information. We have pointed out in Chapter 3 that constructive logic
with strong negation can accommodate partiality. So it is not surprising to discover
that logic programs with strong negation inherit the same capability.
The introduction of strong negation does not give rise to any new computational
diculties. In comparison to classical negation, it has been proved that strong
negation is simpler to implement (see [109] and [12]).
7.2 Extended Logic Programs
Extended logic programs introduced in [48] and [49] have two kinds of negation:
non-monotonic negation and classical negation. We have pointed out in the last
section that term classical negation is a misnomer, so we shall dene an extended
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logic program as a logic program with non-monotonic negation and strong negation.
Denition 7.2.1 An extended logic program is a set of rules of the form
sl
0
:? sl
1
; sl
2
; : : : ; sl
m
; not sl
m+1
; : : : ; not sl
n
:
where n  m  0, and each sl
i
is an atom p or the strong negation of an atom  p.
In [49], a literal is an atom p or the strong negation
1
of the atom  p. Since we
have used the term literal either for an atom p or for its non-monotonic negation
not p, we instead use the term strong literal for an atom or its strong negation.
In the above denition of an extended logic program, strong negation is allowed
to appear both in the head and in the body of a rule. That is to say, an extended
logic program may have a strong negative conclusion as well as positive one. So,
positive and strong negative information in an extended logic program are treated
with equal importance. It is interesting to note that such an equal importance
follows directly from the symmetry of the logic of strong negation.
In contrast, positive and non-monotonic negative information are treated in dif-
ferent ways in normal logic programs. Non-monotonic negation may only appear
in the body of a rule, and the derivation of negative facts is dierent from that of
positive ones as we have seen in the last two chapters. Such dierence still exists in
extended logic programs.
Similarly, a deductive database hDB;Pi can also be extended by incorporating
strong negation into the extensional database DB and the intensional one P. An
extended extensional database consists of strong literals rather than just atoms, and
an extended intensional database is an extended logic program. Since an extended
extensional database may contain both positive facts and strong negative facts, we
require no atom and its strong negation to occur in it at the same time to preserve
consistency. Semantics for extended databases can be reduced to semantics for
1
They use the term classical negation instead of strong negation.
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extended logic programs, so we shall concentrate on only extended logic programs
in the following.
7.3 Semantics of Extended Programs
7.3.1 The Answer Set Semantics
In [49], the semantics of an extended program is dened by its answer sets, resulting
in the answer set semantics. Answer sets are similar to stable models except that
they consist of strong literals rather than atoms. The denition of answer sets in
[49] is done in two steps.
Firstly, consider extended programs without nonmonotonic negation not. So we
shall call them extended denite programs. Similar to denite logic programs, every
extended denite program Pmay be associated with a unique set of strong literals,
called the answer set of P. Informally speaking, an answer set consists of all strong
literals inferred from the rules of P. We have seen in Chapter 5 that there are
three dierent but equivalent approaches to assigning one set of atoms to a denite
program, but we consider here only the xpoint approach to formally dening the
answer set of extended denite programs. For other approaches, see [110].
Recall that, in order to dene the xpoint characterisation of denite programs,
the operator T
P
on HB
P
is used. For extended denite programs we need a similar
operator T

P
, which is dened on SL = HB
P
[  HB
P
instead of HB
P
as follows.
T

P
(X) = fsl
0
2 SL : 9r 2 P(head(r) = sl
0
^ 8sl 2 body(r)sl 2 X)g
It is straightforward to prove that the operator T

P
is monotonic and thus has
a least x-point lfp(T

P
). Although the least x-point lfp(T
P
) of an denite logic
program P contains only positive atoms, lfp(T

P
) of an extended denite logic pro-
gram, may contain both positive and strong negative literals, in particular, both q
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and  q as the following simple example shows.
Example 7.3.1 Let P consist of three rules
p :? :
q :? p:
 q :? p:
P has fp; q; qg as its least x-point lfp(T

P
), which contains both q and  q. 2
In classical logic, all strong literals (among other things) can be inferred from a
contradiction. Based on this fact, Gelfond and Lifschitz in [49] gave the following
notion of the answer set for extended denite logic programs.
Denition 7.3.1 For any extended denite program P, the answer set (P) of P is
dened as follows:
(P) =
8
>
<
>
:
lfp(T

P
) if lfp(T

P
) contains no pair of p and  p;
SL
P
otherwise.
where SL
P
is the set of all strong literals of P.
Before we dene answer sets of arbitrary extended programs, a remark on in-
consistency is in order. In the above denition, the way inconsistency is dealt with
is classical. This is not the only approach to inconsistency. The so-called paracon-
sistent approach which is contradiction-tolerant can be taken as it is done in [17].
For us, it seems wrong from the informational viewpoint to say that we can infer
everything from a contradiction. Rather, it would be more reasonable to take a con-
tradiction as a signal that something is wrong. In the present context, a contradic-
tion means that the extended program in question is problematic. A contradictory
program needs to be modied so as to remove the contradiction. So, we shall reject
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any inconsistent set as an answer set on the basis of the very inconsistency, and not
dene any answer set for a contradictory program as we shall see in our denition of
semantics for extended logic programs in the next subsection. There we shall also
show another problem associated with the above denition.
Now we move on to dene answer sets of arbitrary extended programs. This
is done in a similar way to the denition of a stable model through reducing an
extended program to a program without not. Given a set  of strong literals, let
P

the extended program obtained from P by deleting
(1) each rule that has a formula not sl in its body with sl 2 ;
(2) all literals of the form not sl in the body of the remaining rules.
Denition 7.3.2 (Gelfond and Lifschitz [49]) Given an extended logic program P. A
set  of strong literals is called an answer set of P if and only if  coincides the
answer set of P

, that is the following equation holds:
 = (P

).
It is easy to see that the two denitions of answer set coincide when applied to
a program P without not. Moreover, the second more general denition of answer
set is also a generalisation of the denition of stable model.
7.3.2 The Quasi-answer Set Semantics
In the last subsection, we reviewed the answer set semantics. Its denition is sim-
ilar to that of the stable model semantics. Alternatively, the answer set semantics
can be dened through rstly transforming an extended program into a normal
program, and then applying the stable semantics to the resulting transformed nor-
mal program. This transformation-based approach is in fact preferable in the sense
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that we need not be restricted to only the stable semantics. Indeed any other se-
mantics can be used on the transformed program. Naturally, we prefer to use the
quasi-stable semantics. We rst consider how to transform extended programs into
normal programs.
Let P be an extended program. For any predicate p(t
1
;    ; t
n
) occurring in P,
introduce a new predicate with the same arity, denoted sn p(t
1
;    ; t
n
), where sn
in sn p(t
1
;    ; t
n
) is for strong negation. For any strong literal sl, dene its positive
form, denoted sl
+
as follows:
sl
+
=
8
>
<
>
:
p(t
1
;    ; t
n
) if sl is a positive literal p(t
1
;    ; t
n
);
sn p(t
1
;    ; t
n
) if sl is a strong negative literal  p(t
1
;    ; t
n
).
Denition 7.3.3 (Gelfond and Lifschitz [49]) To transform an extended program P
into a normal program, denoted P
+
, is to replace any rule r in P of form
sl
0
:? sl
1
; sl
2
; : : : ; sl
m
; not sl
m+1
; : : : ; not sl
n
:
by the following rule r
+
sl
+
0
:? sl
+
1
; sl
+
2
; : : : ; sl
+
m
; not sl
+
m+1
; : : : ; not sl
+
n
:
The transformation
2
consists in replacing every occurrence of strong negation
 p(
~
t) by a new positive atom sn p(
~
t). After transforming an extended program P
into a normal program P
+
, we may apply any semantics to the resulting program P
+
in a straightforward way. We shall consider the stable semantics and quasi-stable
semantics respectively. For any set S  SL, let S
+
= fsl
+
: sl 2 Sg.
In [49], it is proved that for a set S of strong literals, if S contains no pair of p
and  p, then S is an answer set of P if and only if S
+
is a stable model of P
+
. So,
we may alternatively dene the notion of answer set as follows.
2
Based on the same idea, Wagner in [109] shows how to transform an arbitrary formula to a
formula without any occurrence of strong negation, and also to apply the transformation to transfer
an extended denite program into a denite logic program.
7. Quasi-stable Semantics with Strong Negation 144
Denition 7.3.4 For any set S  SL
P
of strong literals, if S contains no pair of p
and  p, and S
+
is a stable model of P
+
, then S is an answer set of P.
The consistency assumption is indispensable. Without it, the correspondence
between stable models and answer sets would no longer hold as the following example
from [49] shows.
Example 7.3.2
p :? not  p:
q :? p:
 q :? p:
This program has no answer sets whereas its transformation P
+
does have fp; q;
qg
+
as its unique stable model. 2
This example to some extent also suggests that the same consistency condition
might be added into the original denition of answer set given in the last section.
With this slight modication, we shall not only have a neat correspondence between
dierent denitions of answer sets but also remove the annoyance that everything
can be inferred from a contradiction. Motivated by these considerations, we oer
the following denition of quasi-answer sets.
Denition 7.3.5 For any set S  SL
P
of strong literals, if S
+
is a quasi-stable
extension of P
+
and contains no pair of sl and sn sl, then S is a quasi-answer set
of P.
With this denition available, it is straightforward to generalise various proper-
ties about the quasi-stable extensions we have proved in Chapter 6 to quasi-answer
sets (with appropriate modications). For example, we can show that if  is an
answer set of P and contains no pair of p and  p, then it is also a quasi-answer-
extension. One exception that we need to bear in mind is that an extended logic
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program may have no quasi-answer extension at all though any logic program does
always have at least one quasi-stable extension as our simple example above indi-
cates.
Another point worth mentioning is that, like positive atoms, the monotonicity
of strong negative literals may be compromised when strong negation and non-
monotonic negation are both used in an extended logic program. A piece of strong
negative information when inferred from an extended logic program rather than es-
tablished directly may be infected with non-monotonic negation and thus no longer
monotonic. If we want to maintain the monotonicity of a piece of strong nega-
tive information, then we should be careful not have it depend on non-monotonic
negation.
7.4 Why Not Classical Negation?
In this section, we have a closer look at why classical negation used in [48] and [49]
is in fact strong negation. The misnomer was pointed out in [109]. Nevertheless,
the term classical negation is still widely used in literature, such as [12], [20], etc.
This is due to the inuence of [48] and [49], which presumably in turn comes from
the dominant role of stable models in semantics of logic programs.
We rst of all consider the argument given by Wagner in [109]. His criticism
is based on the fact that classical rst-order logic is semantically two-valued. This
bivalence entails the principle of the excludedmiddle which, as shown by the example
in [109], is violated under the answer set semantics of extended logic programs given
by [49]. It follows that the second negation in [48] and [49] cannot be classical. Here
is the counterexample program used in [109].
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Example 7.4.1 Let P consist of the following two rules,
p :? q:
p :?  q
Had we interpreted in the above program as classical negation, it would have been
reasonable for p to be true relative to whatever semantics is used for the program.
But it is easy to see that the answer set of P is the empty set ;. One the other hand,
if when  is taken as strong negation, then P does have ; as its unique answer set.
2
Let us now analyse an example from [49] to further support the conclusion that
the use of the term \classical negation" is not appropriate.
Example 7.4.2 This example from [49] contains two programs P
1
and P
2
, where P
1
consists of
 p :? :
p :?  q:
and P
2
 p :? :
q :?  p:
The example was used in [49] to show that the answer set semantics is not \con-
trapositive" with respect to : ? and 
3
, in the sense that the semantics assigns
dierent meanings to the rules p : ?  q and q : ?  p. Indeed, according to
the answer set semantics, P
1
has a unique answer set f pg, and P
2
has a unique
answer set f p; qg. Since classical logic is contrapositive with classical implication
! and classical negation, they instead claim that non-contrapositiveness is because
that their semantics interprets program rules as inference rules rather than classical
conditionals.
3
In [49], ! and : are used instead of :  and .
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We argue that even if program rules are interpreted as inference rules, any proper
semantics should assign the same set to these two programs as long as in the frame-
work of classical rst-order logic. It is not controversial to assign the set f p; qg as
the meaning of P
2
. So we need to show why P
1
should also have the same set as its
meaning when classical negation is used.
Let r
0
denote the program rule p :?  q,  the classical implication symbol,
and `
r
0
the deductive relation of the classical propositional logic
4
augmented with
the inference rule r
0
. Recall that in propositional logic there is a famous theorem
called the Deduction Theorem relative to the deductive relation `. When propo-
sitional logic is extended with the inference rule r
0
, the Deduction Theorem still
holds relative to `
r
0
. With these notes at hand, the remaining task is straightfor-
ward. First of all, we have  q `
r
0
p using the inference rule r
0
. By the Deduction
Theorem, we then have `
r
0
 q  p. From which it follows that `
r
0
 p  q by the
contrapositiveness of rst-order logic. By the deductive theorem again, we thus have
 p `
r
0
q. That is to say, q is a logic consequence of P
1
, and it thus is reasonable to
assign f p; qg as the meaning of P
1
if classical negation is used.
On the other hand, if the negation in the programs P
1
and P
2
is interpreted as
strong negation, then we can no longer infer q fromP
1
, giving us a proper explanation
why these two programs have dierent meaning under the answer set semantics. 2
7.5 Knowledge Representation Using Strong
Negation
Although non-monotonic negation has proved to be quite useful in various domains
and application frameworks, it is not sucient in some situations, and its use in
4
Since we are only concerned of ground logic programs here, propositional logic is enough
without using classical rst-order logic.
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logic programs can lead to undesirable results. In this section, we give some more
examples from literature to show how how strong negation can be used to eliminate
undesirable results caused by the use of non-monotonic negation.
Example 7.5.1 This example is from [49]. As pointed out in [49], the example is
actually credited to John McCarthy. Consider the following regulation about cross-
ing railway tracks: A school bus may cross railway tracks under the condition that
there is no approaching train. How shall we express this regulation as a program
rule? The key point is to interpret the negation in the condition that there is no
approaching train. Had the negation been interpreted as non-monotonic negation
not, the regulation would be expressed as
cross(school bus; railway tracks) :? not approaching(train):
This would mean that a school bus may cross railway tracks whenever there is no evi-
dence that train is approaching. Although the exact meaning of no evidence depends
on specic semantics used, the point is that the truth of not approaching(train) is
defeasible. When more information is available, we may nd that there is in fact an
approaching train. In this case, we certainly do not want the bus to cross tracks.
So the above representation is not desirable.
Instead of non-monotonic negation not, a more satisfying representation can be
obtained with the use of strong negation :
cross(school bus; railway tracks) :?  approaching(train):
Now a school bus will not cross railway tracks unless it had the strong negative fact
 approching(train), which is established on the basis of direct observation and
thus will not be subject to any change later. 2
Example 7.5.2 This example from [49] is about the representation of terminal ver-
tices of a directed graph, showing how they can be dened by using an extended
7. Quasi-stable Semantics with Strong Negation 149
logic program:
 terminal(X) :? arc(X;Y ):
terminal(X) :? not  terminal(X):
2
Example 7.5.3 This example comes from [3].
runs :? not broken:
 runs :? :
broken :? flatT ire:
broken :? badBattery:
Given a car not running, we cannot conclude that the car is not broken without
inconsistency. So it must be broken, as might be caused by a at tire or bad
battery. 2
Example 7.5.4 This is also from [49] though with a slight modication. The example
illustrates how both non-monotonic negation and strong negation are used. Suppose
that an anonymous college uses the following regulations for awarding scholarships
to its students:
(1) Every student with the GPA of at least 3.8 is eligible.
(2) Every minority student with the GPA of at least 3.6 is eligible.
(3) No student with the GPA under 3.6 is eligible.
(4) The students whose eligibility is not determined by previous rules are in-
terviewed by the scholarship committee.
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The above regulations can be respectively encoded into the rst four rules in the
following extended program,
eligible(X) :? highGPA(X):
eligible(X) :? minority(X); fairGPA(X):
 eligible(X) :?  fairGPA(X):
interview(X) :? not eligible(X); not  eligible(X):
fairGPA(X) :? highGPA(X):
The last rule is added to capture the relation between predicates highGPA and
fairGPA, that is, a GPA of at least 3.8 is also a GPA of at least 3.6. Its inclu-
sion in the program can help to prevent us from putting  fairGPA(ann) and
highGPA(ann) into an extended database on the basis of consistency.
2
7.6 Relation between Strong Negation and Non-
monotonic Negation
In this section, we make some informal remarks about the relation between strong
negation and non-monotonic negation. We have seen that the main utility of strong
negation is to express monotonic negative information, whereas information ex-
pressed by non-monotonic negation is not monotonic and usually subject to change
when more information is available. Non-monotonic negation is weaker than strong
negation, that is to say, if it is true that  p, then it is also true that not p, but
the reverse is usually not true. Given this fact, we might be tempted to make this
relation explicit by expressing it as
not p :?  p: (7:1)
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But this is not appropriate for two reasons. One is that, in logic programming, not
is used only in the body but not in the head. The other is that we have nothing
to lose without (7.1), that is, (7.1) is in fact redundant. Let us consider a simple
example by the way of illustration.
Example 7.6.1 Let P consist of the following two rules.
 q :? :
p :? not q:
With (7.1), we can easily infer p from the program. However, it is not dicult to
see that we can still infer p even without using (7.1). 2
Both strong negation and non-monotonic negation can be applied to incomplete
predicates. But there is an important dierence between them. The logic of strong
negation is three-valued whereas the logic of non-monotonic negation is two-valued.
The three-valuedness of strong negation comes from the incompleteness of its as-
sociated predicates. However the two-valuedness of non-monotonic negation comes
from the non-monotonic characteristic of inference and thus has nothing to do with
its associated predicates.
There is another dierence worth mentioning between strong negation and non-
monotonic negation, which is in fact the consequence of the dierence above. Al-
though the answer set is identical to the stable model when the answer set semantics
is applied to a normal logic program, it was pointed out in [49] that there is a crucial
semantic dierence: answer sets and stable models gave dierent meaning to those
atoms not explicitly expressed in them. An atom not in a stable model is interpreted
as false in the framework of the stable model semantics whereas an atom not in an
answer set is interpreted as unknown. This is certainly an important observation.
However we need to be clear that the dierence between false and unknown is only
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true of predicates to which strong negation is applied. For all other predicates, we
should continue to use the strategy of representing negative information implicitly;
otherwise we may have an undesired result as illustrated by the following example.
Example 7.6.2 Let P consist of the following rules:
even(0) :? :
even(s(s(X))) :? even(X):
Where the predicate even(X) means that X is an even number, and s(X) denotes
the successor function of Peano arithmetic. Both the answer set and quasi-answer
set of P is
feven(0); even(s(s(0))); even(s(s(s(s(0)))));    ; g
Since strong negation is not applied to the predicate even, we use non-monotonic
negation with it by default. Thus the answer to the query even(s(0)) is false as
intended. Without using this default convention, we would have to conclude that
the answer to the query even(s(0)) was unknown, contrary to the intended meaning
of even.
In [49], it was proposed to avoid this problem by adding
 even(X) :? not even(X):
to the original program instead of using our default strategy. However, this seems
unnecessary. Moreover it may result in overuse of strong negation. In contrast, our
solution is simpler, more straightforward, and thus preferable. 2
Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, we have studied negation in logic and deductive databases. Among
other things, two kinds of negation are discussed in detail: strong negation and
nonmonotonic negation. We have built a rst-order logic system CF
0
with strong
negation, and proposed a novel model of nonmonotonic negation, called quasi-stable
semantics.
8.1.1 Strong Negation
Motivated by Barwise and Etchemendy's work on infon logic [10], we were led to
strong negation and argued that negation used in situation theory is in fact strong
negation rather than intuitionistic one. But the usual logics of strong negation, that
is constructive logics, have intuitionistic quantication which has a too strong dy-
namic satisfaction condition on universal quantiers. We have argued the condition
is not appropriate from the situation-theoretic viewpoint. Based on these argu-
ments, we have built a rst-order logic system with strong negation and bounded
static quantiers, called CF
0
, that owes much to Thomason's logic CF [98] but
153
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allows for expanding domains.
The logic system CF
0
is intended to be used as infon logic, the underlying logic
for situation theory. We admit that CF
0
needs to be extended in dierent ways in
order to be a fully-edged infon logic.
In addition to the foundational role for situation theory, CF
0
may have potential
applications in database theory. The utility of strong negation in the community
of logic programming and deductive databases is to express explicit monotonic neg-
ative information. Although logic involved in extended logic programs is only as
a fragment of constructive logics without implicational operator, our logic system
CF
0
does provide a general logical framework for further extensions. It may also be
used as logical basis for the study of deductive databases in a more general context
where more than one database may be involved at the same time.
8.1.2 Nonmonotonic Negation
The introduction of strong negation into logic programming and deductive databases
is to complement but not to replace a more common kind of negation, that is non-
monotonic negation. A whole spectrum of semantic theories for logic programs with
nonmonotonic negation have been proposed, ranging from those that may infer very
little information from a logic program (\sceptical") to those that infer a great deal
(\credulous"). In this thesis, we have reviewed and analysed just a few of var-
ious existing semantic theories, including the Fitting semantics, the well-founded
semantics, the stable model semantics.
The analysis has shown that these semantics are not fully satisfying. Never-
theless, they do provide us with profound insight towards understanding of non-
monotonic negation. It is based on these semantics and the analysis of the essential
characteristic of nonmonotonic negation that we have come up with the quasi-stable
semantics. An important observation is that, given the nonmonotonicity of nega-
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tion not, a model of negation not cannot be appropriate unless it has a mechanism
to allow the retraction of tentatively assumed negative information in the light of
newly discovered information. In other words, a non-monotonic negation such as is
required for logic programs (at least in a database context) should be computed by
a non-monotonic, revision process. Such a process has been introduced through a
mechanism of consistency-recovery in the quasi-stable semantics. As a result, the
quasi-stable semantics has avoided the conceptual aw suered by the stable model
semantics. In the quasi-stable semantics, the existence problem of the stable model
semantics is genuinely solved rather transformed into a dierent form as it is in the
three-valued version of stable semantics. We have also shown by example that the
quasi-stable semantics does not give rise to anomalies as the stable model semantics
does. We have proved that the quasi-stable semantics has many desirable features
similar to that of the stable model semantics. It is our belief that the quasi-stable
semantics provides us with an adequate model of nonmonotonic negation, and thus
enables us to assign an appropriate meaning to a logic program.
8.2 Further Work
8.2.1 Possible Extensions of CF
0
Although CF
0
is a full rst-order logic system, it is only fragmentary from the
situation theoretical viewpoint. For one thing, the components in a basic formula
R(a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
), or using the notation of infon logic, R; a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
; i are still
individuals whereas infon logic allows them to be any objects.
CF
0
can be extended in many ways. A natural extension is to replace basic
formulasR(a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
) ofCF
0
with basic infonsR; a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
; i, emphasising
that components a
1
; a
2
; :::; a
n
in basic infons can be any objects not just individuals.
Such structures lend themselves to the treatment of complex objects.
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Another possible extension is to incorporate an operator into CF
0
in order to
express non-persistence.
1
What is true in one situation is still true in a larger
one. However what is undetermined in a situation may become true or false when
more information is available. It is then natural to introduce an operator such
as `denitely' (see [75]) or, more directly, an `undetermined' operator U . Using
this operator U , the indeterminacy of both the assertion and the (strong) negation
of an infon  can be expressed by means of U and U   respectively. If an
agent, querying a situation s for a decision whether , fails to establish both  and
 , (s)he can then thereby establish U. In a larger situation, however, what is
originally absent in a smaller situation may become available, thus the same agent
may verify  so that U is rejected. So, U is not persistent. Similarly, if a query
to a situation s fails to refute , then it rejects the claim that  is refuted by s and
thereby establishes U  . For the same reason, U   is not persistent either. The
distinction between strong negation and U is similar to Barwise and Etchemendy's
distinction between negation and denial(see Barwise and Etchemendy [9]). However,
our approach is dierent from Barwise and Etchemendy's. Among other things, the
inclusion of U in our logic will lead us into nonmonotonic logic whereas Barwise
and Etchemendy claim that \Closing the class of propositions under conjunction,
disjunction, and denial would result in a notion of proposition whose logic is entirely
classical."(see p. 169 of [9]). Full details of such an extension remain to be done.
8.2.2 Issues Relevant to the Quasi-stable Semantics
8.2.2.1 Non-WFE-based Quasi-stable Semantics
In the current formulation of the Quasi-stable semantics, the computation of a quasi-
stable extension begins with the WFE, further extended using hypothetical reason-
1
Readers are invited to refer to Veltman's paper Defaults in Update Semantics [106]. There
he introduces operators like `presumably' to deal with non-persistence within the framework of
update semantics.
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ing and operator F
P;L
. As a result, the WFE is automatically contained in every
quasi-stable extension. We admit that the use of the WFE is only a shortcut and
we are liable to be accused of cheating, though we insist that the shortcut is not
unreasonable given that it has been universally accepted that any extension of a
logic program should contain at least the WFE. Alternatively, we might have not
started from the WFE. We would have just used hypothetical reasoning and the
operator F
P;L
, and then shown that theWFE is indeed included in each quasi-stable
extension. This approach would be conceptually more economical and thus may be
preferred.
8.2.2.2 Non-ground Quasi-stable Semantics
The study of the quasi-stable semantics in this thesis is restricted to ground logic
programs. A non-ground logic program is rst instantiated relative to its Herbrand
universe. Stable models, well-founded models, and quasi-stable extensions are rep-
resented as sets of ground atoms. In [53] the stable and well-founded semantics of
logic programs, and the answer set semantics of extended logic programs are gen-
eralised based on non-ground interpretations; that is sets of atoms rather than sets
of ground atoms are used to represent stable models, well-founded models and an-
swer sets, resulting in non-ground semantic theories for logic programs and extended
logic programs. A set of atoms usually provides a more compact representation of its
ground counterpart. Consequently, the non-ground stable, well-founded semantics,
and answer set semantics are more ecient than the corresponding ground versions.
The key technical notion used is that of an \anticover" of a set of substitutions.
Informally, an anticover of a set X of substitutions is described as \a set of substi-
tutions, all of which are incompatible (i.e. they share no common instance) with
the substitutions in X, and such that each substitution that is incompatible with
all members of X is an instance of some substitution in the anticover." [53]. It
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would be interesting to know whether the notion of anticover can also be extended
to non-ground quasi-stable extensions so as to to give a non-ground quasi-stable
semantic theory.
8.2.2.3 Implementation of the Quasi-stable Semantics
There have been various implementations of deductive databases. See [87] for a
survey. Implementations mentioned in [87] are mainly under the stratied, locally
stratied or well-founded semantics. Recently, there have been dierent eorts on
eective and ecient implementations for computation of stable models for logic
programs.
Based on mixed integer programming, three dierent algorithms for computing
stable models of logic programs have been proposed and implemented in a proto-
type compiler in [12]. It is reported in the same paper that these algorithms and
implementations have also been extended to handle logic programs with both non-
monotonic negation and strong negation
2
. One signicant point is that deduction
is performed at compile-time rather than run-time. As a result, run-time query
execution can be reduced to the traditional relational database operations and thus
can be performed relatively more eciently than otherwise.
In [78] a direct and ecient implementation of the well-founded and stable model
semantics has been proposed for range-restricted function-free logic programs. The
computation of stable models for ground logic programs makes use of bottom-up
backtracking search and a powerful pruning method based on a well-founded type
approximation for stable models. The implementation also contains an algorithm
for instantiating a logic program to its ground version. The instantiation algorithm
only produces a subset of ground instances of the program without losing any stable
models. The implementation can compute all stable models, decide whether a logic
2
In [12], the term classical negation is used instead of strong negation.
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program has a stable model, and decide whether a given formula is satised in some
or all of the stable models of a program.
The above two implementations are for ground logic programs. A logic program
has to be instantiated relative to its Herbrand universe before the computation of sta-
ble models for the program. In [24], a dierent implementation of the well-founded
and stable model semantics has been proposed for non-ground logic programs. The
computation of stable models, based on the so-called assume-and-reduce algorithm,
is still relative to ground logic programs. But the computation of well-founded se-
mantics is for non-ground logic programs. A prototype system called SLG [23] has
been developed for goal-oriented query evaluation under the well-founded semantics.
Given a query, SLG produces a residual program containing answers for all subgoals
which are relevant to the query. In [24] SLG is extended to accommodate the stable
model semantics. For a given query, SLG rst produces a residual program of the
query and then computes stable models relative to the residual program rather than
original programs. In this way, SLG provides integrated query evaluation under
both the well-founded semantics and stable model semantics. SLG itself, however,
is elective about which semantics to use, that is the user may choose either semantics
for nding answers to the query.
Given the close relation of the quasi-stable semantics with the stable model se-
mantics, we believe that these implementations with appropriate modication could
also be adapted to the quasi-stable semantics. Given the problems of the stable
model semantics, it is our opinion that a further eort is worthwhile to implement
the quasi-stable semantics.
References
[1] S. Abiteboul, R. Hull, and V. Vianu. Foundations of Databases. Addison-
Wesley, Reading, MA, 1995.
[2] S. Akama. Constructive predicate logic with strong negation and model theory.
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 29:18{27, 1988.
[3] J. J. Alferes, L. M. Pereira, and T. C. Przymusinski. Strong and explicit
negation in non-monotonic reasoning and logic programming. In J. J. Alferes,
L. M. Pereira, and E. Orlowska, editors, Logics in articial intelligence, Lec-
ture Notes in Articial Intelligence 1126, pages 143{163. Springer, 1996.
[4] A. Almukdad and D. Nelson. Constructible falsity and inexact predicates.
Journal of Symbolic Logic, 49:231{233, 1984.
[5] K. R. Apt, H. Blair, and A. Walker. Towards a theory of declarative knowl-
edge. In J. Minker, editor, Foundations of Deductive Databases and Logic
Programming, pages 89{148. Morgan-Kaufmann, San Mateo, Calif., 1988.
[6] K. R. Apt and M. H. van Emden. Contributions to the theory of logic program-
ming. Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery, 29(3):841{862,
1982.
[7] C. Baral, J. Lobo, and J. Minker. Generalized well-founded semantics for
logic programs. In M. E. Stickel, editor, The 10th International Conference
160
on Automated Deduction, Lecture Notes in Articial Intelligence 449, pages
102{116. Springer-Verlag, 1990.
[8] J. Barwise. The Situation in Logic. Number 17 in CSLI Lecture Notes. CSLI
Publications, Stanford, 1989.
[9] J. Barwise and J. Etchemendy. The Liar: An Essay on Truth and Circular
Propositions. Oxford University Press, New York, 1987.
[10] J. Barwise and J. Etchemendy. Information, infons, and inference. In K. Mukai
R. Cooper and J. Perry, editors, Situation Theory and Its Applications, volume
1, CSLI Lecture Notes 22, pages 33{78. CSLI Publications, Stanford, 1990.
[11] J. Barwise and J. Perry. Situations and Attitudes. MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA, 1983.
[12] C. Bell, A. Nerode, R. T. Ng, and V. S. Subrahmanian. Mixed integer pro-
grammingmethods for computing nonmonotonic deductive databases. Journal
of the Association for Computing Machinery, 41(6):1178{1215, 1994.
[13] J. L. Bell and M Machover. A Course in Mathematical Logic. North-Holland,
Amsterdam, 1977.
[14] E. Bencivenga. Free logics. In D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner, editors, Handbook
of Philosophical Logic, Vol III: Alternatives in Classical Logic, pages 373{426.
D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1986.
[15] N. Bidoit. Negation in rule-based database languages. Theoretical Computer
Science, 78:3{83, 1991.
[16] N. Bidoit and C. Froidevaux. Negation by default and unstratiable logic
programs. Theoretical Computer Science, 78:85{112, 1991.
161
[17] H. Blair and Subrahmanian V. S. Paraconsistent logic programming. Theo-
retical Computer Science, 68:135{154, 1989.
[18] S. Blamey. Partial logic. In D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner, editors, Handbook
of Philosophical Logic, Vol III: Alternatives in Classical Logic, pages 1{70. D.
Reidel, Dordrecht, 1986.
[19] A. Bondarenko, P. M. Dung, R. Kowalski, and F. Toni. An abstract,
argumentation-theoretic approach to default reasoning. Articial Intelligence,
93:63{101, 1997.
[20] G. Brewka and T. Eiter. Preferred answer sets for extended logic programs. In
A. G. Cohn, L. Schubert, and S. C. Shapiro, editors, Principles of Knowledge
Representation and Reasoning, pages 86{97. Morgan-Kaufmann, 1998.
[21] A. K. Chandra and D. Harel. Horn clause queries and generalizations. Journal,
Logic Programming, 2(1):1{15, 1985.
[22] J. Chen and S. Kundu. The strong well-founded semantics for logic programs.
In Z. W. Ras and M Zemankova, editors, The 6th International Symposium on
Methodologies for Intelligent Systems, Lecture Notes in Articial Intelligence
542, pages 490{499. Springer-Verlag, 1991.
[23] W. Chen, T. Swift, and D. S. Warren. Ecient top-down computation of
queries under the well-founded semantics. Journal of Logic Programming,
24(3):161{199, 1995.
[24] W. Chen and D. S. Warren. Computation of stable models and its integration
with logical query processing. IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data
Engineering, 8(5):742{757, 1996.
162
[25] K. L. Clark. Negation as failure. In H. Gallaire and J. Minker, editors, Logic
& Data Bases, pages 293{322. Plenum Press, New York, 1978.
[26] E. F. Codd. A relational model of data for large shared data banks. Commu-
nications of the Association for Computing Machinery, 13(6):377{387, 1970.
[27] E. F. Codd. A database sublanguage founded on the relational calculus. In
ACM SIGFIDET Workshop on Data Description, Access, and Control, pages
35{61, San Diego, California, 1971.
[28] E. F. Codd. Further normalization of the data base relational model. In
R Rustin, editor, Courant Computer Science Symposium 6: Data Base Sys-
tems, pages 33{64. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Clis, NJ, 1972.
[29] E. F. Codd. Relational completeness of database sublanguages. In R Rustin,
editor, Courant Computer Science Symposium 6: Data Base Systems, pages
65{98. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Clis, NJ, 1972.
[30] E. F. Codd. Recent investigations in relational data base systems. In
J. L. Rosenfeld, editor, Information Processing 74, pages 1017{1021. North-
Holland, Amsterdam, 1974.
[31] A. G. Cohn. Order-sorted logic. In S. C. Shapiro, editor-in-chief, Encyclopedia
of Articial Intelligence, Volume 1, 2rd ed., pages 864{866. John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., New York, 1992.
[32] K. Devlin. Logic and Information. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1991.
[33] J. Dix. A classication theory of semantics of normal logic programs: I. strong
properties. Fundamenta Informaticae, 12(3):227{255, 1995.
163
[34] J. Dix. A classication theory of semantics of normal logic programs: II. weak
properties. Fundamenta Informaticae, 12(3):257{288, 1995.
[35] J. Dix and M. Muller. The stable semantics and its variants: a comparison of
recent approaches. In L. Dreschler-Fischer and B. Nebel, editors, Proceedings
of the 18th German Annual Conference on Articial Intelligence (KI '94),
Lecture Notes in Articial Intelligence 861, pages 82{93. Springer-Verlag, 1994.
[36] M. Dummett. Elements of Intuitionism. Oxford Logic Guides. Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1977.
[37] P. M. Dung. An argumentation-theoretic foundation for logic programming.
Journal of Logic Programming, pages 151{177, 1995.
[38] T. Fernando. On the logic of situation theory. In K. Mukai R. Cooper and
J. Perry, editors, Situation Theory and Its Applications, volume 1, CSLI Lec-
ture Notes 22, pages 97{116. CSLI Publications, Stanford, 1990.
[39] F. B. Fitch. Symbolic Logic. Ronald Press Co., New York, 1952.
[40] M. Fitting. A Kripke-Kleene semantics for logic programs. Journal of Logic
Programming, 4:295{312, 1985.
[41] G. Frege. Begrisschrift (Chapter I). In P. Geach and M. Black, editors,
Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, 3rd ed., pages
1{20. Blackwell, Oxford, 1980.
[42] G. Frege. On sense and meaning. In P. Geach and M. Black, editors, Transla-
tions from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, 3rd ed., pages 56{78.
Blackwell, Oxford, 1980.
164
[43] D. M. Gabbay. What is negation in a system? In F. R. Drake and J. K.
Truss, editors, Logic Colloquium '86, pages 95{112. North-Holland, Amster-
dam, 1988.
[44] H. Gallaire and J. Minker (ed.). Logic & Data Bases. Plenum Press, New
York, 1978.
[45] J. W. Garson. Quantication in modal logic. In D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner,
editors, Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Vol. II: Extensions of Classical Logic,
pages 249{307. D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1985.
[46] M. Gelfond. On stratied autoepistemic theories. In Proceedings of the
6th National Conference on Articial Intelligence, pages 207{211. Morgan-
Kaufmann, 1987.
[47] M. Gelfond and L. Lifschitz. The stable model semantics for logic programs. In
R. A. Kowalski and K. A. Bowen, editors, Proceedings of the 5th International
Conference and Symposium on Logic Programming, pages 1070{1080. MIT
Press, 1988.
[48] M. Gelfond and L. Lifschitz. Logic programs with classical negation. In
D. Warren and P. Szeredi, editors, Proceedings of the 7th International Con-
ference on Logic Programming, pages 579{597. MIT Press, 1990.
[49] M. Gelfond and L. Lifschitz. Classical negation in logic programs and disjunc-
tive databases. New Generation Computing, pages 365{385, 1991.
[50] G. Gentzen. Investigation into logical deduction. In M. E. Szabo, editor, The
Collected Papers of Gerhard Gentzen, pages 68{131. North-Holland, Amster-
dam, 1969.
165
[51] K. Godel. The completeness of the axioms of the functional calculus of logic. In
J. van Heijenoort, editor, From Frege to Godel: a source book in mathematical
logic, 1879-1931, pages 582{591. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1967.
[52] K. Godel. On formally undecidable propositions of Principia mathematica and
related systems I. In J. van Heijenoort, editor, From Frege to Godel: a source
book in mathematical logic, 1879-1931, pages 596{616. Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, 1967.
[53] G. Gottlob, S. Marcus, A. Nerode, and V. S. Subrahmanian. Non-ground
stable and well-founded semantics. Available from LPNMR archives at
http://www.cs.engr.uky.edu/ lpnmr/papers.html.
[54] Y. Gurevich. Intuitionistic logic with strong negation. Studia Logica, 36:49{59,
1977.
[55] C. E. Hewitt. Planner: a language for proving theorems in robots. In First In-
ternational Joint Conference on Articial Intelligence, pages 295{301, Wash-
ington, 1969.
[56] A. Heyting. Intuitionism, An Introduction. North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1956.
[57] Y. Hu and L. Y. Yuan. Extended well-founded model semantics for general
logic programs. In K. Furukawa, editor, The 8th International Conference on
Logic Programming, pages 412{425. MIT Press, 1991.
[58] A. C. Kakas, R. A. Kowalski, and F. Toni. Abductive logic programming.
Journal of Logic and Computation, 2(6):719{770, 1992.
[59] T. Kakas and P. Mancarella. Preferred extensions are partial stable models.
Journal of Logic Programming, 14:341{348, 1992.
166
[60] P. G. Kolaitis. The expressive power of stratied programs. Information and
Computation, 90(1):50{66, 1991.
[61] R. Kowalski. Logic for data description. In H. Gallaire and J. Minker, editors,
Logic & Data Bases, pages 77{103. Plenum Press, New York, 1978.
[62] K. Kunen. Negation in logic programming. Journal of Logic Programming,
4:289{308, 1987.
[63] H. J. Levesque. Making believers out of computers. Articial Intelligence,
30:81{107, 1986.
[64] J. W. Lloyd. Foundations of Logic Programming. Springer-Verlag, Berlin,
1984.
[65] E. G. K. Lopez-Escobar. Refutability and elementary number theory. Inda-
gationes Mathematicae, 34:362{374, 1972.
[66] V. W. Marek and M. Truszczynski. Autoepistemic logic. Journal of the As-
sociation for Computing Machinery, 38(3):588{619, 1991.
[67] V. W. Marek and M. Truszczynski. Nonmonotonic Logic: Context-Dependent
Reasoning. Springer-Verlag, 1993.
[68] A. A. Markov. Constructive logic (in russian). Uspekhi Matematiceskih Nauk,
5:187{188, 1950.
[69] J. McCarthy. Mechanization of thought processes. In M. Minsky, editor, Se-
mantic Information Processing, pages 403{418. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
1968. Originally published in Proceedings of the Symposium of the National
Physics Laboratory, vol. 1, pages 77-84. London, 1958.
167
[70] J. Minker. On indenite databases and the closed world assumption. In
Proceedings of the 6th Conference on Automated Deduction, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science 138, pages 292{308. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1982.
[71] J. Minker. Perspectives in deductive databases. Journal of Logic Programming,
5(1):33{60, 1988.
[72] J. Minker. An overview of non-monotonic reasoning and logic programming.
Journal of Logic Programming, 17:95{126, 1993.
[73] J Minker and C. Ruiz. Mixing a default rule with stable negation. In Pro-
ceedings of the Fourth International Symposium on Articial Intelligence and
Mathematics, pages 122{125. Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 1996.
[74] R. Moore. Semantical considerations on nonmonotonic logic. Articial Intel-
ligence, 25(1):75{94, 1985.
[75] P. L. Mott. Intuitionistic logic with a `denitely' operator. Research Report
97.05, School of Computer Studies, University of Leeds, 1997.
[76] D. Nelson. Constructible falsity. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 14:16{26, 1949.
[77] J. M. Nicolas and H Gallaire. Data base: theory vs. interpretation. In H. Gal-
laire and J. Minker, editors, Logic and Data Bases, pages 33{54. PlenumPress,
New York, 1978.
[78] I. Niemela and P. Simons. Ecient implementation of the well-founded
and stable model semantics. Available from http://www.uni-koblenz.de/ag-
ki/DLP/#pubs, 1996.
[79] D. Pearce and G. Wagner. Reasoning with negative information I{strong
negation in logic programs. Acta Philosophica Fennica, 49:430{453, 1990.
168
[80] D. Pearce and G. Wagner. Logic programming with strong negation. In
P. Schroeder-Heister, editor, Proceedings of Workshop on Extensions of Logic
Programming, pages 311{326. Springer, Berlin, 1991.
[81] L. M. Pereira, J. J. Alferes, and J. N. Aparicio. Adding closed world assump-
tions to well-founded semantics. Theoretical Computer Science, 122:49{68,
1994.
[82] D. Poole. A logic framework for default reasoning. Articial Intelligence,
36:27{47, 1988.
[83] T. C. Przymusinski. On the declarative semantics of deductive databases and
logic programs. In J. Minker, editor, Foundations of Deductive Databases and
Logic Programming, pages 193{216. Morgan Kaufmann, 1988.
[84] T. C. Przymusinski. Extended stable semantics for normal and disjunctive
logic programs. In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Logic
Programming. MIT Press, 1990.
[85] T. C. Przymusinski. Well-founded semantics coincides with three-valued stable
semantics. Fundamenta Informaticae, XIII, 1990.
[86] W. V. Quine. From a Logical Point of View : 9 Logico-philosophical Essays.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1953.
[87] R. Ramakrishnan and J. D. Ullman. A survey of deductive database systems.
Journal of Logic Programming, 23(1):125{149, 1995.
[88] R. Ramakrishnan (ed.). Applications of Logic Databases. Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1994.
[89] H. Rasiowa. N -lattices and constructive logic with strong negation. Funda-
menta Mathematicae, 46:61{80, 1958.
169
[90] R. Reiter. On closed world databases. In H. Gallaire and J. Minker, editors,
Logic and Databases, pages 55{76. Plenum Press, New York, 1978.
[91] R. Reiter. A logic for default reasoning. Articial Intelligence, 13:81{132,
1980.
[92] R. Reiter. Towards a logical reconstruction of relational database theory.
In J. Brodie, M. L. Mylopoulos and J. W. Schmidt, editors, On Conceptual
Modelling, pages 191{238. Springer-Verlag, New York, 1984.
[93] K. A. Ross and R. W. Topor. Inferring negative information from disjunctive
databases. Journal Of Automated Reasoning, 4:397{424, 1988.
[94] R. Routley. Semantical analyses of propositional systems of Fitch and Nelson.
Studia Logica, 33:283{298, 1974.
[95] D. Sacca and C. Zaniolo. Stable models and non-determinism in logic program
with negation. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM PODS Symposium, pages 205{
218. ACM Press, New York, 1990.
[96] D. Sacca and C. Zaniolo. Partial models and three-valued models in logic
programs with negation. In A. Nerode, W. Marek, and V. S. Subramanian,
editors, Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Logic Programming
and Nonmonotonic Reasoning, pages 87{104. MIT Press, 1991.
[97] J. S. Schlipf. Formalizing a logic for logic programming. Annals of Mathematics
and Articial Intelligence, 5:279{302, 1992.
[98] R. H. Thomason. A semantical analysis of constructible falsity. Zeitschrift fur
Mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik, 15:247{257, 1969.
[99] A. S. Troelstra. Choice Sequences: A Chapter of Intuitionistic Mathematics.
Oxford Logic Guides. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977.
170
[100] A. S. Troelstra and D. van Dalen. Constructivism in Mathematics, volume 1.
North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1988.
[101] J. D. Ullman. Assigning an appropriate meaning to database logic with nega-
tion. In Computers as Our Better Partners, pages 216{225. World Scientic
Press, 1994.
[102] D. van Dalen. Intuitionistic logic. In D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner, editors,
Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Vol III: Alternatives in Classical Logic, pages
225{339. D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1986.
[103] M. H. van Emden and R. A. Kowalski. The semantics of predicate logic as a
programming language. JACM, 23(4):733{742, 1976.
[104] A. van Gelder. The alternating xpoint of logic programs with negation.
Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 47:185{221, 1993.
[105] A. van Gelder, K. A. Ross, and Schlipf J. S. The well-founded semantics for
general logic programs. Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery,
38(3):620{650, 1991.
[106] F. Veltman. Defaults in update semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic,
25:221{261, 1996.
[107] N. N. Vorob'ev. Constructive propositional calculus with strong negation (in
Russian). Doklady Akademii Nauk SSSR, 85:465{468, 1952.
[108] G. Wagner. A database needs two kinds of negation. In B. Thalheim, Demetro-
vics J., and H.-D. Gerhardt, editors, The 3rd Symposium on Mathematical
Fundamentals of Database and Knowledge Bases Systems MFDBS-91, pages
357{371. Springer, 1991.
171
[109] G. Wagner. Logic programming with strong negation and inexact predicates.
Journal of Logic and Computation, 1:835{859, 1991.
[110] G. Wagner. Vivid Logic: Knowledge-Based Reasoning with Two Kinds of
Negation. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1994.
[111] X. G. Wang and P. Mott. Quasi-stable semantics for logic programs. Research
Report 98.14, School of Computer Studies, University of Leeds, available from
http://csis1.leeds.ac.uk/pmottpub.htm, 1998.
[112] X. G. Wang and P. Mott. A variant of Thomason's rst-order logic CF based
on situations. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 39(1):74{93, 1998.
[113] X. G. Wang and P. Mott. A critical note on stable model semantics. Submitted
for publication, available from http://csis1.leeds.ac.uk/pmottpub.htm, 1999.
[114] H. Wansing. Logic of Information Structures. Number 681 in Lecture Notes
in Articial Intelligence. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1993.
172
